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Preface
Based on concerns that unconventional gas development is both under-regulated in some jurisdictions and also over-
regulated in other parts of the world, the IRGC offers a set of risk governance recommendations relating to the development 
of this resource. The goal is that by applying these recommended actions, risks to the environment, climate, economy 
or society will be significantly reduced while the benefits of utilizing this newly available resource will be strengthened.  
This report was generated  based on an expert workshop, held in November  2012, an extensive literature review and 
numerous conversations with experts in academia, scientific institutions, industry, regulatory authorities and policymakers. 
The aim of this report is to help experts, in various countries and context conditions, to design policies, regulatory 
frameworks and industrial strategies to maximize the benefits that unconventional gas development could promise while 
reducing the associated  risks. It will be followed by a policy brief that focuses on providing  policy recommendations.
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Numerous countries throughout the world are exploring the 
potential promise of unconventional gas development (UGD) 
as a component of national energy policy. IRGC presumes that 
policymakers seek to maximize the overall well-being of society, 
taking into account the risks and benefits of UGD compared with 
the risks and benefits of alternative energy sources. The global 
interest in UGD has been stimulated by a rapid increase in shale 
gas development in North America over the past 15 years. 
This policy brief defines UGD as the use of advanced methods of 
hydraulic fracturing, coupled with directional drilling (i.e. horizontal 
as well as vertical drilling) to access natural gas resources that were 
previously considered technically inaccessible or uneconomic to 
produce. While this brief focuses on UGD from shales, many of 
the brief’s risk governance recommendations are also relevant to 
gas development from tight gas sands and coal seams.
UGD could potentially provide a variety of benefits. Specifically:
• Provide affordable energy to businesses and consumers in the 
industrial, residential and transportation sectors;
• Create direct and indirect employment and economic prosperity; 
• Contribute to a country’s energy security by lowering 
dependence on imported energy;
• Provide a basis for a new export industry, since many countries 
seek to import natural gas;
• Generate fewer greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions than coal 
and oil;
• Diminish damage to local environmental quality by replacing 
some uses of coal and oil with a cleaner alternative; 
• Provide a backup energy source to solar and wind renewables; 
and
• Enhance the competitiveness of a country’s manufacturing 
sector, especially subsectors (e.g. chemicals, steel, plastic 
and forest products) that use natural gas as a key input to 
production.
UGD also potentially poses a variety of risks. Possible threats 
to human health, safety and the environment are prominent 
concerns, especially if effective risk management practices are 
not implemented. Potential threats include:
• Degradation of local air quality and water resources;
• Consumption of potentially scarce water supplies;
• Habitat fragmentation and ecosystem damage;
• Community stress and economic instability;
• Induced seismic events;
• Exacerbation of global climate change by triggering more 
emissions of methane, which is a potent, climate-changing 
gas; and 
• Slowing the rate of investment in more sustainable energy 
systems.
While there are a series of both known and inferred potential 
benefits as well as threats associated with the development of 
this resource, there also may exist other impacts, both positive or 
negative, that might occur in either the short and long term, which 
are not yet fully understood.
In this report, IRGC examines the risks and benefits of UGD 
and offers some risk governance recommendations to guide 
the deliberations of policymakers, regulators, investors and 
stakeholders involved in the public debate about UGD. The 
recommendations are based in part on IRGC’s integrated approach 
to risk governance (IRGC, 2005) and IRGC’s previous work on risk 
governance deficits (IRGC, 2009) and in part on the insights that 
IRGC has drawn from doing work on risk governance in other 
technology sectors such as bioenergy and regulation of carbon 
capture and storage (IRGC, 2008a, 2008b). More importantly, the 
recommendations are based on a November 2012 international 
workshop, a review of the publicly available literature and case 
studies of recent political and regulatory developments concerning 
UGD in North America, Europe and Asia. 
The IRGC definition of risk is an uncertain (usually adverse) con-
sequence of an event or activity with regard to something that 
humans value. In the case of UGD, ineffective risk governance may 
lead to unnecessary environmental damage, foregone commercial 
opportunities, inefficient regulations, loss of public trust, inequi-
table distribution of risks and benefits, poor risk prioritization and 
failure to implement effective risk management. IRGC thus advises 
Executive summary
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decision-makers to consider the risk governance recommenda-
tions in this report as policy options concerning UGD are explored.
Risk governance recommendations for UGD
1. Countries considering UGD should establish estimates of their 
technically and economically recoverable gas reserves and 
revise such estimates over time.
2. The role of UGD in a country’s national energy policy needs 
to be clarified by weighing the multiple risks and benefits of 
alternative energy sources through a process that encourages 
participation by a broad range of stakeholders and the public.
3. Policies to expand UGD should be implemented in ways that 
are consistent with global and national environmental goals 
(e.g. climate protection policies designed to slow the pace of 
climate change).
4. If a country envisions a major commitment to UGD, government 
and industry should expect to make a sustained investment 
in the associated capabilities (e.g. workforce, technology, 
infrastructure and communications) that are required for 
success.
5. A regulatory system to effectively govern UGD, including 
necessary permitting fees to support required regulatory 
activities, should be established, with meticulous attention to 
the principles of sound science, data quality, transparency and 
opportunity for local community and stakeholder participation.
6. Baseline conditions of some critical metrics should be 
measured and monitored to detect any adverse changes 
(e.g. changes to water supply and quality) resulting from 
development and these data are considered in the context 
of natural changes, along with the range of potential sources 
and mechanisms.
7. Since effective risk management at sites is feasible, companies 
engaged in UGD should adhere to best industry practices 
and strive to develop a strong safety culture, which includes 
sustained commitment to worker safety, community health 
and environmental protection.
8. During exploration, development and well closure, natural 
resources should be used efficiently; air and water quality 
should be protected; ecological harms should be minimized; 
and temporary disturbances of land should be remediated 
with care.
Major process recommendation
In undertaking this project, IRGC engaged in hundreds of UGD-
related conversations with representatives from industry, local 
and national governments, international agencies, think tanks and 
other non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Based on these 
conversations, IRGC found that many officials around the world 
seek a better understanding – beyond the content of mass media 
reports – of the facts about UGD, including innovations in technical 
practices, regulatory systems and community engagement. 
Therefore, IRGC makes the following process recommendation: 
An international platform on UGD should be established 
through which interested stakeholders meet on a regular 
basis, share knowledge about technical practices, regulatory 
systems and community relationships, and help stimulate 
continuous improvement. Although this recommendation 
is straightforward, it is crucial because practices in the 
UG industry are maturing rapidly and many of the existing 
regulatory systems to oversee UGD are undergoing refinement 
or major reform. 
In making this recommendation, IRGC underscores that the success 
of UGD will not be determined solely by engineering, geological 
and economic considerations. Without political legitimacy and 
local community cooperation, UGD is not sustainable. The 
challenge for national and community leaders is to determine 
whether development of an unconventional gas industry is in the 
interest of their constituents and, if so, what type of governance 
systems should be instituted to ensure proper risk assessment and 
management. In order to make informed decisions, national and 
community leaders, as well as investors and companies engaged in 
UGD, need prompt access to the best available information about 
technical, regulatory and community practices. The recommended 
international platform is intended to help meet this need.
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A “natural gas revolution” in the energy sector is under way. It 
is being driven by the large-scale development of natural gas 
from “unconventional reservoirs,” which are dominated by shale 
formations, but also include tight sandstones and coal seams. 
In North America, the growing rate of gas production from these 
unconventional sources is already affecting global energy markets, 
international trade and energy prices. If the revolution carries 
forward to other countries, it will have wide-ranging implications for 
the future energy security of nation states and regions, and could 
be a significant factor in global efforts to reduce climate change. 
Although much of the unconventional gas development to date 
has taken place in North America, companies and policymakers 
around the world are rapidly gaining interest in the future of UGD. 
In 2011, the International Energy Agency (IEA) released a report, 
Are We Entering a Golden Age of Gas? (IEA, 2011) and in 2012, 
it released Golden Rules for Golden Age (IEA, 2012c), indicating 
optimism about recoverable reserves, technology, extraction and 
production of unconventional gas. IEA foresees a tripling in the 
supply of unconventional gas between 2010 and 2035, leading to a 
much slower price increase than would otherwise be expected with 
rising global demand for natural gas. Global gas production could 
increase by 50% between 2010 and 2035, with unconventional 
sources supplying two thirds of the growth – a large percentage of 
which is likely to come from North America (from the United States 
in particular) (IEA, 2012b). The United Kingdom’s Royal Society 
(Royal Society, 2012; UK, 2012), Resources for the Future (Brown 
& Krupnick, 2010), the US Energy Information Administration (EIA, 
2011), the European Union (EC, 2011; 2012), Chatham House 
(Stevens, 2010), Econometrix (Econometrix, 2012), KPMG (2012) 
and Oliver Wyman (2013), among others, have recently released 
reports on UGD, with insights on development trends, technology, 
economics, risks, regulations and geopolitical ramifications. 
What is clear from recent reports is that the growth of the 
unconventional gas industry is already having a profound impact 
in North America. The proportion of shale gas rose from less than 
1% of domestic gas production in the United States in 2000 to 
more than 20% by 2010, and the EIA projects that it will account 
for 46% of the United States gas supply by 2035 (Stevens, 2012). 
Rapid growth in UGD has contributed to an 80% decline in natural 
gas prices in North America over the past decade. Lower energy 
costs, royalties paid to property owners and a growing workforce 
tied to the UG industry have stimulated the US economy. Of special 
note is a predicted revival of the North American manufacturing 
industry, especially natural gas-intensive manufacturing, such as 
petrochemicals, steel and paper (Tullo, 2012; ACC, 2013). Some 
European manufacturing firms are building new plants in the US 
instead of in Europe to capitalize on low-cost shale gas supplies 
(Hovland, 2013; Bryant, 2013; Chazan, 2013). Greenhouse gas 
emissions in the US have also been significantly reduced in the 
past five years, aided in large part by the substitution of coal for 
natural gas in power generation. Increasing use of natural gas as 
a transportation fuel is now widely proposed in North America, 
and new investments in vehicle technology and infrastructure are 
starting to be made.  
Recoverable UG reserves: how much 
and where?
Unconventional gas itself is usually characterized as one of the 
following:
• Shale gas: Gas within shale is found in low-permeability, clay-
rich sedimentary rocks. The shale is both the source and the 
reservoir for the natural gas. This occurs as both “free gas” 
trapped in the pores and fissures of the shale or adsorbed onto 
the organic matter contained in the matrix of the rocks.
• Tight gas sands: Tight gas systems are low-permeability 
reservoirs, usually comprised of sandstone, siltstones (tight 
sands), and limestones that serve as both the source and 
reservoir for the gas.
• Coal bed methane (CBM): Coal bed methane is produced from 
and stored in coal seams. Coals have very high gas storage, 
as gas is adsorbed onto the organic matter in the coals and 
held in place by water. Production of the gas is achieved by 
de-watering the coal, allowing for desorption of the gas. 
• Methane hydrates: These are a crystalline combination of 
natural gas and water formed at low temperatures under high 
pressure in the permafrost and under the ocean. These have not 
yet been developed and may not be commercially viable for at 
least another 10 to 20 years (CGES, 2010). However, a recent 
demonstration project in Japan resulted in a more optimistic 
timeline of five years.
Section 1:
Global interest in 
unconventional gas 
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This report deals only with the first three as they are onshore 
resources that are characterized by low permeability systems that 
require advanced drilling and completion technologies. There are 
many ways to estimate and report the potential resource base 
from one or all of these sources. Estimates of technically and 
economically recoverable reserves may be the most valuable 
numbers for policymakers, as they describe how much gas is 
available for production with current technology and prices. In 
undeveloped basins these estimates tend to be highly uncertain. 
Over time, such estimates are refined as detailed information is 
obtained from exploration and development efforts. 
The EIA has published estimates of technically and economically 
recoverable gas resources (EIA, 2013b). For unconventional shale 
gas, it estimates that China has the world’s largest reserves (33 
trillion cubic meters or tcm), followed by Argentina (24 tcm), Algeria 
(21 tcm), United States (20 tcm), Canada (17 tcm), Mexico (15 tcm) 
and Australia (13 tcm) (EIA, 2013b). Other countries with potentially 
large reserves include Brazil, Russia, South Africa and, to a lesser 
extent, India and Pakistan. Shale gas is the major component of 
this unconventional reserve base in most cases, and Europe1 as 
a whole has 18 tcm of technically recoverable resources, with 
Poland, France and Norway having the largest reported resources. 
The distribution of unconventional gas resources is global as 
shown in Figure 1. This is in contrast to the overall global natural 
gas resource distribution in which Russia is dominant followed by 
the United States (Figure 2).
1 Estimates for “Europe” includes the sum of resources from Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, 
Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.
Figure 1. Assessed 
shale gas and shale oil 
basins in the world.
Figure 2. Recoverable 
natural gas reserves  
in trillion cubic meters (tcm) 
in 2011. Based on IEA
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The drivers of UGD
Rising global interest in UGD is driven by several factors:
Successful research, development  
and demonstration
Modern methods of UGD represent a success story in research 
and development supported by industry and government. For 
example, the pioneer of advanced hydraulic fracturing is the 
late George P. Mitchell, a petroleum engineer and co-founder 
of Mitchell Energy and Development Group (US). Mitchell and 
his colleagues, using private funds and public support from the 
US Department of Energy, began extensive experiments in the 
late 1970s on the use of additives and staged stimulations. Over 
a period of 20 years, creative ways were developed to fracture 
shales and other unconventional reservoirs using staged slickwater 
hydraulic stimulations. Devon Energy Corporation bought Mitchell’s 
firm in 2002 for US$3.1 billion, added innovative techniques of 
horizontal drilling and helped launch a surge in North American gas 
production (Fowler, 2013). More recently, petroleum engineers have 
implemented new methods to extract significantly more gas from 
each well than was possible even a year or two ago (Gold, 2013b).
Economic imperatives 
The rapid, 15-year expansion in UGD within Canada and the United 
States reflects a variety of economic imperatives: the pursuit 
of profit by innovative energy service providers making use of 
advanced extraction technologies, the desire of communities and 
property owners for the financial rewards from localized economic 
development and royalty revenue, the creation of new employment 
opportunities (albeit in some cases hazardous to workers) (see 
Box 1) and the desire of consumers (residential, commercial and 
industrial) for a promising source of affordable energy (BCG, 2012). 
Additionally, Canada and the US, as market-oriented countries, 
view energy production as a promising source of prosperity 
and wealth, and are striving to gain a competitive edge in the 
huge global market for energy (ACC, 2012; BBC, 2012). But as a 
consequence of this rapid expansion in gas supply, the price of 
natural gas within Canada and the US is now quite low. And as a 
consequence there are a number of proposals in North America 
for new liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals to export gas to 
Europe, Asia and elsewhere in the world where prices remains 
significantly higher.
Job creation can be one of the primary 
benefits associated with unconventional gas 
development. A variety of technical and non-
technical skills are required in each of the 
phases of development and, in general, workers 
in this industry are well compensated. The 
demands for highly educated and specialized 
personnel are greatest for conducting 
exploration activities. Lower-skilled labor is in 
the greatest demand to conduct development 
activities, such as well construction, drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing. As development activity 
subsides, the necessary workforce will shrink 
dramatically (Jacquet, 2009).
Figure 3. Projected employment patterns, 
percent of highest employment, for each of the 
stages of development of a hypothetical shale 
gas development. Source: Jacquet, 2009.
The pay received by workers in this industry can be attributed to the strenuous and often inflexible work schedules, and also reflects the occupational 
risks associated with working in the field. Workers are responsible for operating heavy equipment in close quarters and moving materials with the 
assistance of human labor (e.g. connecting drill string). Workers also have to handle chemicals. The death rate in the oil and gas industry (27.5 per 
100,000 workers 2003–2009) is the highest of all US industries. The biggest contributor to this rate is transportation-related death (29%), followed 
by being struck by objects (20%), explosions (8%), being crushed by moving machinery (7%) and falls (6%). The estimated rate of non-fatal work-
related injuries in 2010 was 1.2 per 100 full-time workers. National Institute for Occupation Safety and Health data suggest safety risks are elevated 
for new workers and smaller companies (NIOSH, 2012).
Box 1: Job creation and occupational hazards
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Declining conventional gas production
While Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries account for almost 50% of total natural gas 
consumption, production of conventional oil and gas has not kept 
pace. In the United States, the annual production of conventional 
gas has generally declined since production peaked in the early 
1970s (USGS, n.d.). Declining production in the United Kingdom 
has also caused a downward trend in European output in recent 
years (IEA, 2012c). When oil and gas are produced in tandem 
at conventional plays, it is the anticipated price of oil, rather 
than that of gas, that drives gas development decisions since 
the commercial returns from oil and natural gas liquids are much 
greater, especially in North America. 
Movement away from nuclear energy after 
Fukushima
In the wake of Fukushima, Japan’s nuclear disaster in 2011, a 
number of countries have taken the decision to phase out nuclear 
power plants (e.g. Germany as well as Japan). Renewable energy 
is part of the energy portfolio, but so is increased consumption of 
fossil fuels, especially natural gas (EC, 2012). Thus, it seems likely 
the push for nuclear phase-outs will – and already is – expanding 
interest in UGD (Püttgen, 2012). 
Reduction in carbon emissions
Natural gas used in power generation can reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions by approximately half when compared with coal 
combustion2. Between 2006 and 2011, the total carbon emissions 
in the United States fell by 7.7%, and the switch from coal to 
natural gas as a fuel for base-load generation has played a key 
role in this decline (IEA, 2012a). The reduction in CO2 emissions in 
the US due to the shale gas revolution is about twice as large as 
the impact of EU efforts under the Kyoto Protocol (Victor, 2013). 
Other substitutions of natural gas, including as a transportation 
fuel to replace petroleum or diesel, may also reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. Because natural gas is cleaner burning than coal, 
it is widely touted as the fuel that can potentially bridge the gap to 
a lower-carbon future. The carbon emission reduction advantages 
of UGD may be offset in the post-2020 period if gas slows the 
penetration of low-carbon sources of electric power (e.g. new 
nuclear power plants and renewables) (EMF, 2013).
Global geopolitical considerations
Another reason for the growing interest in unconventional oil and 
gas is simply global geopolitics. The US and China, two of the 
world’s largest economies, are major net energy importers. Another 
major energy importer, Japan, is seeking new sources of energy. 
Increasing domestic sources of energy would not only boost these 
countries’ net trade balance, but also make them less reliant on 
the Middle East, which continues to be politically unstable. Much 
of Europe – and Poland, in particular – relies greatly on Russia for 
its energy needs. Russia alone is earning US$42–60 billion per 
year selling gas into Europe (Victor, 2013). Therefore, UGD would 
be geopolitically advantageous to many European countries. More 
UGD could also potentially mitigate the high gas prices in European 
markets by increasing supply. Some of the largest conventional 
oil- and gas-producing countries (e.g. Venezuela, Saudi Arabia 
and Iran) are not estimated to possess large unconventional 
gas resources. The distribution of unconventional gas resources 
outside of traditional oil-exporting nations portends a geopolitical 
shift of power and influence. The prospect for energy-importing 
countries, such as China, Poland or the US, becoming net 
exporters of energy is quite attractive to politicians from energy, 
economic and national security perspectives. In the long run, the 
prominence of the Persian Gulf nations and Russia in global energy 
markets may decline, and new players, such as Australia, Argentina 
or even West Africa, may become far more influential on the world 
market based on their ability to export both gas and oil produced 
from unconventional reservoirs (Gorst, 2013).
Table 1: Total natural gas production and consumption in OECD countries for selected years (tcm)
OECD countries 1971 1973 1990 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011e
Production (tcm) .807 .876 .881 1.122 1.155 1.145 1.177 1.205
Consumption (tcm) .791 .867 1.031 1.541 1.557 1.513 1.598 1.593
 % Production/consumption 102% 101% 85% 73% 74% 76% 74% 76%
2 Assuming fugitive methane emissions during the production process are well controlled.
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Recommendations
IRGC believes that, as more countries around the world consider 
UGD, and as North America refines its policies toward UGD, it is 
worthwhile for policymakers, industry and other stakeholders to 
consider some common risk governance guidelines to reduce the 
negative impacts associated with development and enhance the 
positive ones. In this report, IRGC suggests a set of risk governance 
recommendations that were guided by IRGC’s multi-disciplinary 
approach to risk governance, its previous assessments of risk 
governance in other technology developments (e.g., bioenergy 
and carbon capture and storage) and, most importantly, the input 
received at a workshop on UGD held in November 2102. (See in 
Acknowledgements, for a list of the scientists, engineers, risk 
analysts, regulators and other practitioners who participated in the 
workshop.) Within this report, IRGC’s general recommendations for 
effective governance of risk are presented, with recognition that 
each region or country may need to tailor the application of the 
guidelines to local conditions, cultures and political/legal traditions. 
The key recommendations include:
1. Countries considering UGD should work to obtain accurate 
estimates of their technically and economically recoverable 
reserves of UG and revise such estimates over time.
 Countries considering UGD need to recognize that current 
available estimates of gas resources have a degree of 
fragility to them. In order to make informed decisions about 
national energy policy and UGD, countries should acquire 
the best available estimates of technically and economically 
recoverable reserves. Since estimates may change significantly 
due to detailed land surveys and initial exploratory drilling, 
and production experience, estimates of recoverable reserves 
should be updated periodically based on recent evidence.
2. The role of UGD in a country’s national energy policy needs 
to be clarified by weighing the multiple risks and benefits of 
alternative energy sources through a process that encourages 
participation by a broad range of stakeholders and the public.
 Since the risk-benefit calculus will vary on a country-by-country 
basis, UGD will play a larger role in some countries than in 
others. A country’s mix of energy sources is also expected 
to change over time due to a variety of technical, economic 
and policy factors. When considering UGD, countries should 
clarify how it will fit into their portfolio of energy sources and, 
particularly, how UGD will impact the degree of dependence 
on other fossil fuels, nuclear power and renewable sources. 
As a country’s experience with UGD grows, policymakers’ 
expectations should be updated, and the projected mix of 
energy sources for the future should be modified accordingly. 
As a key component of refining a nation’s energy policies, 
opportunities for input from stakeholders and the public should 
be provided. 
3. Countries should clarify how the development of their 
unconventional gas reserves will be implemented in a way 
that helps meet (or at least does not obstruct) the nation’s 
climate-protection policies.
 If a growing UG industry is viewed as a threat to attainment 
of a country’s climate-protection goals, opposition to UGD is 
expected to intensify. A country’s UGD policy should address, 
in an analytic and transparent manner, how UGD will help 
meet the country’s climate-protection goals, including any 
obligations under international treaties. 
4. Countries envisioning a major commitment to UGD should 
allocate financial resources to develop the skills and capabilities 
to do it safely and sustainably.
 Government and industry should expect to make a sustained 
investment in the associated capabilities (e.g. workforce, 
technology, infrastructure and communications) that are 
required for success.
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Introduction
Like all sources of energy, unconventional gas production is not 
without risk. Throughout the entire process of gas production 
and use, there are potential risks to human health, safety and the 
environment. In this section we identify the major risks and suggest 
how these risks can be managed from a technical perspective.
The section begins with a basic description of the steps in a UGD 
project. The risks are then examined as they relate to land, water 
and air resources. To ensure proper technical management of risk, 
governance recommendations are suggested for each resource 
category. The level of risk will vary from locality to locality and, 
therefore, no attempt has been made to prioritize these risks. Such 
prioritization should be an essential element of the risk governance 
in any given setting.
Phases of UGD
No two unconventional gas development projects will be the same, 
but the activities for commercial development can be segregated 
into four general phases: exploration, development, production 
and closure. The phases overlap in various ways, but are frequently 
discussed separately within the industry. 
Exploration
In the exploration phase, the primary goal is to discover the gas 
resources, assess their accessibility and magnitude, and determine 
their commercial promise/technical recoverability. Exploration 
activities include the collection and analysis of geological and 
geophysical data, along with the drilling of exploratory wells 
with limited testing (and hydraulic fracturing) to gauge rates of 
production. In some cases, wildcat wells are drilled outside known 
oil/gas basins, despite the higher financial and technical risks. 
Exploration and/or development (sometimes mineral) rights often 
provide the legal basis to conduct these activities. These rights 
are contractually secured, but the process for acquiring them can 
take many forms depending on the existing legal structures and 
Section 2:
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government policies of a given nation (e.g. contracts with private 
owners of mineral rights versus public auctions of promising tracts 
when land/mineral rights are publicly owned). 
A gas developer will require some subsurface geological and 
geophysical information to guide the development process. 
Requisite data on reservoir characteristics, such as depth and 
thickness, can be obtained through reflection seismic surveys, 
which involve sending pulses of energy into the subsurface 
and then recording and correlating that energy’s response to 
subsurface features. In a given development, several exploratory 
boreholes may be drilled. Pressure, density, temperature and 
gamma response data, along with borehole geometry information, 
are routinely collected as these wells are drilled and, in some 
cases, core samples will be collected for further laboratory 
analysis. Additional information may be obtained from formation 
outcrops and data collected during past conventional oil and gas 
developments. Proprietary software will then be used to synthesize 
this information with existing data and experience, and estimate 
the properties of the reservoir. 
A significant amount of upfront planning also occurs in parallel to 
the exploration activities before further investment in commercial 
development. Existing regulations and policies, environmental 
concerns and other constraints to development need to be 
identified. Existing and future product and waste handling and 
processing capacities and needs will also be examined. Only after 
all of these factors and others have been considered can a realistic 
assessment of the economic potential of developing the resource 
be fully understood. For these reasons, acquisition of exploratory 
or development rights does not necessarily mean commercial UG 
production will occur. 
Development 
While exploration activities may cover a large geographical 
area, development typically concentrates on core areas where 
production economics are most favorable (known as “sweet 
spots”). Production-related facilities include well-site separation 
and storage equipment, pipelines, and compression and 
processing facilities. The infrastructure requirements, beyond 
establishment of production facilities, are significant, especially 
if a large number of wells are to be drilled and completed. Road 
and pipeline access to production sites need to be established, 
as materials, water and equipment must be transported to and 
from the multiple production sites. If the reservoir produces both 
natural gas and a liquid hydrocarbon component, larger and more 
extensive equipment will be required to extract, separate and 
transport the produced fluids. If the gas reservoir exists within the 
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bounds of a previously established oil- or gas-producing region, 
the additional facilities required could be significantly less. 
Unconventional gas reservoirs are accessed by drilling wellbores 
vertically through the overlying bedrock. The wellbore may enter the 
reservoir vertically, but is then usually turned to move horizontally 
through the producing formation. With current onshore technology, 
the horizontal portion of the wellbore can be drilled thousands of 
meters from the vertical wellbore (King, H., 2012a; Helms, 2008). 
This is accomplished using a high-pressure drilling mud that 
delivers energy to a steerable “mud” motor in the drill bit that is set 
in angled and horizontal trajectories. Advancing technologies for 
down-hole measurement, data telemetry (Brommer, 2008; Helms, 
2008) and subsurface modeling enable real-time control of drill-bit 
navigation and optimal placement of the wellbore in the reservoir 
(Halliburton, 2012). 
Drilling operations may be suspended multiple times to insert steel 
casing (generally cemented) into the wellbore, which prevents 
the wellbore from collapsing and impairs fluid migration into or 
out of the well. When drilling reaches the depth of the reservoir, 
the wellbore may contain multiple “strings” of casing, which 
collectively act to isolate the hydrocarbon and brine-rich horizons 
from potable groundwater aquifers. The longest “string” of casing, 
known as the production casing, extends from the surface to the 
end of the drilled wellbore. 
When the drilling and casing operations are finished, the process of 
stimulating the formation using hydraulic fracturing is undertaken 
(King, H., 2012b). Hydraulic fracturing is designed to enhance 
connectivity of the reservoir to the well and thereby promote the 
flow of gas into the production casing. It is usually performed 
in a series of “stages” over segments of the wellbore in the 
target reservoir. At each stage, a portion of the casing will be 
perforated (typically through oriented explosive charges) and then 
a sequence of fluids will be pumped into the perforated section 
at high pressure. The largest volumes of water (up to 20,000 m3) 
and pressure are needed to induce fracturing of the surrounding 
rock and to carry “proppant” (sand or ceramic grains) deep into 
the fine cracks in the formation. For this sequence, pumping rates 
may exceed 12 m3 per minute and down-hole pressures can rise to 
approximately 20,000 psi 1,400 bars (Montgomery & Smith, 2010). 
In successful hydraulic fracturing operations, the proppant will 
prevent closure of the induced fractures after pumping pressure is 
relieved. Modern hydraulic fracturing operations rely on a suite of 
chemicals to achieve the properties necessary to convey pressure 
and proppant to the fracture tips (GWPC, 2011). 
Production
Production from unconventional reservoirs is established in the 
“flowback” period in which the water and excess proppant, which 
were used to stimulate the well, along with some of the fluid 
native to the formation, are allowed to flow out of the well. During 
this process, significant amounts of fluid, dissolved minerals 
and chemicals, and other entrained materials are flowed to the 
surface and collected. Once this initial high volume of fluid is 
produced, wells generally produce little water, which is often 
collected in tanks on the well pad. Throughout a well’s life span, 
regular visits to the well site will be necessary to test gas pressure 
measurements, collect produced water for disposal and to perform 
site maintenance, such as repairing erosion and/or storm water 
controls, among other activities. Unconventional gas wells are 
characterized by high initial production that declines rapidly in 
the first few years to production levels that may be sustained for 
decades. Some closure activities will occur during the production 
phase when parts of the drilling pad are reclaimed as production 
is on-going. Also, gathering lines to collect the gas and send it on 
to a pipeline for sale and distribution are constructed. When the 
costs for operating a well exceed the value of the gas and liquid 
hydrocarbons produced, its operations will typically be suspended 
temporarily, but it will ultimately need to be decommissioned.
Closure
The process for decommissioning an unconventional well, known 
as plugging and abandonment, begins with the removal of the 
surface equipment and infrastructure for production of gas from 
the well. This includes the dehydrator, wellhead and tank batteries. 
The steel production casing, which extends from the surface 
to the producing formation may also be removed and sold as 
scrap. Finally, a series of cement plugs are constructed within 
the wellbore to isolate the various water and hydrocarbon-bearing 
formations from each other and the shallow groundwater system. 
The final stage in this reclamation process is rehabilitation of the 
well site to an alternative use. 
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Figure 4. Basic dynamics of shale 
gas extraction in a horizontal well-
bore. (Hydraulic fracturing can also 
be utilized to enhance reservoir 
performance in a conventional ver-
tical well.) Source: IFP New Energy
Risk identification
From a business perspective, natural gas production from 
unconventional reservoirs poses a variety of financial risks. Such 
a capital-intensive enterprise proceeds without assurance or 
understanding of the extent of the potential payoff. The focus 
of this section, though, is not the financial risks, which market 
forces are designed to address, but the unintended risks to public 
health, safety and the environment that could possibly occur as 
a consequence of the gas development process. These risks 
may create damage to society that extends beyond the financial 
damage to businesses and property owners with commercial 
interests in UG development. 
Unintended consequences can be categorized as those associated 
with the adequacy of engineering practices and technologies, 
and those associated with human operational factors, though 
sometimes technical and behavioral factors interact to accentuate 
risk. Risks can also be assessed by the severity of their harm 
(inconvenience to neighbors versus health damage from drinking 
water contamination), the temporal nature of the risk (immediate 
versus long-term cumulative risks) and spatial extent (localized 
effects versus those that extend over large geographical areas). 
For clarity of discussion, risks are itemized below according to 
whether they impact land, water or air. Not all risks are of the 
same likelihood or severity of consequence, and thus relative risks 
need to be assessed on a site-by-site and region-by-region basis 
in order to give appropriate priority to risk management activities. 
Land
As with all energy resource developments, the effect of UGD on 
the land can be significant, including impacts to both the current 
and potential land uses, and the associated ecological systems. 
The environmental risks depend on site-specific factors, such as 
the climate, topography and existing uses of the land, and on the 
pace and scale of development. Some of the impacts on land are 
similar to conventional gas development and other mining and 
industrial activities. However, because of the dispersed nature of 
this resource in the subsurface, the overall footprint or impact of 
unconventional gas development is generally larger than that of 
conventional gas development, which is concentrated in smaller 
areas (fields). This impact involves roads, pipeline right-of-ways, 
along with production and gathering facilities. Nonetheless, land 
impact from UGD is likely to be smaller than from other energy 
sources (NGSA, 2013). In a study  by the American Petroleum 
Institute (SAIC/RW Beck, 2013), the number of acres of land 
needed to produce the fuel to power 1,000 homes  for one year 
is: natural  gas 0.4, coal 0.7, biomass 0.8, nuclear 0.7, wind 6, 
solar 8.4.
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Land erosion and water siltation
A flat and stable well pad is needed for unconventional gas 
development, which requires the surface of the well pad to be 
graded and typically covered in crushed stone or gravel (NYSDEC, 
2011). In some settings, this pad may also need to be impermeable 
(e.g. concrete) to prevent fluids from seeping into the subsurface. 
Access roads are required to link existing roadways to the well pad 
for access and egress of people, equipment and materials. Land is 
also cleared for gathering pipelines and infrastructure to process 
and distribute the produced gas. To summarize these activities, 
Johnson et al. (2010) estimated that about 12 ha are impacted by 
the establishment and support of a multi-well pad development. 
Some of the impacts include:
• Changes to surface gradients and land biomass/soil 
compositions from UGD increase the risks of erosion and 
siltation of surface waters (Entrekin et al., 2011). 
• Loss of nutrient-rich topsoil can permanently impair use of land 
in the future (Drohan et al., 2012). 
• Physiographic changes associated with preparing the well pad 
may also affect groundwater recharge and surface runoff. 
• Removal of vegetation will also change local evapotranspiration 
rates (Harbor, 2007). 
Habitat loss and ecosystem fragmentation
Unconventional gas reservoirs exist below a variety of surface 
environments and the expected land use change from developing 
these resources is not equal. Habitat loss can be directly correlated 
to the amount of land required to develop unconventional gas 
reservoirs. However, impacts are not only measured in direct 
land disturbance, but also include “edge effects,” – a well-known 
ecological concept in which adjacent lands, especially in forested 
areas, can be impacted by disturbance. The disturbance creates 
new edges within “interior ecosystems,” which are inhospitable to 
sensitive flora and fauna (e.g. songbirds). The cumulative effects 
of multiple disturbances result in habitat fragmentation, which 
threatens native species while space is created for invasive species 
to thrive (Johnson et al., 2010; Drohan et al., 2012; Slonecker et 
al., 2012).
The risks associated with land use change from UG operations 
are highest in sensitive areas and when steps are not taken to 
lessen the disturbance. Drohan et al. (2012) point out that a 
managed, organized approach to drilling and infrastructure could 
help minimize these impacts. However, the ecological impacts of 
land use change for UGD may take time to develop. This inhibits 
risk assessment and management, as siting restrictions can 
significantly alter production economics.
Figure 5. Change from all 
developments (due to UGD and 
other activities) in percent interior 
forest by watershed in Bradford 
and Washington counties, 
Pennsylvania, from 2001 to 2010. 
Source: Slonecker et al., 2012.
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Inadequate surface rehabilitation 
Once drilling and hydraulic fracturing operations are complete on 
a particular well pad, the equipment and materials not needed 
to sustain production can be removed. A well pad area of less 
than one hectare is sufficient (NYSDEC, 2011). After all producing 
wells on a well pad are decommissioned, the remaining portion 
of the well pad and other surface disturbances maintained for 
servicing of the well will no longer be necessary, leaving only 
pipeline easements. 
Due to soil compaction, removal of topsoil and the layer of gravel 
covering the well pad and access roads, natural recovery of the 
surface environment to its original state should not be expected. Soil 
conservation measures, such as the installation and maintenance 
of erosion controls and use of storm water management practices, 
may reduce damage to the surface environment. If the surface 
disturbances become permanent, the adverse impacts of habitat 
loss and ecosystem fragmentation are accentuated. Complete 
reclamation of the surface usually involves the removal of the 
gravel layer, land re-grading and replacement of topsoil, and re-
vegetation. Minimizing the effects of UG development on habitats 
requires that reclamation activities are appropriate and timely. 
Recommendations
1. Perform baseline measurements to assess ecosystem health 
(e.g. species abundance) and characterize existing habitats 
(e.g. aerial surveys); identify existing environmental pollution 
(e.g. erosion and sedimentation). Baseline measurements 
should be recorded prior to commercial UG development. 
Monitor changes in all phases of commercial development. 
2. Include the risks associated with well pad development in siting 
decisions and construction operations. Use appropriate soil 
conservation measures and maintain environmental controls 
(e.g. erosion barriers) for as long as they are necessary.
3. Use land efficiently and consider opportunities to reduce the 
footprint of well pad and infrastructure development. This may 
include collaborative development (e.g. shared rights-of-way 
for pipelines) and organized development units. 
4. Pre-plan intermediate and final surface reclamation and their 
costs. Plans should include all of the activities at the surface 
to restore the land to its natural or pre-development state. 
Water
Multiple processes associated with extraction of unconventional 
gas pose risks to water resources. These risks can impact the 
availability and quality of surface and groundwater. The effects 
of these risks may vary according to natural factors, such as 
hydrology and geology, as well as on existing uses and demands 
for water resources and the manner in which the water is utilized. 
In gauging the impact to water resources, it is important to bear 
in mind the relative usage for UGD in comparison with other large 
consumers of water such as agriculture and thermal power sectors. 
Water usage is changing in many areas as new techniques to 
recycle and reuse both water used for stimulation and produced 
waters are being employed (Stark et al., 2012; Nicot et al., 2012; 
EID, 2013). 
Water supply diminution
Water is used in dust suppression, drilling “mud” formulation and 
in the hydraulic fracturing process. The largest water demands 
are associated with hydraulic fracturing in shale formations, which 
requires 10,000–20,000 m3 per well (DOE, 2009). Smaller amounts 
are needed for developing coal bed methane (DOE, 2004). Modes 
for transporting the water include tanker trucks or pipelines, and 
the water is typically taken from local sources due to the cost of 
water hauling (Arthur et al., 2010). At or near the well pad, water for 
hydraulic fracturing may be stored in lined ponds (impoundments) 
or kept in mobile tanks (Arthur et al., 2010). 
There are risks of water supply diminution due to the consumptive 
use of freshwater for UGD, especially in regions where freshwater 
supplies are constrained. Aquatic, riparian and floodplain 
ecosystems are directly impacted by reductions in flow. Ecological 
responses to changes in habitat availability or disruptions to the 
life cycles of plant and animal species can be assessed (DePhilip 
& Moberg, 2010). Water withdrawals may also cause second-order 
impacts to water quality, such as changes in temperature. The 
principal risk of groundwater withdrawals is aquifer drawdown, 
which can negatively impact the use of water wells for drinking, 
agriculture and other purposes (Nicot & Scanlon, 2012). 
The water demands for unconventional gas operations are 
not constant, but are usually concentrated when and where 
unconventional wells are being hydraulically fractured (Mitchell 
et al., 2013). An assessment of local resource capacity is 
necessary to determine what effects freshwater demands for 
UGD may have. The assessment of local resource capacity 
should be complemented with a holistic characterization of the 
current and future water demands for hydraulic fracturing in the 
international risk governance council Risk Governance Guidelines for Unconventional Gas Development
P 18
context of existing uses of water resources, including ecological 
needs. Freshwater consumption may be reduced by the use of 
alternative water sources. These include recycling of water used 
in the hydraulic fracture stimulations “flowback” water (Lutz et al., 
2013), use of water produced with gas and acid mine drainage 
(Curtright & Giglio, 2012). In areas of limited water supply the risks 
are more widespread, so both local and accumulative impacts 
are likely. 
Fluid migration outside of production 
casing
Drilling an unconventional gas well can potentially compromise 
the natural separation that isolates potable groundwater systems 
from deeper brine and hydrocarbon-bearing strata. To allow for the 
production of hydrocarbons and prevent movement of fluids into 
groundwater, the drilled borehole is cased (steel pipe cemented 
into the wellbore). Multiple layers of steel and cement may be 
used to isolate potable aquifers and provide protection of the 
groundwater resource. 
Although the procedures and materials used in the casing process 
reflect decades of continually advancing technologies and often 
meet strict design criteria, successful isolation is obtained when 
appropriate implementation and verification measures are used. 
The seal created by the cement with the wellbore is the critical 
component, yet problems may arise, which could affect the quality 
of the seal (King, G., 2012). The presence of a flaw increases the 
risk of unintended pathways that connect groundwater with fluids 
from the deep subsurface, including with brine, hydrocarbons 
(particularly dissolved and free methane) and fracturing fluids. The 
most common problem with casing construction is poor bonding 
between the casing and cement or the cement and/or the borehole 
wall. The frequency of leaking casing problems in association with 
UGD is in the range of 1 to 3% (Vidic et al., 2013).
The integrity of the casing/cement system must survive the 
repeated stresses associated with hydraulic fracturing and 
throughout its productive lifetime (King, G., 2012). Additionally, 
the system must also continue to isolate the various fluid-bearing 
strata in the subsurface after the well has ceased production and 
is plugged and abandoned. Wells are subject to mechanical, 
thermal and chemical stresses in the subsurface. Compromised 
integrity of the mechanical isolation may be due to degradation 
of the wellbore, corrosion in steel sections of casing or changing 
geological conditions (Det Norske Veritas, 2013). Complete 
verification of wellbore seal integrity is not possible. Pressure 
monitoring and tests to estimate the quality of the cement bond 
with the wellbore are commonly used. If problems are identified, 
“workovers,” the industry term for repairing a well, are possible 
interventions to address these issues (King, H., 2012b). 
When sites are selected carefully and fracking operations are 
conducted using state-of-the-art methods, groundwater chemistry 
in shallow aquifer systems should reflect only natural processes. 
This has been verified, for example, in a study of shallow 
groundwater quality in a shale-production area in Arkansas. From 
2004 to 2012, about 4,000 producing wells were completed in 
the Fayetteville Shale (north-central Arkansas). Sampling of 127 
domestic wells took place to assess water quality. The comparisons 
to historical (pre-production) values and to water-quality values in 
neighboring areas (without gas production) showed no evidence 
of degradation of water quality (Kresse et al., 2012). 
A recent study of methane contamination of drinking water 
supplies in Pennsylvania found that methane concentrations in 
drinking water are elevated in wells near oil and gas operations. 
The authors advance several possible pathways that could explain 
the contamination but suggest that the pattern of contamination 
is more consistent with leaky gas-well casings than with release 
and long-distance migration of methane after hydraulic fracturing 
(Osborn et al., 2011; Warner et al., 2012). Additional challenges 
and complexities associated with the potential for groundwater 
contamination are being investigated by the USEPA, the state 
of NY Department of Health and other entities in various states. 
Several comprehensive reports are expected from these sources 
in the near future.  
Implementation of best industry practices can minimize the risk 
of fluid migration from casings. The risks associated with poor 
well construction and isolation of groundwater supplies may be 
controlled if problems are identified and proper steps are taken 
to remediate problems. 
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Fracture communication with groundwater
With hydraulic fracturing, the potential exists to hydraulically 
connect gas-producing reservoirs with water-bearing zones 
in the subsurface (including underground sources of drinking 
water). This risk of subsurface groundwater contamination from 
hydraulic fracturing is understood to be correlated with the depth 
at which fracturing occurs (King, H., 2012b). Increasing the vertical 
separation of the underground sources of drinking water with 
the producing horizons reduces the risk because there will be 
more confining layers of overlying rock (or “frac barriers”) to limit 
fracture propagation upward (Davies et al., 2012). No empirical 
data currently exist that conclusively demonstrate there has 
been direct communication of hydraulically stimulated producing 
horizons with groundwater reservoirs (EPA, 2004). In fact, a recent 
study used tracers at a site in Greene County, West Virginia to 
discern where fluids resided after fracking operations. After a year 
of monitoring, the study found that the fluids remained isolated 
from the shallower areas that supply drinking water (AP, 2013, 
Hammack et al., 2013). However, it may be too early to say the 
risk is zero, as it may take an extended period of time for these 
unintended consequences to develop or be detected. One concern 
is that the groundwater and the underlying reservoirs could have 
pre-existing (natural) hydraulic connections (Warner et al., 2012). 
Currently, the US Environmental Protection Agency is engaged in 
assessment of “The Potential Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing on 
Drinking Water Resources,” with the final results expected to be 
released in 2014. In the EU, the impact of hydraulic stimulation 
was initially investigated in Poland in 2011 and did not show any 
changes in the natural environment which could be linked with the 
hydraulic fracturing (Konieczynska et al., 2011) 
Uncertainty about this risk is elevated by a poor understanding of 
subsurface fluid flow and the existence of subsurface geological 
features (IEA, 2012c). Encountering a natural fracture that leads to 
potable water supplies is possible, but there is incentive for drillers 
to avoid intersecting these features because they can negatively 
impact desirable fracture propagation, and subsequently, gas 
production (Gale et al., 2007). Because fluids are being introduced 
at high rates and pressures, there are additional risks of subsurface 
communication in areas with a history of oil and gas drilling or 
underground mining due to the weakness in the overlying rocks 
that these activities have created. There also exists the risk 
that fractures formed by a hydraulic stimulation could intersect 
a pre-existing wellbore that also intersects the reservoir being 
stimulated. The induced fractures could compromise the integrity 
of this wellbore and possibly lead to the migration of fluids out 
of the producing zone and into overlying horizons. The presence 
of these conditions reduces the pressure required to push the 
fluids in the reservoir up thousands of feet. Hydraulic fracture 
monitoring (see Figure 6) allows for three-dimensional modeling 
of fracture propagation, though these technologies may not be 
suitable in all circumstances and can be prohibitively expensive 
(Neal, 2010). These figures show the estimated distance between 
the deepest surface aquifers and the height and location of the 
fractures induced by the stimulation of the reservoir. 
A related yet tangential aspect of this potential risk is the long-
term fate of the injected fluids. While they begin by residing only 
in the induced and natural fractures, only 50 to 70 percent of 
the introduced fluids return to the surface as flowback fluid. The 
balance of the fluid remains in the reservoir and has the potential to 
interact chemically with native fluids and the reservoir rock. Some 
chemical agents, specifically metals and organic compounds, may 
be mobilized and could migrate over time into the fracture system 
and even out of the reservoir. As the development of shale gas 
reservoirs is a relatively new technology, this possible long-term 
risk has yet to be fully assessed and evaluated (Portier et al., 2007).
In addition to the risk of establishing direct hydrological 
communication between the hydrocarbon-bearing reservoir and 
the groundwater system, there exists the potential risk of large-
scale perturbation of the subsurface hydrological flow regime 
due to extensive drilling and hydraulic stimulation. In many 
cases, the stratigraphic units that are being targeted for UGD 
are low permeability zones that serve as barriers to flow within 
the subsurface environment. Modification of this role on scales 
that may permit subsurface fluids and pressures to significantly 
change may have unforeseen consequences on other aspects of 
the subsurface hydrologic regime. As with the risk associated with 
the possible mobilization of chemicals and the long-term fate of 
introduced fluids, this potential risk has yet to be fully assessed 
and may have important consequences for development of some 
regions. Analogs have been modeled in relation to large-scale 
hydrological effects of geological sequestration (Tsang et al., 2008).
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Figure 6. Estimated fracture propagation determined by micro-seismic monitoring of hydraulic fracturing operations in the wells drilled 
in the Barnett and Marcellus shale plays.
Surveys show created fracture relative to the position of the lowest known freshwater aquifers, shown in blue at the top of each panel 
(Fisher, 2010).
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Box 2: Induced seismicity
The energy associated with the injection (or withdrawal) of fluids from the subsurface can cause the brittle failure or fracturing of rocks, resulting 
in seismic events. This can happen in three ways in association with UGD: 1) during the process of stimulating reservoirs with hydraulic fracturing 
procedures; 2) during the withdrawal of gas and water during production; and 3) during the reinjection of flowback fluid and/or water that is produced 
in association with the production of gas. In the first two cases, the seismicity that results occurs within the producing reservoir and is of a very low 
magnitude. It is termed “micro-seismicity” and includes events with moment magnitudes of -1 to -4 Mw. Generally seismic events need to exceed a 
moment magnitude of 2 to be felt. 
The process of hydraulically stimulating a productive interval in a reservoir by definition exceeds the elastic strength of the rock and causes localized 
brittle failure that creates fractures to connect the wellbore with the matrix of the reservoir. The process results in many micro-seismic events that 
can be recorded, but these cannot be felt at the surface, and the risks to people and property are minimal. The distribution and geometry of these 
micro-seismic events are used by the industry to refine its understanding of the effectiveness of hydraulic stimulations. Similarly, as water and gas are 
removed from a producing formation, there exists the possibility that the decrease in volume of the pore system will be associated with micro-fractures 
that form within the reservoir and result in micro-seismicity. These events are analogous to those induced in a hydraulic fracture stimulation procedure, 
but are generally of a smaller moment magnitude. Also in a similar manner, gas-producing companies may use the distribution and geometry of these 
micro-seismic events to enhance their understanding of the drainage distribution of gas from the reservoir.
The third way in which seismicity can be induced is by the reinjection of fluids into a saline water-filled aquifer in the deep subsurface (Johnson, 
2013b). The aquifer is often a deep and hydraulically isolated formation with a high storage capacity. The production of large volumes of fluids from 
the subsurface in association with produced gases and liquid hydrocarbons from unconventional reservoirs is an operational challenge. The injectant 
is either flowback fluids from hydraulic stimulation procedures during the completion of wells and/or formation water that is produced along with the 
gas during the production period. A significant difference of this source of seismicity from the previous two is that the volume, duration and rate of 
fluid injection can be much higher (tens of millions of gallons). If the volume or rate of injection is high enough, and if a critically stressed fault lies 
within the elevated pressure window, the stress caused by the pressure of the injected fluids will exceed the elasticity of the rock in either the storage 
reservoir or in the overlying/underlying seals. Thus the injection may cause brittle failure of the rock and result in a seismic event. The geometry of the 
faulting limits the scope of the risk.
Risks of damaging seismicity or other negative consequences resulting from the aforementioned processes are twofold. First, if the storage horizon 
in a wastewater disposal well is deep enough and lies adjoining a brittle formation that is critically stressed and contains large pre-existing fractures 
(often the crystalline basement complexes that underlie the sedimentary column in a basin) and the injection rates and volumes are high enough to 
cause brittle failure, the initiation of a seismic event is possible. If a critically stressed fault is perturbed by the pressure field, a seismic event could be 
triggered that would be proportional to the displacement or movement on the fault. Depending upon the type of bedrock and unconsolidated materials 
in the region that are shaken, varying amounts of damage are possible at the surface.
Appropriate adherence to existing rules and subsurface policies that restrict the volumes and injection rates to pressures below the threshold of brittle 
failure are the most common means of managing this risk. Zoback (2012) has recommended a set of five basic practices that could be used by 
operators and regulators to safeguard an injection operation from inducing seismicity when pumping fluid into the subsurface: 1) avoid injection into 
active faults and faults in brittle rock; 2) formations should be selected for injection (and injection rates should be limited) to minimize pore pressure 
changes; 3) local seismic monitoring arrays should be installed when there is a potential for injection to trigger seismicity; 4) protocols should be 
established in advance to define how operations will be modified if seismicity is triggered; and 5) operators need to be prepared to reduce injection 
rates or abandon wells if triggered seismicity poses any hazard.
Compared with other risks from UGD, induced seismicity is considered relatively low in both probability and severity of damages and thus is not a 
major focus of routine oil and gas operations. A recent report by the US National Academy of Sciences (National Research Council, 2013) on induced 
seismicity states “The process of hydraulic fracturing a well as presently implemented for shale gas recovery does not pose a high risk for inducing 
felt seismic events and injection of disposal of waste water derived from energy technologies into the subsurface does pose some risk for induced 
seismicity, but very few events have been documented over the past several decades relative to the large number of disposal wells in operation.”
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Pollution from surface leaks and spills
At various points in the UGD process, the storage, handling and 
transportation of potentially hazardous, toxic, radioactive and 
carcinogenic fluids are required (NYSDEC, 2011; URS, 2011; 
King, G., 2012). There are inherent risks of human exposure 
from mishandling these fluids. Holding tanks, tanker trucks, pits 
and other containers may leak, and chemicals could be spilled, 
potentially reaching ground and surface waters (King, G., 2012) 
The risks to human health and the environment (e.g. wildlife) from 
exposure to uncontrolled releases of chemicals and wastes vary 
in frequency and magnitude. Even under pessimistic assumptions, 
the extent of human exposure has been shown to be less than 
the safety thresholds adopted for regulatory risk management 
(Gradient, 2013).
To evaluate the frequency of these events, necessary considerations 
include the rate of development, modes of transportation (pipeline, 
truck, etc.) and storage mechanisms (pits, tanks, etc.). Frequency 
may be further delineated by the failure rate associated with 
each technology (e.g. single- versus double-walled tanks). The 
volume of a release is inversely proportional to the likelihood it will 
occur (Rozell & Reaven, 2012). Lower-probability (high-volume) 
releases are associated with catastrophic failures of containment 
mechanisms and accidents during transportation. 
The magnitudes of the potential impacts from contamination 
depend on the concentration and chemical composition of the 
solutes in the water. Thus, where and when unintentional releases 
may occur will also be a factor in determining the level of risk. 
Best practices for fluid and waste handling on and off the well 
pad are complemented by backup containment systems, such 
as placing synthetic liners below the gravel layer on the well pad 
(King, H., 2012b). Effective emergency preparedness and response 
capacities also help to reduce the risks from unintended releases 
or accidents. 
Improper disposal of solid and liquid 
wastes
Drilling and hydraulic fracturing generate considerable solid 
and liquid wastes requiring appropriate disposal. Solid material 
removed from the subsurface to create the wellbore is collected 
on the well pad and is known to contain elevated levels of heavy 
metals and other hazardous materials, including naturally occurring 
radioactive material (NORM) (NYSECD, 2011; King, H., 2012b). 
After hydraulic fracturing, the flowback water is typically stored 
on the well pad in lined pits or vented tanks. The quantity and 
constituents of the fluid waste streams vary within and across 
formations, and may be concentrated by treatment processes, 
but they are expected to contain the chemicals from the fracturing 
fluid and salts, hydrocarbons, dissolved metals and NORM from 
the reservoir (Rowan et al., 2011; Hammer & VanBriesen, 2012.)
Disposal options for produced wastes should be limited by their 
potential adverse effects to health and human welfare, as well 
as to the environment. Disposal of solid or partially de-watered 
wastes in landfills, on the ground or by entombment (burial) are 
current practices. Leachate is the primary risk to surface and 
groundwater quality. Numerous methods for disposal of waste 
fluids exist, though not all may be appropriate or viable for a 
particular project. An arid climate is necessary for evaporating 
waste fluids, and suitable geologic conditions must be present 
for deep-well injection of wastes. Properly implemented deep well 
injection of various types of waste (EPA Classes I–V) has been 
documented to be effective in protecting groundwater (GWPC, 
2011).
Constituent concentrations and volumes determine both the 
effectiveness and cost of treatment processes for waste fluid 
disposal. For example, conventional sewage treatment plants 
designed for organic and biological constituents are not effective 
at removing metals and other dissolved solids common in gas 
industry wastewater (Wilson & VanBriesen, 2012) and should not 
be used for disposal (See “Pennsylvania ‘scrambles’ to address 
wastewater disposal issues” in Box 6, Section 4). Illicit dumping 
of wastes on the ground and into rivers by waste haulers has 
been observed (Silver, 2012), but is not known to be widespread. 
Precautions must be taken to ensure wastes are disposed safely 
and permanently. With proper planning and oversight, low-level 
hazardous wastes may be disposed in a manner that poses 
negligible risks to surface and groundwater resources (Gray, 
1990). Depending on the amount of waste generated and its 
constituents, specialized facilities may be required to lower the 
risks to acceptable levels. Opportunities for the beneficial reuse 
of drilling wastes may also decrease waste disposal requirements 
(ANL, 2013). Waste manifests, or other systems to track the 
collection and disposal of wastes generated from UGD, enhance 
transparency and are viable deterrents to illicit practices.
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Failure to properly plug a well
The process for decommissioning an unconventional well is known 
as plugging and abandonment. It may include the removal of 
the production casing, which extends from the surface to the 
producing reservoir. The wellbore is then filled with cement, or 
more commonly, a series of cement plugs above fluid-bearing 
formations is used to block fluid flow in the wellbore. The purpose 
is to permanently isolate the brine and hydrocarbon formations 
from each other and shallow groundwater horizons that could be 
connected by flow through the wellbore. 
Failure to permanently plug a well may allow brine and other 
hydrocarbons, particularly methane, to reach the surface and/or 
contaminate groundwater. The uncontrolled movement of methane 
in the subsurface, known as stray gas, poses an explosion risk if 
it accumulates in buildings and also contributes to atmospheric 
concentrations of methane (NETL, 2007). 
Preventing the flow of fluids in the wellbore decreases the potential 
for deterioration of the mechanical isolation by chemical exposure 
(Muehlenbachs, 2009; Nichol & Kariyawasam, 2000). However, 
there is the potential that the plugging process is unsuccessful 
or is incompletely executed. Long-term monitoring of abandoned 
wells may be necessary to identify and repair potential issues with 
mechanical seal integrity beyond well-plugging operations. Well 
owners may also be neglectful of responsibilities when costs are 
high and perceived benefits are low (Mitchell & Casman, 2011). 
Recommendations
1. Perform baseline measurements of  water   quantity, 
characterizing seasonal and inter-annual variability of surface 
water flows and groundwater levels. Examine water demands 
for UGD at local and regional  scales and assess the potential 
effects on water resources and the environment in the context 
of existing uses.
2. Perform baseline measurements of surface and groundwater 
quality in close proximity to development and where the 
potential impacts from source degradation are highest (e.g. at a 
public water supply intake). Monitor water quality and respond 
to changes that can lead to the discovery of operational or 
compliance problems. 
3. Minimize human exposure to materials and fluids that are 
hazardous and/or carcinogenic and prevent environmentally 
damaging releases through proper handling and disposal, 
and if necessary, remediation. Select the disposal and reuse 
methods that can adequately contain the types and volumes 
of fluids used, and monitor containment effectiveness.
4. Characterize both the geological (e.g. frac barriers) and 
hydrological (e.g. groundwater) systems, and understand how 
they interact before, during and after UGD. Employ hydraulic 
fracturing monitoring (e.g. micro-seismic mapping) to assess 
fracture propagation in new or geologically unique areas. The 
distance and composition of the strata between the surface 
and the target gas reservoirs should be deep and impermeable 
enough that effects in the reservoir do not affect the surface 
or groundwater systems.
5. Verify that groundwater is properly isolated from fluids in the 
wellbore before and after hydraulic fracturing. Use processes 
and materials for wellbore casing that are appropriate for the 
geologic setting and resist degradation from known chemical, 
thermal and mechanical stresses in the subsurface. Monitor 
and maintain well casing integrity until it is properly plugged.
6. Develop applicable risk mitigation strategies to govern 
development in susceptible areas that contain either known 
potential technical hazards, such as critically stressed faults 
and venerable groundwater systems, or activities that may be 
vulnerable, such as tourism and agriculture.
7. Use appropriate, modern and effective technologies in 
terms of chemicals, well design, well appurtenances, 
safety management (i.e. risk identification and assessment, 
emergency management) and wastewater disposal.
8. Monitor material flow, including: methane emission levels; 
wastewater composition and volume; chemical and 
radioactive substance concentrations in deep groundwater; 
fluid concentrations; and chemical degradation products as 
appropriate to the risk that these constituents may pose to 
water resources in an area.
9. Pre-plan well-plugging activities and their costs. Establish 
clear responsibility for post-abandonment issues. Financial 
assurance programs have been used to provide an economic 
incentive to well owners for performing plugging activities. 
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Air
One of the principal benefits of UGD is the reduction of combustion 
emissions relative  to other  fossil  fuels though gas is not as 
clean as nuclear power or renewables. For example, combustion 
of coal is a major  source of particulate pollution, which is one of 
the most  health-damaging forms of air pollution (Muller et al., 
2011). Combustion of natural gas produces much less particulate 
matter pollution than  coal  (WBG, 1998), However, developing 
unconventional reservoirs is an energy-consuming process, and 
uncontrolled emissions in the process could  partially undermine 
these  air-quality gains  of gas. The emissions’ sources may be 
temporary or continuous, mobile or stationary, and localized or 
dispersed over  a large  area. The physical effects may extend 
to human health,  infrastructure, agriculture and  ecosystems 
(Litovitz et al., 2013), but these impacts depend significantly on 
the context of development, including regional climate conditions 
and population distribution. In some  communities, air pollution 
associated with UGD has been a greater concern than water 
pollution (CC, 2013).
Dust 
The construction of the well pad and access roads (both grading 
and laying gravel) and the movement of trucks and heavy machinery 
on or near the well pad for drilling and hydraulic fracturing generate 
dust. In addition to potential environmental impacts (EPA, 2012a), 
breathing this dust can cause or exacerbate respiratory ailments 
in workers and people living or working downwind (Davidson et 
al., 2005; Esswein et al., 2013). Silica dust is generated as the 
proppant is transferred, blended, and injected with the slickwater 
(hydraulic fracturing fluid). Potential exposure to unsafe levels of 
respirable crystalline silica (sand <10 µ in diameter) represents an 
occupational risk associated with several industries. Breathing 
silica can lead to the incurable lung disease, silicosis, and has 
also been associated with lung cancer and chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease (NIOSH, 2002). 
Fugitive dust is managed through the use of well-understood dust 
control and suppression methods. Dust suppression, usually by 
application of water and/or other chemicals, may be sufficient to 
minimize the amount of dust generated from construction and the 
movement of equipment and trucks on the well pad (EPA, 2012a). 
The risks to workers from respirable silica dust on the well pad 
may be reduced, where the sand transfers and blend activities 
occur, by the use of housed mixing mechanisms and appropriate 
respirators. Process improvements to limit or capture dust (e.g. 
employing “dust collectors”) during hydraulic fracturing operations 
are recommended by the US National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (OSHA, 2013). 
Mobile and transient combustion 
emissions
Mobile internal engine combustion emissions occur during 
the construction, drilling and hydraulic fracturing stages of UG 
development. Hundreds to thousands of truck trips may be 
necessary to bring equipment, supplies and people to and from 
the well pad (NYSEDC, 2011). Transportable diesel engines 
provide the power for well drilling and casing operations, as well 
as for hydraulic fracturing. Diesel fuel consumption ranges from 
1,150,000–320,000 liters per well (Clark et al., 2011). 
Emissions from internal combustion engines include nitrogen 
oxides (NOx), sulfur oxides (SOx), carbon dioxide (CO2), volatile 
organic compounds (VOCs) and particulate matter. The principal 
risks are to human health from inhalation of particles and ozone, 
the latter being formed from the photo-oxidation of VOCs and NOx. 
Severity of the adverse health impacts range from minor eye and 
throat irritation to serious or fatal respiratory and cardiopulmonary 
problems (Litovitz et al., 2013). The CO2 emitted from these engines 
is a greenhouse gas, though minor in magnitude compared with 
other major point sources of CO2 such coal-fired power plants. 
Mobile emissions are transient, with average air concentrations 
roughly proportional to the drilling activity level in a particular area. 
Because operating heavy machinery and truck transport represent 
costs to the operator, there is a financial incentive to minimize 
fuel use and associated emissions. When water is transported by 
pipelines truck trips may be shortened or avoided altogether (King, 
G., 2012). Proper maintenance and use of more efficient equipment 
can reduce emissions. Diesel fuel is widely used in generators and 
trucks. Switching fuel from diesel to natural gas reduces some of 
the combustion-related emissions (King, G., 2012). 
Stationary combustion emissions
Produced gas from individual wells is aggregated through a 
network of gathering pipelines. When the natural pressure of the 
gas is too low, it is introduced to transmission and distribution 
pipelines through electric-powered compressors, which may be 
grid-connected, but are more commonly co-located with natural 
gas fuelled generators (Burklin & Heaney, 2005; Armendariz, 
2009; EIA, 2013a). Heavier hydrocarbons may be transported in 
pipelines, but are also commonly shipped in transportable tanks 
(NPC, 2011). Energy consumption for natural gas compression is 
proportional to throughput and the pressure requirements of the 
receiving pipeline.
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From the associated combustion emissions, there are risks from the 
formation of ozone and from increasing greenhouse gas emissions. 
The emissions from natural gas compression are stationary and will 
occur over the operational life of a facility. Proper maintenance and 
use of leaner burning compressors can reduce these emissions 
(Burklin & Heaney, 2005). Emissions can also be reduced by using 
electric motors to power the compressors (Armendariz, 2009). 
Fugitive methane emissions
From the wellhead to burner (and all points in between) there 
are multiple places from which natural gas may escape to the 
atmosphere. Potential sources include pumps, flanges, valves, 
gauges, pipe connectors, compressors and other components 
(Armendariz, 2009). Natural gas losses in the system are known 
as fugitive methane emissions, and they may occur as intentional 
releases or unintentional leaks. A large source for intentionally 
released methane is the pneumatic valves commonly used by the 
gas industry as liquid level controllers, pressure regulators and valve 
controllers (EPA, 2006). Unintentional releases may be the result 
of poor installation and maintenance, as well as from expected 
wear of sealed components by rust or corrosion (Armendariz, 
2009). Natural gas compressors are another potentially large 
source of fugitive methane emissions. During normal operation 
of compressors, natural gas may leak from the packing systems 
(NYSDEC, 2011) and will be intentionally released when performing 
maintenance (Gillis et al., 2007).
Fugitive methane emissions increase greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere, and are of special concern 
because of methane’s large greenhouse gas potential. However, 
quantifying these emissions may be difficult given their dependency 
on operator practice, and the fact that they are dispersed over 
a wide area and change with time (e.g. as components wear). 
Limiting fugitive methane emissions can be economically 
motivated because the captured gas has commercial value when 
sold in the marketplace (Gillis et al., 2007). Routine inspection and 
maintenance of the components from where leaks typically occur 
can reduce fugitive methane emissions. Minimizing the intentional 
releases of natural gas is possible by switching from high- to 
low-bleed pneumatic valves or by controlling these valves with 
compressed air or electricity (EPA, 2006) and using closed-process 
design in treating backflow and waste. Although a recent study 
of methane emissions at 190 on-shore natural gas sites in the 
United States found an overall smaller rate of methane emissions 
– during drilling operations – than had been suggested in modeling 
exercises and similar studies, pneumatic controllers and selected 
leaks were still significant (Allen et al., 2013; Revkin, 2013).
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Box 3: Greenhouse gas emissions
Greenhouse gas emissions from natural gas production, transmission, distribution and use come from fugitive methane emissions and fuel combustion 
(Jaramillo et al., 2007). A number of GHG life cycle analyses have estimated emissions throughout the natural gas life cycle (Venkatesh et al., 2011; 
Arteconi et al., 2010; Odeh & Cockerill, 2008; Ally & Pryor, 2007; Okamura et al., 2007; Tamura et al., 2001; Kim & Dale, 2005). However, unconventional 
gas production utilizes unconventional methods. The concern for increased emissions from horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing has stimulated a 
recent spate of GHG life cycle analyses (Howarth et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 2011; Hultman et al., 2011; NETL, 2011; Burnham et al., 2011; Stephenson 
et al., 2011). The studies examined generic shale gas plays (Howarth et al., 2011; Hultman et al., 2011; Burnham et al., 2011; Stephenson et al., 2011) 
or specific plays (e.g. Marcellus or Barnett). Also, these studies looked at a variety of end uses (e.g. electricity generation, transportation). All make a 
myriad of modeling assumptions that result in some variability in results. The figure below shows the overall GHG emissions from the well to the plant 
gate (through the transmission system) from each of the studies. For the Howarth et al. (2011) study the results using 100-year global warming potential 
(GWP) values for methane are presented for comparison purposes, though the 20-year GWP values are relevant to shorter term impacts.
Weber and Clavin (2012) review the studies shown in the figure above. They reconciled differences in upstream data and assumptions and conducted 
a Monte Carlo uncertainty analysis of the carbon footprint of both shale and conventional natural gas production. They found the “likely” upstream 
“carbon footprint” of natural gas production from conventional or unconventional sources to be largely similar, with overlapping 95% uncertainty ranges 
of 11.0–21.0 gCO2e/MJ for shale gas and 12.4–19.5 gCO2e/MJ for conventional gas. The upstream emissions represent less than 25% of the total 
emissions from heat production, electricity, transportation services or other functions.
Conducting life cycle assessments of UGD 
Countries with sufficient UG resources should conduct comprehensive life cycle assessments (LCAs) of current and potential natural gas production 
chains. Ideally, LCAs should include a sensitivity analysis (a systematic procedure for estimating the relative impacts that various factors in the chains 
may contribute), and a probabilistic analysis, as a way to incorporate uncertainty into the analysis. Assessments should initially be completed using a 
generic scenario to account for the many potential factors associated with UGD, in contrast to the various other potential sources of energy (electricity, 
heat and transport fuel). Region-specific scenarios should then be created to incorporate specific geological and hydrological conditions.
Figure 7. Greenhouse gas 
emissions: unconventional  
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Air pollution from liquids separation 
processes
After hydraulic fracturing, the pressure on the formation is reduced, 
allowing fluids to flow from the formation into the wellbore. Over a 
period of several hours to a few days, water volumes reaching the 
surface are large and will dominate the flow that includes some 
gas and associated heavier hydrocarbons (known as condensate). 
During this time, the co-produced gas may be vented or flared 
(burned) at the same time that the upward flowing fluids are 
directed into open pits or holding tanks on the well pad. In wet gas 
production, hydrocarbons will also be present in the wastewater. 
The ratio of gas to liquid flow in the wellbore increases quickly, 
and eventually the produced gases, primarily methane, can be 
recovered through the use of separation technologies, though 
continued flaring is common if there is no outlet (market) for the 
produced gas (NYSDEC, 2011). The process of well completion 
is finished when the wellhead or “Christmas tree,” a structure of 
valves and pipes to control the flow of gas, is bolted to the top of 
the casing that extends to the surface. 
The production stream experiences a series of pressure drops 
where water and condensate may drop out and damage the 
pipelines. On-site separation (e.g. glycol dehydration) to remove 
these fluids or heating processes are commonly employed to 
prevent the inclusion of water and condensate en route to gas 
processing facilities and/or compression stations. The water and 
condensate separated from the gas are stored in vented tanks and 
collected periodically from the well pad in tanker trucks for use 
or sent to processing for disposal (NYSDEC, 2011; Armendariz, 
2009). In areas where the fraction of condensate in the production 
stream is high, gas-processing facilities are used to create 
two hydrocarbon streams – one composed of mostly heavier 
hydrocarbons and the other primarily methane. Fractionation 
facilities are used to separate the heavier hydrocarbon stream 
into its separate components, namely propane, ethane and butane, 
each with distinct commercial value (NPC, 2011). 
When the water and liquid hydrocarbons are removed from the 
gas stream, hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) such as benzene and 
other VOCs, including hydrocarbon vapors, may be released to 
the atmosphere. Such VOC emissions will occur throughout the 
life cycle of a well (Litovitz et al., 2013; Armendariz, 2009). Some 
of the emissions will be released during the separation processes 
and others may be released as off-gas from stored flowback and/or 
produced water that is kept in open pits or in large, vented tanks. 
To minimize GHG emissions from venting and flaring during 
the initial “flowback” phase of production, portable separation 
technologies capable of handling high-volume flows of liquids are 
increasingly used (Litovitz et al., 2013). Use of these low-emissions 
or “green” completion technologies is limited by the availability of 
gathering pipelines to transport the recovered hydrocarbons. Water 
and liquid hydrocarbons produced at low rates over the life of an 
unconventional gas well may also be separated from the produced 
gas stream and recovered at the well pad for disposal or sale. 
Efficient capturing of the produced hydrocarbon fluids is possible 
through the use of widely available vapor recovery units (Gillis et 
al., 2007). The alternative is to vent or flare liquids produced with 
the gas, though flaring has the advantage of reducing HAP, VOC 
and methane emissions into the atmosphere (Armendariz, 2009). 
The concentrations of volatile elements and other toxics in the 
produced water, the type of storage, and the amount of time the 
waste fluids spend on the well pad are key factors in determining 
the magnitude of local and regional risks to air quality and human 
health.  
Recommendations 
1. Select dust management practices that are compatible with 
local conditions, minimize environmental impacts and limit 
human exposure. Consider operational changes and remedies 
to limit fugitive silica dust emissions. 
2. Perform baseline measurements of local and regional air 
quality. These may include (at a minimum) NOx, SOx, methane 
and VOCs. Monitor air quality and respond to changes 
appropriately. 
3. Minimize methane emissions through all phases of 
unconventional gas development and across the infrastructure 
used to produce and deliver natural gas to consumers. Limit 
venting and flaring and perform regular maintenance to prevent 
leaks. 
4. Measure and monitor human exposure to air pollutants. 
Consider the potential effects on community health in siting 
decisions for well pads and related infrastructure (e.g. 
compressors). 
5. Incorporate potential air emissions in regional land use 
planning efforts
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Section 3:
The need for 
political legitimacy
Political legitimacy implies that the national, regional and/or local 
legal systems permit (or even encourage) exploration, production 
and transport of unconventional gas resources. Moreover, in 
specific communities where UGD occurs, legitimacy means that 
local citizens and their leaders are prepared to accept some risks 
and disturbances in daily life in exchange for perceived benefits. 
If a nation, region or locality appears to be unreceptive to UGD, 
developers and their investors are likely to shift resources to other 
jurisdictions where the political environment is encouraging. In this 
respect, the sites for UGD around the world will be influenced by 
political considerations as well as by geological conditions and 
economic promise. 
In this section, we examine the recent political history of UGD 
regulation in several areas. By presenting short case studies from 
jurisdictions in North America, Europe and Asia, we seek to identify 
factors that may help explain why UGD is politically more legitimate 
in some jurisdictions than others. The case studies presented are 
not comprehensive, but serve as examples of types of political 
activities around the world. Not all areas are covered. There is, for 
example, recent policy activity in Australia on this topic (SCER, 
2013; ACOLA, 2013) but it is not included in the list of case studies. 
The case studies also provide an empirical foundation for IRGC’s 
recommendations related to the political legitimacy of UGD. The 
recommendations are timely, since some jurisdictions have not 
yet established regulatory policies toward UGD or are refining the 
policies they have. 
North America
Canada and the United States are similar in two respects – both 
countries have long histories in oil and gas production, and both 
countries have been led by political leaders who favor development 
of an UG industry. In Canada, prime ministers Jean Chretien 
(Liberal, 1993–2003) and Steven Harper (Conservative, 2006–
present) have supported expanded gas development, as have 
presidents George W. Bush (Republican, 2001–2008) and Barack 
Obama (Democrat, 2009–present). 
Canada 
The Canadian natural gas industry, which has operated since the 
19th century, is seen as an export-oriented industry and thus a 
source of jobs and prosperity. The rate of gas production in Canada 
is steadily rising, despite the declining yields from conventional 
plays, because of the growth in unconventional production (Kohl, 
2012). Canada also is attracting foreign capital (including Chinese 
investors) to help build its shale gas industry (Penty & van Loon, 
2012; Krugel, 2012). 
The timing of Canada’s growth in shale gas production could not 
be better: the market for Canadian gas in the US is declining (as 
US gas production rises) (Persily, 2012) but buyers throughout Asia 
(especially Japan, China and India) are offering hefty premiums 
for Canadian gas, well above current market prices in the US. 
As Canada develops its UG resources, it is a mistake to think that 
it will occur only in one or two provinces. Regions with particular 
geological promise include the Horn River Basin and Montney 
Shales in northeastern British Columbia; the Colorado Group in 
Alberta and Saskatchewan; the Utica and Lorraine Shale regions 
in Quebec; and the Horton Bluff Shale in New Brunswick and 
Nova Scotia. 
The politics of shale gas production in eastern Canada are far more 
contentious than in western Canada, where energy extraction has 
been a way of life for decades and shale gas plays can be taken 
without having a noticeable impact on large population centers. 
Sensitivity about shale gas production in Quebec is accentuated 
because some of the plays are located near the St Lawrence River, 
where there are densely populated communities and valuable 
agricultural fields (Blatchford, 2012).
UGD in Canada has not occurred without some adverse incidents. 
In September 2012 a company was performing a hydraulic 
fracturing operation in Alberta when drillers inadvertently 
perforated above the target reservoir at a depth of 136 meters. 
The government investigated and determined that the incident 
posed an insignificant risk to drinking water resources, but the 
company was required to implement a groundwater monitoring 
program. Enforcement action against the company was also taken, 
as it was determined that a variety of industry best practices were 
not followed (ERCB, 2012). 
Organized opposition to UGD has already been passionate in the 
province of Quebec, as indicated by emotionally charged public 
hearings and community demonstrations. A large-scale, grassroots 
citizens’ march through Montréal in 2011 was accompanied by a 
call for a 20-year moratorium (Blatchford, 2012).
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The controlling Liberal Government in Quebec responded in 2011 
with a temporary moratorium in order to allow more time for studies 
of potential ecological risks (Dougherty, 2011). When the 2012 
elections brought into power a new government with strong links 
to the environmental movement in Quebec, the new environment 
minister expressed the public view that “I don’t foresee a day when 
there will be a technology that will allow safe exploitation (of shale 
gas)” (Reuters, 2012b). 
For the Canadian industry to thrive, the government must also 
foster pipeline development and liquefied natural gas export 
terminals. Both are significant infrastructure investments with 
challenging regulatory and public-acceptance issues (Eaton, 2012).
Canada already has an extensive array of pipelines for moving 
natural gas (NRC, 2013). Networks of gathering pipelines move 
gas from wells in productive fields to processing facilities, while 
feeder lines move hydrocarbon products to the long-distance 
transmission lines. Several large-volume transmission lines deliver 
product to industrial users, refineries, local distributors and, 
importantly, to the United States.
The challenges of pipeline development are exemplified by the 
troubles facing the “Mackenzie Gas Project” in Canada. In 2004, a 
consortium of large companies proposed a new 750-mile, C$15.4 
billion pipeline that would connect Arctic gas fields with the rest of 
Canada and the United States. Operations were to begin in 2009. 
A review by a Canadian Government expert panel took much 
longer than expected, as some First Nation communities and 
environmental groups raised concerns about threats to local 
species and native cultures. There were also concerns that 
greenhouse gas emissions could rise if the gas is used to heat 
and upgrade oil sands. 
After five years of study, the panel concluded that fish in the 
Mackenzie River would not be harmed, that regional planning 
could protect polar bears, caribou and beluga whales and that 
greenhouse gas emissions might be curtailed due to diminished 
use of coal (Krauss, 2009). Canada’s National Energy Board took 
another year to issue a formal approval (Dvorak & Welsch, 2010) 
but the project experienced additional delays due to a lack of 
agreement over taxes, royalties and financing arrangements. Most 
recently, the corporate sponsors have curtailed spending on the 
project and delayed the start date to 2018, in part due to the 
unexpected growth of UGD in the United States (CBJ, 2012). 
Priorities in Canada are shifting somewhat from serving US 
customers to serving Asian and European customers. To reach 
those profitable markets, the gas must be liquefied and shipped 
across the ocean to terminals at Asian and European ports. Canada 
does not have adequate LNG export terminal capacity to meet the 
growing demands for gas in Asia and Europe. Like pipelines, export 
terminals require large capital investments, regulatory approvals 
and local public cooperation.
The US Department of Energy reports that 10 new LNG export 
terminals have been proposed (two in Canada and eight in the 
United States). The multi-year approval processes for LNG export 
facilities can be quite complex in both countries, and the US 
Government has not yet made a decision about the extent of 
LNG exports that are in the best interests of the United States 
(DOE, 2012). 
LNG export terminals are not simple to arrange. Consider the new 
plan by a Canadian energy company (Pieridae Energy Canada) 
to build a large LNG facility in the small port town of Goldboro, 
Nova Scotia (LNGWN, 2012). The facility would be located near 
a 1,400-kilometer transmission pipeline system and would be 
equipped to store, liquefy, load and export gas. Much of the gas 
would be supplied by unconventional plays in eastern Canada. 
Project endorsers include the Premier of Nova Scotia and local 
political leaders in Goldboro and the Municipality of the District 
of Guysborough, Nova Scotia. The Goldboro facility is many 
years away from operation, but the roll out of this ambitious plan 
illustrates the extent of local and provincial cooperation necessary 
for a credible launch of such a large infrastructure project. 
In summary, with the notable exception of Quebec, the political 
environment for UGD is quite favorable in Canada. There are 
discussions within the federal government considering subsidies 
for the construction and operation of LNG terminals. In western 
Canada particularly, the permitting process for UGD is already 
operational. Decisions are in the hands of professional civil servants 
because the legitimacy of UGD is not a major political issue. While 
Canada’s biggest customer for gas exports has historically been 
the United States, the Canadian industry, in collaboration with 
local, provincial and national officials, is gearing up to export large 
volumes of gas to Asia and Europe. 
United States of America
The system of property rights in the United States varies from state 
to state. In some, many of the surface landowners have retained 
their subsurface mineral rights; in other states they have not. State 
laws also differ on rules for the management of gas production and 
on whether neighboring owners are obligated to allow sales of gas 
from a shared reservoir (forced pooling). Even within a single state 
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(e.g. Texas), subsurface mineral rights may be handled differently 
in different parts of the state (Olson, 2013).
Despite the complexity of American property rights, state laws 
often provide incentives for gas development. Landowners often 
receive financial royalty payments from natural gas production that 
operates on their property. Property owners may also receive a 
“bonus payment” at the point of sign up for gas development, in 
addition to royalty payments. For some individual landowners, the 
financial benefit can run into the tens of thousands of dollars or 
more, depending on the volume and price of the gas that is sold 
(Plumer, 2012). This system of royalty payments is not unique to 
UGD, as it also fostered the development of conventional oil and 
gas resources as well as minerals in the US. 
Three states (Arkansas, Pennsylvania and Texas) currently account 
for much of the UGD in the US, but other states (Colorado, 
Michigan, Ohio and West Virginia) are rapidly expanding their 
contributions or are planning UGD (e.g. Bell, 2013a; DN, 2013). The 
states of California and Illinois have decided against a prohibition 
of UGD and instead have enacted new regulatory systems that 
permit UGD under stringent and relatively burdensome constraints 
(Wernau, 2013). It is too early to assess whether California or 
Illinois will see significant UGD (Conrad, 2013; Dean, 2013). New 
York State, which we discuss below, has enacted a legislative 
moratorium until 2015. 
Unconventional gas wells in the United States are not restricted to 
remote, unpopulated areas. A recent analysis of population data 
from 11 energy-producing states found that 23 US counties, with 
more than four million residents, each had more than three new 
wells (since 2000) per square mile. At least 15.3 million Americans 
live within a mile of a well that has been drilled since the year 2000 
(Gold & McGinty, 2013). 
Public opinion in the United States varies from state to state but is 
largely receptive to UGD. In November 2011 Deloitte administered 
an online survey to a representative sample of 1,694 adults living in 
the United States (Deloitte, 2012). The vast majority of respondents 
see natural gas as a clean energy resource whose production 
and use is closely linked to job creation. Only about 20% of 
respondents felt that the risks of shale gas development outweigh 
the benefits. Although citizens living near active fields are likely to 
have higher levels of awareness, about 40% of US respondents 
were unfamiliar with hydraulic fracturing (i.e. had never heard of 
it or were not at all familiar with it). The most frequently cited 
concerns about shale gas development were water contamination 
(58%), impact on surface land (49%), amount of water used (34%) 
and air emissions and earthquakes (both 29%). In a separate study, 
residents of both Michigan and Pennsylvania were found to be 
supportive of UGD (Brown et al., 2013; AP, 2012b).
Oil and gas operations in the US are subject to some federal 
regulations that set minimum performance standards and goals, 
but the bulk of regulatory oversight is governed by the laws of the 
individual states. In 2005 the US Congress exempted hydraulic 
fracturing from national drinking water regulations that apply 
to underground injection of fluids. This exemption gives states 
flexibility to choose how to regulate hydraulic fracturing, and there 
is some variance in how different states exercise their discretion. 
More generally, the political demand for regulation of UGD varies 
considerably across the United States (i.e. from a fairly pro-
development permitting system in the state of North Dakota to a 
prohibition of UGD in New York). To illustrate this variability, we 
consider the regulatory and political environments in three states 
that are important to the United States’ future as a gas producer: 
Texas, Pennsylvania and New York. 
Texas
The Barnett Shale is a formation that extends from the region of 
Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas, south and west, covering 5,000 square 
miles. Hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling have enabled 
the Barnett Shale to become the largest source of UGD in the 
US (TRC, 2012). 
Permit applications are evaluated by the Texas Railroad 
Commission, a regulatory agency once responsible for railroads 
and now principally responsible for oil and gas regulation (Ryan, 
2012). Each UGD proposal in Texas is evaluated through the 
same permitting process that covers conventional gas projects – 
a review process that entails detailed geological and engineering 
assessments. 
The commission has an unusual structure: the three politicians who 
lead the agency are elected in periodic statewide contests (Ward, 
2011; Magelssen, 2012). They make policy decisions and oversee 
the work of a professional staff that includes engineers, scientists, 
lawyers and other professionals. Since the commissioners serve 
fixed terms of office and are not removable at the will of the Governor 
of Texas, the commission has a measure of independence that is 
somewhat uncommon among US regulatory agencies.
The commission is an active regulatory body. New regulations 
were adopted recently to reduce flaring and venting at oil and gas 
wells and to disclose the chemicals used in the drilling fluids during 
hydraulic fracturing (UGCenter, 2011; WONC, 2012b). 
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The rapid growth of UGD in Texas has precipitated some 
controversy. Since the UGD projects are situated in the midst of 
one of the nation’s largest metropolitan areas (Dallas-Fort Worth), 
they can be a source of community irritation due to noise, traffic 
accidents and congestion, and odors and air contaminants. 
Another concern is that freshwater resources are scarce in parts 
of Texas, yet hydraulic fracturing consumes large amounts of water.
One of the most hotly contested issues was the US Environmental 
Protection insertion into the Parker County drinking water 
contamination case. EPA has broad authority to intervene when 
drinking water is contaminated, and gave credence to complaints 
from two Texas residents, despite the technical objections of the 
Texas Railroad Commission (Earthworks, 2011). At issue is not 
whether contamination occurred, but whether the contamination 
was due to UGD. 
The EPA ultimately dropped its claim against the drilling company 
after geochemical fingerprinting analysis of contaminated well 
water indicated that methane likely came not from the deeper 
Barnett shale but from a shallower formation called the Strawn 
(Everley, 2013; Gilbert & Gold, 2012; Armendariz, 2013). Residents 
continue to pursue their complaints (Soraghan, 2013). The EPA has 
also dropped investigations of methane contamination in Pavillion, 
Wyoming and Dimrock, Pennsylvania. 
The key contaminant at issue, methane, is naturally occurring 
and can migrate, so its mere presence in drinking water does not 
necessarily indicate that gas exploration or production caused 
the contamination. In Texas the issue is further complicated by 
the presence of many abandoned conventional wells, which also 
can be a source of residual contamination. 
The Texas Railroad Commission contends there are no documented 
cases of hydraulic fracturing leading to groundwater contamination 
in the state of Texas, despite more than six decades of reservoir 
stimulation through hydraulic fracturing (IOGCC, 2013). The EPA 
now has a large-scale national investigation of the water quality 
issue as it relates to UGD under way (EPA, 2013). 
Pennsylvania
The Marcellus Shale is up to 9,000 feet beneath southern New 
York, northern and western Pennsylvania, the eastern half of 
Ohio and most of West Virginia (Abdalla, 2012). UGD began in 
Pennsylvania in 2007 and has proliferated rapidly. By December 
2012, 5,700 wells had been drilled and 3,600 wells in Pennsylvania 
were producing gas from the Marcellus Shale. 
Over 85% of the Pennsylvania UG production comes from just six 
of the state’s 67 counties, half of it coming from two counties on 
the border of the State of New York. The second largest area of 
production is in the southwest region of the state near Pittsburgh 
and the Ohio border (Magyar, 2012b). 
Pennsylvania is not known like Texas to be a long-term player in 
energy production but the history books reveal otherwise. More 
than 350,000 oil and gas wells have been drilled in Pennsylvania 
since the first commercial oil well was established in Titusville, 
Pennsylvania in 1859 (Pahouse, 2013). The state is known for its 
industrial strength, and the declining prices of natural gas have 
helped Pennsylvania attract new manufacturing plants that use 
gas as a feedstock (Casselman & Gold, 2012).
Due to decades of experience with severe air and water pollution 
from coal use and steel production, Pennsylvania also has a 
vigorous environmental movement and a strong regulatory 
tradition (Kury, 2013; Tarr, 2005). Citizens for Pennsylvania’s Future 
(PennFuture) is a statewide public interest organization that has 
played a leadership role in highlighting the environmental risks 
of UGD and advocating for stringent regulation of the industry 
(PennFuture, 2012). Environmental advocates have been pitted 
against a strong advocacy effort from industry that includes 
everything from industrial donations to local elected officials to 
television commercials in western Pennsylvania touting the virtues 
of UGD (Schwartzel, 2012).
Permits for UGD are submitted to Pennsylvania’s Department of 
Environmental Protection (Bureau of Oil and Gas Management). 
The bureau has regional offices around the state that review and 
process permit applications. Concerns have been raised that the 
regional offices were not staffed adequately to respond to the 
surge of drilling proposals (Abdalla, 2011). 
Unlike Texas, where the top regulators are elected commissioners, 
leading Pennsylvania regulators serve at the pleasure of the 
Governor of Pennsylvania – a more common arrangement under 
US state laws. Thus, the civil servants who regulate shale gas are 
ultimately subordinate to the Governor of Pennsylvania, and thus 
the opposing interest groups seek to persuade the governor to 
favor their position on key issues. 
Pennsylvania’s UG industry grew enormously before the state 
could muster the consensus to modernize its regulatory system. 
In early 2012 Pennsylvania’s Governor finally signed a 174-page 
law that refines the way UGD is regulated (Kasey, 2012). 
Each county was authorized to levy an “impact fee” on UGD that 
is indexed to the prevailing price of gas. The state is to collect the 
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fees and distribute them to state agencies (40%), municipalities 
(40%) and counties (20%). About US$200 million in fees were 
collected in 2012. 
As part of a legislative compromise that ensured enactment of 
the impact fee, counties and municipalities are prohibited from 
using their planning/zoning authority to impose non-regulatory 
restrictions on oil and gas operations. This provision, which was 
challenged successfully in constitutional litigation, was aimed at 
providing uniformity for UG producers and service companies that 
operate in multiple jurisdictions simultaneously. 
The state’s Oil and Gas Act was also amended to increase 
the bonding amounts required of UG firms while the setback 
requirements were widened to protect homes and waterways. 
Stronger notification requirements are provided for landowners, 
stricter measures are applied against spills and some new 
disclosures about use of drilling fluids are required. 
Public opinion in Pennsylvania, where there are growing concerns 
about the risks of UGD, is nonetheless favorable toward UGD, 
especially in communities where drilling occurs. The Center for 
Social and Urban Research at the University of Pittsburgh surveyed 
403 residents of Washington County (near Pittsburgh), where about 
600 gas wells are operating. Forty-nine percent of respondents 
supported UGD, 29 percent opposed UGD, and 22 percent did 
not have an opinion. More than three quarters of respondents 
perceived economic opportunities from UGD and about one third 
of respondents had a family member who had signed a lease with 
a gas drilling company. A majority of respondents (58%) perceived 
at least a moderate threat to the environment from UGD but those 
concerns were not strong enough to favor the kind of prohibition 
on UGD that was enacted in Quebec (Heuck & Schulz, 2012). 
For the foreseeable future, it appears that UGD will flourish in the 
State of Pennsylvania, as leaders of both political parties in the 
state have endorsed the practice, assuming proper regulations 
are followed (AP, 2012a). Recent state regulations and the new 
Pennsylvania legislation are likely to reinforce the legitimacy of 
UGD throughout the state (Abdalla, 2011), though it is not clear 
whether the Pennsylvania legislation will serve as a model for other 
states (Rabe & Borick, 2013). 
New York
The State of New York was the United States’ first producer of oil 
and gas. Early in its deliberations on UGD, in 2008, the governor 
made a determination that departed from the regulatory treatment 
in Pennsylvania and Texas by designating that UGD is to be treated 
as a distinct operation, different from conventional oil and gas 
development. This unique determination, prompted by pressure 
from environmental groups within the state, triggered a requirement 
for a supplementary environmental impact assessment, which in 
turn led to a de facto moratorium on UGD until the environmental 
issues were resolved (CNN, 2011). 
The moratorium gave proponents and opponents valuable time to 
raise money, develop strategy and mobilize opinion for or against 
UGD. It also strengthened the hands of those landowners in New 
York who were seeking better terms on the leases they signed 
with energy companies (Magyar, 2012a). Both developments have 
reduced the attractiveness of New York to energy companies.
In 2011, after completion of the environmental study, the governor 
proposed for public comment a compromise policy where UGD 
would be banned permanently in state parks and other public 
lands, in the New York City watershed, in the Syracuse watershed 
and near some other state aquifers. However, the proposal leaves 
85% of New York’s Marcellus Shale open for drilling, since five 
counties near the Pennsylvania border would be allowed to pursue 
UGD. 
Under the governor’s proposal, each town or community in those 
counties would have the power to decide whether to permit 
or prohibit UGD (Hakim, 2012). The governor appears to be 
sensitive to the preferences of some towns in upstate New York 
that support UGD, in part because of the economic boost it has 
provided to nearby counties in Pennsylvania. In his 2013 State 
of the State speech, the governor highlighted the need for more 
economic development in the depressed upper state counties 
near Pennsylvania. Meanwhile, as his speech was delivered, about 
1,000 people gathered in Albany (the state’s capital) in protest, 
urging the governor to enact a complete ban of UGD (Wolfgang, 
2013).
After more than four years of organized advocacy by groups 
on both sides of the issue, public opinion in the state is about 
equally divided, with slightly more voters trusting opponents 
of UGD than supporters of UGD (SRI, 2011). About 40 upstate 
communities in New York have banned UGD, and similar bans are 
under consideration in 90 communities. Sixty communities, most 
of them in the five-county region that might be free to drill under 
the governor’s plan, have passed resolutions indicating that they 
will permit UGD in accordance with state regulations. The political 
battle in south-central New York’s Otsego County has been quite 
pitched, with opponents appearing to have gained the upper 
hand. The number of Otsego towns with bans or moratoriums 
on UGD has increased from five to nine from mid-2011 to early 
2013 (Wines, 2013).
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In summary, the State of New York has yet to find a sustainable 
policy on UGD and, in the interim, no permits for UGD are being 
issued. The governor has delayed a final decision on UGD several 
times, primarily so that various studies could be undertaken, 
including a new human health impact study. Most recently, the New 
York General Assembly in Albany enacted a temporary statewide 
moratorium on shale gas development. Thus, the future for UGD 
in the State of New York remains quite cloudy.
Overall, the political and legal environment for UGD in North 
America is not monolithic. For example, within Canada the situation 
in Quebec is quite different from that in Alberta. And even two 
political jurisdictions that border each other (e.g. New York and 
Pennsylvania) can have sharply different regulatory policies toward 
UGD. From a standpoint of a national policy, however, both the 
United States and Canada are aggressive about building an UG 
industry and, as we shall see, they are open to collaboration with 
other countries around the world that are considering UGD (State, 
2013).
Europe
The European Commission in Brussels has not taken a firm policy 
position on UGD. In 2011, the European Council called for an 
assessment of Europe’s potential for sustainable extraction and 
use of conventional and unconventional (shale gas and oil shale) 
fossil fuel resources, in order to further enhance Europe’s security 
of supply. In 2012 the European Parliament approved (by a vote 
of 492 to 129) two non-binding resolutions related to UGD: one 
calls for each member state to make its own policy on UGD and 
the other calls for each member state to exercise caution if UGD 
is pursued. A proposed ban on UGD was rejected by a vote of 
391 to 264 (Fulbright, 2012). 
In January 2012 a study of four member states (France, Germany, 
Poland and Sweden) concluded that there are no significant gaps 
in coverage in the current EU legislative framework, at least for 
regulating the current level of shale gas activities (Philippe & 
Partners, 2011). Regarding possible areas for improvement of 
national regulatory frameworks, the study considered it problematic 
that current public participation in the authorization process for 
exploration projects is often rather limited. It also stressed that 
the application of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 
should not be linked to gas production thresholds alone, and it 
emphasized that regulations should provide legal certainty for 
investors.
In September 2012 the European Commission published three 
studies on unconventional fossil fuels, in particular shale gas:
• The first study considers potential effects on the energy market. 
It reports that unconventional gas developments in the US and 
global availability of UG may indirectly influence EU gas prices 
(JRC, 2012).
• The second study on climate impacts indicates that shale 
gas produced in the EU causes more GHG emissions than 
conventional natural gas produced in the EU, but – if well 
managed – less than imported gas from outside the EU, be it 
via pipeline or by LNG (AEA, 2012a).
• A third study on environmental impacts looks at the potential 
risks that shale gas development and the associated hydraulic 
fracturing may present to human health and the environment. It 
concludes that extracting shale gas generally imposes a larger 
environmental footprint than conventional gas development 
due to risks of surface and ground water contamination, 
water resource depletion, air and noise emissions, land take, 
disturbance to biodiversity and impacts related to traffic (AEA, 
2012b).
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In the first quarter of 2013, the European Commission organized 
a large consultation with citizens, organizations and public 
authorities about the development of unconventional fossil 
fuels (e.g. shale gas) in Europe3. Results of this consultation are 
feeding into the European Commission’s “Environmental, Climate 
and Energy Assessment Framework to Enable Safe and Secure 
Unconventional Hydrocarbon Extraction.” This initiative will aim 
at delivering a framework to manage risks, address regulatory 
shortcomings and provide maximum legal clarity and predictability 
to both market operators and citizens across the EU. It will include 
options for an impact assessment to prevent, reduce and manage 
surface and subsurface risks; to adopt monitoring, reporting 
and transparency requirements; and to clarify the EU regulatory 
framework with regard to both exploration and extraction activities.
Until the publication of this EU-wide risk management framework, 
and without clear policy direction from Brussels, the issue is in 
the hands of politicians in the member states, where political 
cultures vary considerably (Atlantic Council, 2011). Policymakers 
throughout Europe are already taking conflicting courses of action 
and some policy reversals have occurred. Most recently, the 
European Parliament voted narrowly (332 in favor, 311 against, 14 
abstentions) for legislation that would require environmental impact 
assessments at all fracking sites as well as public participation 
activities. The final legislation needs to be worked out with the 
European Council, which represents the member states of Europe 
(Kanter, 2013). 
In this political environment, it is not surprising that development 
of the European UG industry is slow (Buckley, 2012; Erlanger, 
2013). To illustrate the different cultures and policies, we survey 
recent political developments in the UK, France, Germany, Poland 
and the Ukraine. 
The United Kingdom
With a long history in oil and gas development (including use of 
advanced hydraulic fracturing technologies), significant potential 
UG reserves and a well-established regulatory system, the United 
Kingdom might seem to be a promising location for early UGD in 
Europe (Richards, 2012). This is certainly what private investors 
believed until an exploratory program by the firm Cuadrilla caused 
unexpected tremors (i.e. small-scale earthquakes) in Lancashire 
(north-western England). The UK Government responded in 2011 
by implementing a temporary moratorium on all UGD until safety 
could be ensured (Herron, 2012). 
In April 2012 a report by technical advisors to the UK Government 
confirmed the link between UGD and the tremors of 2011 but 
concluded that proper management of UGD could minimize any 
seismic safety risk (Green et al., 2012; Royal Society, 2012). In late 
2012 the government, not deterred by anti-UGD demonstrations 
in London and other cities in early December 2012 (Matlack, 
2012), lifted the moratorium, arguing that properly utilized safety 
measures could reduce the risks of earthquakes to acceptable 
levels. The UK Government also emphasized that the spring 2011 
tremors in Lancashire were not major damaging events, as the 
British Geological Survey had recorded nine tremors of similar 
magnitude in a recent two-month period with no harm to health 
and safety (Smith-Spark & Boulden, 2012). The UK safety proposal 
calls for a seismic survey before work starts, a plan for minimizing 
seismic risks (e.g. a regulatory system that stops development 
based on the magnitude of the induced seismic events) and regular 
monitoring of seismic activity before, during and after development 
(Smith-Spark & Boulden, 2012). 
In December 2012, the UK Government announced that it has 
accepted all of the recommendations of the comprehensive 
and authoritative review of the risks of hydraulic fracturing as 
itemized in the Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering 
academies’ report (Royal Society, 2012) and is now working to 
implement their recommendations (UK, 2012). 
Recommendations include: 
• A “frac plan” will need to be constructed, submitted and 
approved by the Department of Energy before any development 
activity can be initiated. 
• An environmental risk assessment (ERA) will be mandatory 
for all shale gas operations and involve the participation of 
local communities at the earliest possible opportunity. The 
ERA should assess risks across the entire life cycle of shale 
gas extraction, including the disposal of wastes and well 
abandonment. Seismic risks should also feature as part of the 
ERA.
• A transparency requirement: all baseline monitoring data will 
be uploaded on operators’ websites for public use. This goes 
beyond the current transparency in UGD debate in many 
countries, which is limited to only disclosing the ingredients of 
fracturing fluids. 
3 Results of the consultation are available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/energy/pdf/Presentation_07062013.pdf
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The UK is also establishing a new Office of Unconventional Gas 
to provide strong regulatory oversight and to resolve disputes 
between developers, consumer and environmental groups, 
and local communities. Tax incentives to encourage shale gas 
development in the UK are also under consideration (Alterman, 
2012; OGJ, 2012; S. Williams, S., 2012). The UK Government’s 
new pro-UGD policy has already stimulated some new private-
sector interest, but the industry in the UK is expected to grow 
slowly (Young, 2013).
The NGO “Frack Off” opposes any fracking in the UK and is arguing 
that severe health effects are beginning to occur in areas of the 
world where shale gas extraction is widespread (Scott, 2013). 
The Church of England is also raising concerns. The Diocese of 
Blackburn (UK) is issuing leaflets that highlight the environmental 
downsides of fracking and the Christian duty to be “stewards of the 
earth” (Kirkup, 2013). In West Sussex, up to 1,000 demonstrators 
set up a tented camp in the summer of 2013 to protest against 
drilling at one of the first rigs. More than 100 people were arrested, 
including a Member of Parliament from the Green Party. The 
company elected to remove the test rig (Erlanger, 2013). 
Unlike in the US, in the UK the state owns the mineral rights. 
However, the national government and industry are willing to 
authorize some compensation to go directly to local communities 
rather than exclusively to the central government. The industry 
has published a community engagement charter (UKOOG, 
2013), which includes local incentives. One company is offering 
local communities in the UK US$151,000 for each well site, plus 
10% of any resulting revenues (Reed, 2013). In June 2013 the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) announced 
that communities that sign up to host shale gas drilling sites will 
also be rewarded with tax incentives. 
The UK is thus moving proactively to address many of the 
controversial aspects of UGD by presenting numerous specific 
options. Progress toward actual exploration and production of 
gas is slow. 
France
From a geological perspective, UGD in France is attractive because 
the country has some of the richest shale deposits in Europe. 
As of early 2010, the Conservative government led by President 
Nicolas Sarkozy appeared to be receptive to the development of 
this new industry. 
In March 2010 government officials in south-east France 
awarded three shale gas exploration permits, two to the Texas-
based company Schuepbach Energy and one to the Paris-based 
multinational Total SA. Later, the firms Mouvoil SA and Bridgeoil 
SAS were also awarded permits in southern France (Patel, 2011). 
Meanwhile, Hess Oil France was partnering with the French firm 
Toreador Resources to explore for oil and gas in the Parisian basin 
(Jolly, 2011). Some of the permits, which ranged in duration from 
three to five years, were for research only. In the latter case, the 
necessary permit and authorization to proceed was not obtained 
from the state to operate a concession for field activities and 
production. 
The organized environmental movement in France responded 
quickly and aggressively. Friends of the Earth issued a public 
statement that the precautionary principle should be applied to 
UGD, including a comprehensive environmental and health impact 
study (FOE, 2012). An elected French representative to the EU 
with strong ties to the Green Party, José Bové, organized a press 
conference where he urged local communities in France to ban 
exploration activities at the municipal level. Administrative appeals 
were filed in south-east France against the permit that was granted 
to Total SA (Zarea & Waz, 2012). 
The French Government is designed to hear the concerns 
of citizens, as the 22 regions of the country are each divided 
into départements, arrondissements, cantons and communes. 
Communes can organize public consultations in which issues 
of concern are discussed, and “fracturation de la roche” quickly 
became one of them (Mansfield, 2011). 
The 2010 documentary film “Gasland,” which features the alleged 
environmental problems associated with shale gas in the US, 
was shown on national television in France on channel Canal+. 
Excerpts from “Gasland” were also shown to citizens at local 
town meetings, as environmental activists made their case that 
France should not permit UGD like the US does, at least not with 
“fracking” (Mansfield, 2011). As opposition to UGD was building 
in early 2011, news from the United States included the revelation 
that diesel fuel was being used as a drilling fluid in some fracking 
operations (Rascoe, 2011). 
The focus of the French opposition to UGD was not earthquakes, 
as in the UK, but a concern about the potential for contamination 
of groundwater and ultimately drinking water with toxic chemicals 
(Reuters, 2011). Since the nascent UG industry was poorly 
organized and the French Government was slow to dispute 
the allegations or make the beneficial case for UGD, political 
momentum opposing UGD built quickly.
The palpable anger at ensuing protests went beyond what might 
have been expected from even a well-organized advocacy. 
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Citizens were shocked about the inadequate public notification 
of UG permits, the limited or non-existent public consultation 
in many communes, the alleged alterations of the mining code 
that had been made by government officials to facilitate UGD, 
and the implication that the natural resources of France would 
be subjected to American-style energy production practices. The 
resulting rallies and protests across France, including hundreds 
of anti-shale “collectifs,” did not take long to reach the political 
leaders of France (Mansfield, 2011).
The response of the Sarkozy government, which was facing 
elections in May 2012, was hardly reassuring. The former ecology 
minister under Sarkozy, the official who signed the initial UGD 
permits, was confessing a mistake and helping efforts to design 
a stricter regulatory system. In February 2011 the prevailing 
ecology minister under Sarkozy ordered a temporary moratorium 
on shale gas development (Jolly, 2011). The minister went further 
to explain that hydraulic fracturing is the only known technology 
that can access shale gas but it is “not something we want to 
use in France.” When pressed to explain why a moratorium was 
not placed on all shale gas activities, the minister stated that the 
“current mining laws do not permit it (a moratorium)” (Platts, 2011).
By the end of 2011, drilling near the town of Villeneuve-de-Berg 
in southern France was scheduled to begin. In March 2011 well-
organized protests involving more than 20,000 people occurred 
in Villeneuve-de-Berg (McKenna, 2011). 
The Sarkozy government enlarged the moratorium to cover 
research permits and any new UGD permits while extending the 
moratorium until June 2011, when an environmental study was 
scheduled for completion (Leblond, 2011). This stance was too 
weak in the eyes of elected officials in Sarkozy’s own party, and 
the French National Assembly took the issue into their own hands 
(Jolly, 2011). 
Legislators from Sarkozy’s Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) 
party proposed legislation that banned hydraulic fracturing and 
revoked existing shale gas permits. The bill did not rule out 
research into ecologically superior methods of UGD. Joining the 
opposition to UGD, Sarkozy insisted that the desire to tap new 
energy resources could not justify “massacring an almost spiritual 
landscape” (NewEurope, 2011). The Socialist Party argued that the 
UMP bill was full of ambiguous language that might permit some 
use of hydraulic fracturing in the future and was too permissive 
of other types of UGD (Pilgrim, 2011). 
Through rapid actions of its National Assembly, France became 
the first country in the world to ban hydraulic fracturing for oil and 
gas production. The key vote in the Senate was 176 in favor, 151 
against, as the opponents – predominantly the Socialists – argued 
that an even stricter ban should have been enacted (Patel, 2011; 
Scolnick, 2011). Some companies4 challenged the constitutionality 
of the prohibition through litigation but the prohibition was upheld 
by the French judiciary (Jolly, 2013). 
In his ultimately successful bid for the French presidency, Socialist 
Francois Hollande took a firm campaign position against UGD. 
But the proponents of UGD were not deterred. After the May 
2012 election, a coalition of energy companies and labor unions 
sought to persuade the Hollande government to permit limited 
UGD under strict regulations. Their case was boosted when a 
report commissioned by the French government and chaired by 
Louis Gallois, former chairman of EADS, concluded that shale 
gas development could be a significant boost to France’s sagging 
economy (Amiel, 2012). 
In September 2012, Hollande seemed to close the door on any 
form of UGD: “As far as the exploration and exploitation of non-
conventional hydrocarbons is concerned, this will be my policy 
throughout my (five-year) term of office.” (Amiel, 2012). Hollande 
went further and explicitly instructed his environment minister to 
reject seven remaining applications for exploration permits, citing 
“the heavy risk to the environment.” Thus, for the foreseeable 
future, France is not a hospitable legal or political environment 
for UGD.
Germany
At the request of the German Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology, the German Minerals Agency is undertaking an in-
depth investigation (“Project Niko”) of the extent of shale gas 
reserves in Germany, with complete results planned for 2015. 
Through periodic reports, this project is providing the most 
authoritative German view of the scientific issues (Petrow, 2012; 
Vinson & Elkins, 2013).
A recent report from the German Minerals Agency estimates that 
German shale gas reserves are in the range of 700 to 2268 billion 
cubic meters with minimal environmental risk from hydraulic 
fracturing (Bajczuk, 2013). The promising areas for development 
are located in the Lower Saxony Basin, which spans the states 
of Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia and Saxony-Anhalt. 
Given that Germany has ambitious plans to reduce dependence 
on coal and nuclear power, an expanded role for natural gas has 
4 www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2013/2013346qpc.htm
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practical appeal, especially since a well-developed network of gas 
pipelines already exists and renewables are not falling in price as 
rapidly as required to meet Germany’s long-term energy needs for 
affordable energy (Clark, 2013). Moreover, Germany is the largest 
importer of natural gas on the European continent and the third 
leading gas importer in the world. With roughly one third of those 
gas imports coming from Russia, there is also a security argument 
for a new UG industry in Germany.
Permits for natural gas production in Germany are issued at the state 
level, where there are 16 distinct agencies, but few permits have 
been issued to date due to concerns registered by environmental 
groups, community leaders and local politicians (Wüst, 2012). 
The website “Gegen Gasbohren” provides illustrations of the 
communications activities launched by citizens groups opposed 
to hydraulic fracturing. As of October 2012, the numbers of permits 
issued by state were: Baden-Wurttemberg (2, both now expired), 
Lower Saxony (5), North Rhine-Westphalia (19), Saxony-Anhalt (1) 
and Thuringia (2) (Petrow, 2012).
ExxonMobil was allowed to conduct three UG experiments (vertical 
stratigraphic test holes) in February 2008 at the “Damme 3,” north 
of Osnabruck in northwestern Germany. The tests yielded positive 
results but no permits have been granted for gas production. The 
most recent new permit for UGD in all of Germany was granted 
in late 2011 (Wüst, 2012). 
In Lower Saxony, where the permitting agency is based in Hanover, 
because of the shallow depth of the shale formation, there is 
concern about the potential for groundwater contamination. 
ExxonMobil has already invested US$26 million at a site in Lower 
Saxony (“Botersen Z11”), but has not yet persuaded the state 
agency to issue a permit for production (Wüst, 2012).
The situation in Germany is characterized by some features less 
emphasized elsewhere, and these are:
• A long tradition of geothermal research in Germany – 
consequently, the UGD and fracking are often tackled together 
with geothermal energy and by the same or similar stakeholders;
• The insurance “400 m limit” is often used to delimit “shallow” 
and “deep” drilling, each of them having in Germany different 
portfolios of priorities, in particular in terms of the protection 
against drinking water pollution;
• In terms of UGD, Germany is strongly divided north-south: the 
UG-rich north and the UG-poor south. This fact adds to the 
country’s problems of unequal distribution of renewable and 
alternative energy and the respective issue of transmission; and
• The green certificate trading system in Germany has not yet 
been adapted to facilitate increased production and use of UG.
Box 4: Dialogue process on UGD in Germany
Natural gas has been exploited in Germany for more than six decades, and many municipalities have a perfectly harmonious relationship with the natural 
gas industry. However, this was challenged in 2010 when ExxonMobil and other oil and gas companies announced plans to use hydraulic fracturing 
in order to access natural gas reservoirs that had not up until this time been worth exploiting. This announcement provoked protests in many German 
cities. Fueled by US media reports, popular movements against hydraulic fracturing have sprung up in numerous places where exploratory drilling was 
planned. The main concern raised by the prospect of hydraulic fracturing was the risk of release of chemical and methane pollution into drinking water.
The German ExxonMobil affiliate ExxonMobil Production Deutschland GmbH (EMPG) has taken these concerns very seriously and popular opposition 
to hydraulic fracturing in Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia. The company realized it was necessary to respond to the concerns (and the 
attendant opposition), for unless these issues are addressed and an understanding is reached with the relevant stakeholder groups, exploitation 
would be difficult, even if all safety technical measures were taken. ExxonMobil decided to eschew the usual approach of going to court and lobbying 
legislators, and instead engaged in a process involving open communication and dialogue whereby independent scientists would conduct a study of 
the environmental and safety risks entailed by hydraulic fracturing. ExxonMobil asked two outside experts to develop a concept for this undertaking, 
accepted their proposed concept, and provided funding for a study by a panel of outside experts, as well as for a social dialogue. In April 2011, 
approximately 50 stakeholder groups (municipalities, citizens’ action groups, church groups and associations) began participating in a dialogue process 
and monitored the work carried out by the panel of experts. The competent authorities from the German regional states of North Rhine-Westphalia 
and Lower Saxony acted as observers. The panel of experts was able to carry out its work without interference from ExxonMobil and in a transparent 
and open manner that met the highest scientific standards.
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Figure 8. The dialogue process on UGD in Germany
Source: Ewen, et al., 2012.
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Although the opponents of UGD in Germany achieved a de facto 
moratorium on permits at the state level, supporters of UGD warded 
off – at least temporarily – what happened in France: a national 
prohibition. In December 2012 Merkel’s coalition government 
defeated motions from the Green Party and the Left Party calling 
for a prohibition on hydraulic fracturing. The vote margin was 309 
against the prohibition, 259 in favor and two abstentions. A key 
argument made by defenders of hydraulic fracturing is that the 
technique has been used in Germany at conventional wells since 
the 1960s, with no documented groundwater risks or earthquakes. 
The German vote occurred the same day that the UK lifted its 
temporary moratorium on UGD (Nicola, 2012).
The Green Party, however, showed strength in the January 2013 
elections in Lower Saxony, where the shale gas issue was hotly 
disputed by the Greens and Merkel’s party. Since Merkel’s Christian 
Democratic coalition lost by a single vote, the new government 
in Lower Saxony will be a coalition between the Green Party and 
the Social Democrats (Buergin & Parkin, 2013). With the recent 
re-election of the Merkel party, the federal government will have 
less pressure to soften their pro-UGD position. 
The federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation 
and Nuclear Safety issued a draft ordinance on allowing UGD 
under certain restrictions for parliamentary discussion. The draft 
proposes alterations in the federal water law (no fracking in water 
protection areas) and environmental impact assessment (EIA) as 
standard when fracking is used. It is up to the political parties to 
launch a legal initiative in parliament. 
Even if the environmental concerns about hydraulic fracturing 
could be addressed, the politics of UGD in Germany are complex. 
There are a variety of German business interests (e.g. the growing 
renewables industry) that see UGD as a threat to their commercial 
future (Vinson & Elkins, 2013). And the Russian firm Gazprom, 
the largest natural gas producer in the world, is believed by some 
analysts to have influential economic and political allies in Germany 
(Smith, 2012). Gazprom is closely tied to the Russian Government, 
which is publicly critical of efforts to develop an UG industry 
in Europe. Thus, for a variety of reasons, Germany appears to 
present an uphill battle for investors interested in unconventional 
gas development. 
Poland
Poland has the largest deposits of shale gas in Europe. The 
estimated 5.3 trillion cubic feet of recoverable reserves in Poland 
are concentrated in the Baltic basin in the north, the Lublin basin in 
the south and the Podlasie basin in the east (Ernst & Young, 2012). 
Currently, Poland produces only about 29 percent of its annual gas 
consumption but the prospects of increasing domestic production 
are good through shale gas plays (Kruk, 2012).
The country’s commitment to shale gas production arises from 
its 60 percent dependence on Russia for its natural gas needs, 
the prospects of a new domestic industry with employment and 
earnings, the opportunity to respond to the pressure from the EU 
to curtail its greenhouse gas emissions from coal burning, and 
the prospect of growing economic and political power in Europe 
(Kluz, 2012; Smith, 2012; Angleys, 2012). 
Poland’s President Bronislaw Komorowski began his 2010 
presidential campaign with criticism of shale gas, but in a crucial 
presidential debate, argued that shale gas should be explored as 
an alternative to a new 20-year gas deal with Russia (NGEurope, 
2010]). After becoming president, Komorowski has offered strong 
support for shale gas, from seeking cooperative technology efforts 
with the Obama administration to requesting new legislation that 
will provide a favorable investment climate for shale gas production. 
Within the framework of a research project entitled “Assessment 
of environmental hazard caused by the process of prospecting, 
exploration and exploitation of unconventional hydrocarbons,” 
the Director General for Environmental Protection commissioned 
an analysis of the environmental impact of operations related to 
prospecting, exploration and exploitation of shale gas in selected 
wells. The work was carried out by a consortium composed of the 
Polish Geological Institute – National Research Institute (leader), 
University of Science and Technology and Technical University 
of Gdansk.
Several public opinion surveys were conducted in Poland in 2011–
2012, one with a focus on the Pomorskie region of Poland where 
UGD is under way. A large majority of respondents favor shale gas 
exploitation, less than 5 percent are opposed and about 23 percent 
are undecided (Burchett, 2012). Opposition is somewhat greater 
if a well is located in the neighborhood where the respondent 
lives. However, within Poland there remains concern about the 
objectivity of a survey conducted by the European Commission 
on public sentiment toward UGD5. 
5 http://www.lupkipolskie.pl/aktualnosci/newsy-ze-swiata/02-2013/ankieta-w-sprawie-gazu-lupkowego-powinna-byc-powtorzona
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The Polish Government has already issued more than 100 shale 
gas exploration licenses to Polish and international companies 
and smaller independent firms (Elliot, 2012). Despite a favorable 
political climate, the UG industry in Poland has not grown rapidly. 
A variety of setbacks has slowed progress and compelled the 
government to start work on an entirely new regulatory framework 
for the industry.
The setbacks began with a realization that the initial recoverable 
reserve estimates published by the United States Government 
were biased upward, though updated estimates of reserves are still 
quite substantial. Poland’s antiquated leasing process was also ill 
equipped to handle the surge of interest from firms. Some of the 
initial wells delivered relatively little gas production, which helps 
explain why ExxonMobil decided to leave Poland in 2012 (Cienski, 
2012). Investors lack certainty about how much the government will 
tax revenues from gas production, and Poland lacks accounting 
guidance for how joint operations with foreign partners should 
handle finances (Ernst & Young, 2012). Municipalities and local 
governments questioned what benefit they would reap from the 
new industry. 
For several years the Polish Government has been developing 
a much anticipated new law that will provide greater regulatory 
clarity and certainty for investors, including a uniform system of 
concessions and taxes. The growth of Poland’s UG industry will 
be slow until the new law is finalized, since many investors will 
remain cautious until the details of the regulatory system are known 
(Burchett, 2012; Scislowska, 2013). 
Concession holders had drilled around 50 shale gas wells by 
August 2013. This number is still the largest number of wells in 
Europe even though it is less than previously assumed. In the 
upcoming years, up to 350 wells might be drilled, according to 
Polish concessions. Lower assumptions of the recoverable gas 
resources published by the Polish Geological Institute in March 
20126 cooled down industry optimism a little, but it did not result 
in companies withdrawing. A few companies resigned from shale 
gas prospection in Poland, but their concessions were bought by 
others which are proceeding with development. 
Right now the government is finalizing public consultations on the 
new regulations planned to be implemented as soon as possible 
to enable companies to plan their activity. Until the new law is 
implemented, a slowdown of shale gas exploration is expected.
Ukraine
Ukraine has Europe’s third largest shale gas reserves at 1.2 trillion 
cubic meters, behind those of France and Norway. Ukraine deals 
currently with Royal Dutch Shell and Chevron for shale gas 
development, while paying the extremely high price of over €300 
per thousand cubic meters for Russian gas under a 10-year deal 
signed in 2009 by a preceding government. 
Chevron has proposed investing over €250 million in initial tests to 
ascertain the commercial viability of gas deposits at the Olesska 
field, with a further investment envisaged for the first stage of 
extraction. According to EurActiv (www.euractiv.com), Chevron, 
on one side, claims to be addressing the concerns raised by the 
Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Council, where the representatives 
of the far-right nationalist opposition claim that the agreement 
opens the way to lawful destruction of Ukrainian land during gas 
extraction and turning hundreds of kilometers of Ukraine into 
swamp and desert. Chevron would have the right to use sand, 
stone, underground water supplies and other water sources on 
the basis of agreements in and beyond the (agreed) area.
The shale gas plan in Ukraine hit a setback in August 2013 when 
a local council rejected the government’s draft production-sharing 
agreement with US energy company Chevron amid warnings by 
nationalists regarding likely damage to the environment. The 
deputies in Ivano-Frankivsk region, in western Ukraine, had 
sent the draft back to the government, pressing for guarantees 
which would address their concerns over the exploration plans. 
Chevron wants to finalize a deal to explore the Olesska shale field 
in western Ukraine. Both the population and some politicians are 
concerned that the ecological consequences of shale exploration 
in the mountainous forested region could affect the region known 
for its inland tourist resorts. But the government sees shale gas 
development as important for easing its dependence on costly 
gas imports from Russia, which weigh heavily on its economy.
6 http://pgi.gov.pl/pl/dokumenty-in/cat_view/294-aktualnoci-2012/297-zasoby-gazu.html
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Box 5: European public opinion about unconventional gas development
Between December 2012 and March 2013, DG Environment organized a large consultation among the European population (individuals and organizations) 
to collect information about public opinion and recommendations about the development of unconventional gas in Europe.
The majority of respondents came from France, Germany, Poland, Romania and Spain. Poland is the only country with a majority of respondents in 
favor of UG development. These results are consistent with a Eurobarometer study, conducted in January 2013 among 25,000 people, which revealed 
that the majority of Europeans would be concerned if shale gas projects were located in their neighborhood:
• 74 percent of survey respondents said they would be concerned, of which 40 percent said they would be very concerned (ranging from 54 percent 
in France and 52 percent in Austria to 16 percent in Poland and Hungary);
• 20 percent would not be too concerned, of which 7 percent would not be concerned at all.
A majority of respondents in the public consultation sees opportunities for the EU economy (to create employment, attract investment and enhance 
competitiveness), industry, technological innovation and energy security (to avoid increasing the EU’s energy import dependency, strengthen the 
negotiation position towards external energy suppliers, help diversify the EU energy mix and make energy cheaper for consumers).
Europeans are concerned primarily about the following aspects related to UG development: 
• New problems related to water quality and quantity;
• Potential land, soil and biodiversity issues (habitat fragmentation, reduction of agricultural land);
• Geological issues (seismicity);
• Lack of transparency and public information; 
• Lack of capacity of public authorities to supervise a large number of facilities;
• Potential legal and political failures (fragmentation of regulation, inadequate legislation applicable to UG projects and inconsistency in application 
of regulation); and
• Potential lack in technology knowledge (in particular about the hydraulic fracturing process). 
They are also concerned about decommissioning after operations cease (decontamination and rehabilitation of the site).
Asia
Throughout Asia, where the price of natural gas is much higher 
than it is in North America, countries are pursuing a wide range 
of policies to address the unmet demand for natural gas. These 
policies include construction of new pipelines to deliver imported 
gas from other regions, importation of LNG by ocean vessels, 
greater development of domestic UG resources and pursuit of 
alternatives to gas (coal, nuclear and renewables). China and India 
have expressed a particular interest in UG development but, as 
we explore below, a lack of infrastructure and trained workforce 
will slow the development of their industries.
China 
China is estimated to have the largest deposits of shale gas in the 
world. According to official US Government estimates, China has 
technically recoverable shale gas resources roughly equivalent 
to what is available in Canada and the United States combined 
(Nakano et al., 2012) and efforts are currently under way to better 
evaluate both the technical and economical recoverability of those 
resources. China has not yet launched large-scale commercial 
production and does not yet have a coherent regulatory policy, but 
there are clear signs that China intends to develop an UG industry 
(Nakano, 2012; Biswas & Kirchherr, 2013). Some analysts see UGD 
in China as crucial to slowing an environmentally destructive rate 
of increase in coal dependence (Muller, 2013).
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Shell has taken a particular interest in China’s shale project. The 
company’s progress has been slowed by difficult geology, dense 
population centers, uncertain regulatory regimes, controlled gas 
prices, and complaints in villages near drilling sites due to monetary 
compensation issues (Zhang, 2013). The central government of 
China is working to help address Shell’s concerns.  
In December 2011 the Chinese government signaled a shift toward 
more market-based pricing of natural gas, including an experiment 
with pricing reform in Guangdong province and the Guangxi region. 
The long-term plan is to liberalize wholesale well-head prices for 
unconventional gas resources, including shale gas, coal bed 
methane and coal gas (Nakano et al., 2012). 
Bilateral shale gas cooperation was established in 2009 as a US-
China priority by presidents Obama and Hu. The US-China Shale 
Gas Resource Initiative covers resource assessment, technical 
cooperation, investment promotion, study tours and workshops 
(White House, 2009). Given this level of presidential interest in 
China, it is likely the country’s commitment to shale gas will rise 
rapidly in the years ahead (Nakano et al., 2012). 
India
Natural gas production in India is rising more slowly than the rise 
of domestic consumption, causing a growing dependence on 
gas imports (Nakano et al., 2012). Shale gas production is seen 
as a long-term strategy to curtail import dependence, as India is 
estimated to have 63 trillion cubic meters of technically recoverable 
shale gas resources. 
Promising locations include Barren Measure Shale at Icchapur 
near Durgapur in West Bengal plus reserves in Cambay, Kaveri-
Godavari, Cauvery, Indo-Gangetic and Assam-Arakan basins 
(Nakano et al., 2012). The Damodar Basin is considered particularly 
promising because coal bed methane operations are already under 
way, the shale is relatively shallow, and nearby water resources 
are plentiful.
Currently, India has no large-scale UG industry and no established 
regulatory framework. A first round of exploration licensing, set 
for late 2011, was postponed at the insistence of the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests due to lack of adequate environmental 
assessments. Even if production were to increase rapidly, progress 
would be slowed by the lack of adequate main transmission 
pipelines and tie-lines. A shortage of personnel with training and 
experience in energy production is an acute problem (Ernst & 
Young, 2013). 
In March 2012 China released its first five-year plan for UG 
development. Goals have been set for producing 6.5 billion cubic 
meters of gas by 2015, rising to 100 billion cubic meters by 2020 
(Nakano et al., 2012; Biswas & Kirchherr, 2013). As of late 2012, 
Chinese companies had drilled 61 exploratory wells (horizontal as 
well as vertical), of which 21 were generating gas. Four particularly 
favorable areas (Weiyuan, Changning, Zhaotong and Fushun-
Yongchuan – in South Sichuan and North Guizhou) have been 
selected for initial production (Jianzhong, 2012).
In early 2013, the Chinese Government finalized the assignment of 
new blocks of land for shale gas exploration. Although the Ministry 
of Land and Resources attracted few investors in a first round 
of bidding (2011), the second round (October 2012) led to US$2 
billion in commitments over the next three years in 19 different 
blocks (BNN, 2013). 
The ministry has pledged to supervise the work of the 14 winning 
bidders (all Chinese firms), making sure that the work is carried 
out as promised. International energy companies were excluded 
from the bidding, though they are looking for a variety of ways to 
become involved in the years ahead, through partnerships with 
Chinese companies. 
New Chinese policies to accelerate the pace of UG production 
have been enacted or are under consideration. For technologies 
that are imported to China to assist in UG production, import taxes 
will be reduced or waived (Nakano et al., 2012). Prospecting and 
mining royalties may be waived and value-added taxes reimbursed. 
And production subsidies, already in place, range from 3 to 5 cents 
per cubic meter of gas produced. 
China’s environmental regulatory system is not well developed, 
though they have relevant experience through regulation of coal 
bed methane production (Nakano et al., 2012). The Chinese Ministry 
of Environmental Protection has issued standards to minimize 
methane emissions. The other ministries likely to be involved 
in shale gas development are less focused on environmental 
protection. They include the National Development and Reform 
Commission, the Ministry of Land and Resources, the Ministry 
of Finance and the National Energy Administration (Nakano et 
al., 2012).
Inadequate water supplies may slow the rate of growth of China’s 
UG industry. Eight of China’s 10 river basins are projected to 
experience water shortages by 2030. Some of the most desirable 
shale-gas opportunities are located in basins that are already 
facing acute water shortages.
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Nonetheless, former Indian President Pratibha Devisingh Patil 
told the Parliament that shale gas exploration and production 
are a priority. A proposed regulatory framework, including fiscal 
incentives for developers and market-based pricing of gas, has 
been issued for public comment (Ranjan, 2012; Telegraph, 2013). 
A “Shale Gas Work Plan” devised by officials from India and the 
United States calls for cooperation on resource assessment, 
training of Indian nationals and joint publication of shale gas 
studies (Joint Statement, 2012; Shastri, 2012). And India has also 
developed a bilateral cooperation agreement with Canada.
Recommendations
The challenge for political officials around the world is to determine 
whether development of an UG industry is in the interests of their 
constituents and, if so, what type of risk governance system should 
be instituted. The success of UGD will not be determined solely by 
technical and economic factors. Unless UGD is perceived to be 
legitimate by political officials and acceptable by their constituents, 
UGD will not be sustainable. Based on the political histories in 
this report and IRGC’s experience with other technologies, IRGC 
suggests the following guidelines for countries expanding or 
considering UGD. 
1. Legitimacy of UGD will be easier to accomplish in some 
jurisdictions than others, depending on factors such as the 
degree of citizen familiarity with oil and gas development, 
the perceived need for industrial employment, the intensity 
of organized opposition to UGD, the presence of a strong 
regulatory program that the public trusts and the jurisdiction’s 
degree of commitment to competing energy sources (e.g. 
renewables). 
2. Local community opposition to UGD is likely to be formidable 
if a strong and trusted regulatory system is not present, if 
concerns about safety and environmental risks are not 
addressed effectively, if new contributors to traffic and 
congestion are not addressed properly, if local communities 
do not receive financial benefits from UGD and if permitting 
procedures fail to provide early citizen notification and ample 
opportunity for community deliberation. 
3. In order to sustain political legitimacy, a strong public sector 
risk governance system built on the principles of sound science 
and data verification is critical. Government officials should 
expect significant activism for and against UGD, coupled 
with heightened media coverage and citizen interest. When 
unfounded claims (pro and con) are made about UGD (e.g. in 
the media), the response from government officials must be 
timely, authoritative and responsive to the key issues. 
4. Successful development of UG resources requires large 
investments in related infrastructure (e.g. pipelines, processing 
and – if overseas exports are envisioned – LNG export 
terminals) that are unlikely to be accomplished without active 
support from political leaders at multiple levels of government 
and in competing parties. 
5. Success in UGD can occur rapidly under the right conditions 
but it will not occur without a systematic and sustained 
commitment to the necessary capabilities (e.g. technological, 
workforce, infrastructure and communications). At the 
community level, UGD will also require additional resources for 
local and regional planning, water authorities, roads, schools, 
healthcare facilities and other inputs to daily life. 
6. Countries without strong track records in oil and gas 
development should consider cooperative efforts with 
experienced countries in order to facilitate understanding of 
complex issues ranging from geology and drilling technology 
to regulatory systems and local community participation. 
7. To foster trust in the global UG industry, energy companies 
around the world should consider developing, on their own, a 
program like the chemical industry’s “Responsible Care,” which 
ensures best practices of risk management, sustainability and 
community engagement are followed. A consistent standard 
of industry care may buttress public trust in UGD, especially 
in situations where regulatory agencies are not trusted due to 
underfunding, lack of expertise or other organizational factors.
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Section 4:
The evolution of regulatory 
systems for UGD
Introduction
No new energy technology springs forward immediately with 
a perfectly formed, comprehensive and fine-tuned regulatory 
system – regulatory systems evolve. The governance of risks 
associated with UGD has therefore evolved as a country or state/
province develops experience with gas exploration, development, 
production and closure, and in response to challenges or problems 
that are specific to that region. In Texas and Alberta, for example, 
the regulatory systems for UGD evolved directly from a well-
functioning regulatory system that was already operating for 
conventional oil and gas projects.
A variety of problems can occur in the evolution of regulatory 
practice. Some jurisdictions may restrict or prohibit UGD before 
the industry has a chance to develop and the public has a chance 
to become familiar with the industry. That is what has happened 
in France, Quebec and the State of New York. On the other hand, 
the rapid pace of UGD in a region may overwhelm the applicable 
regulatory system, as seems to have occurred in Pennsylvania 
and could happen in Poland or the Ukraine. When development 
of the regulatory system is too slow (e.g. due to insufficient public 
investments in competent personnel to review permit applications 
and inspect drilling sites), the public may lose confidence in the 
regulatory system, especially if highly publicized adverse incidents 
stigmatize both the industry and regulators. Investors may also lose 
confidence, as a competent regulatory system may be necessary 
to reassure investors in the sustainability of UGD.
Since regulatory systems for UGD differ and are at different stages 
of evolution, they can be quite confusing for policymakers and 
regulators in jurisdictions that have little experience in oil and gas 
oversight and do not have an established and well-functioning 
regulatory system. These jurisdictions may wish to be responsive 
to concerns about environmental protection, community values 
and industry needs, but are not clear about what regulatory 
systems best ensure such responsiveness. 
In this section, the IRGC pinpoints some of the key components 
of an effective regulatory system for UGD. Effectiveness implies 
minimization of health, safety and environmental risks without 
crippling the ability of developers to engage in UGD. While effective 
regulation may also attenuate public concerns, it cannot resolve all 
of them. Like all forms of energy production, UGD is not risk free, 
even when it is overseen by an effective regulatory system. Thus, 
politicians need to appreciate that UGD will stimulate some public 
controversy, even if the activity is properly regulated. 
This section begins by defining some key terms. This is followed by 
an exploration of why regulatory systems vary, and what is different 
about UGD that may trigger modernization of a jurisdiction’s 
regulatory system. The key components of a comprehensive 
system are then described, all rooted in the importance of a site-
specific operating permit with binding conditions that constrain 
the behavior of developers. The section follows with a discussion 
of the essential role of stakeholder participation in both the design 
of the regulatory system and the process of issuing site-specific 
permits. We conclude with recommendations about the design 
and refinement of regulatory systems.
Defining key policy instruments
The term “regulatory system” is used broadly here, referring 
to a wide range of different types and combinations of policy 
instruments, direct government regulation of industry in the form 
of standards, including liability systems under common law, and 
economic incentives to reduce risks through application of bonds, 
taxes and subsidies. Direct government regulation, through the 
imposition of mandatory standards, is by far the most common 
regulatory instrument in the oil and gas sector and may be the 
easiest to incorporate into existing regulatory systems. 
In theory, the multiple potential risks of UGD could instead be 
regulated through lawsuits where those damaged by development 
activities sue for compensation from developers in courts. The 
liability system would provide an economic incentive for risk 
management, and the policies toward damage awards could be 
tailored to optimize the incentives for risk management. Although 
liability systems are sometimes employed as a supplement to 
direct regulation of UGD, we found no political jurisdiction that 
relies entirely on a liability system to regulate UGD. Presumably, 
the transactions costs in a liability system would be fairly high, and 
it is hard to imagine the public having confidence in UGD without 
any direct regulation.
Economic-incentive instruments are sometimes recommended 
as an alternative to direct regulation of risk-generating activities. 
One could envision taxes or fees applied to some or all of the 
risks associated with UGD. Certainly some of the pollutants from 
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UGD (e.g. methane) could readily be included in a cap-and-
trade program to control pollution (e.g. greenhouse gases) from 
multiple industry sectors. Nonetheless, we found no jurisdiction 
that relies entirely on economic incentives to manage the risks 
of UGD, possibly because direct regulation is more familiar to 
policymakers and is more reassuring to people concerned about 
the potential risks of UGD.
The essential component of a direct regulatory system is an 
operating permit. Permits specify the conditions of operation that 
constrain the behavior of the developer in ways that protect human 
health, safety and the environment. The conditions of operation 
are typically compliance with mandatory design, performance 
and/or process standards. A necessary facet of direct regulation 
is a system of inspection and enforcement, including adequate 
resources for permit review, inspection of specific sites, and some 
form of penalties against developers who violate the conditions 
of their permits.
Regulatory systems for UGD do not exist in legal isolation. As 
systems are established and refined, the governing body – whether 
comprised of groups of elected officials, political appointees or 
career civil servants – must make decisions that situate regulation 
of UGD within an existing system of public law. The regulatory 
system cannot be properly designed without some appreciation 
of the technical and financial capabilities of the industry and the 
regulatory entity that will oversee the industry’s operations. 
Ideally, the regulatory system for UGD will reflect espoused energy 
policies. If a country is determined to replace coal with natural 
gas in many applications, then the regulatory system for UGD 
will need to facilitate development of the industry. If a country 
prefers reliance on nuclear power and renewables compared with 
gas, then a highly stringent regulatory system for UGD may be 
appropriate. Consequently, some jurisdictions will design their 
systems to give more weight to protecting health, safety and the 
environment, while others will favor industrial development.
A regulatory system is embedded in the larger political/legal system 
that defines property rights. Political systems vary in whether 
mineral rights are publicly or privately owned, and such variability 
may affect the assignment of rights and the allocation of authority 
within a regulatory system. Stakeholders may be defined differently 
depending on whether the resource is public or private. Many of 
the affected resources are privately owned in North America but 
publicly owned in many European countries. Therefore, in the 
United States the consent of a landowner may be necessary to 
undertake UGD while in some parts of Europe the consent of the 
municipality or other public authority may be determinative. 
How and why regulatory systems vary
The traditional regulatory system may be part of a broader 
regulatory scheme covering all oil and gas (or even all mining 
activity), or it may be tailored specifically to oversee only specific 
technical aspects of UGD, such as hydraulic fracturing and 
horizontal drilling. It is essential for policymakers to analyze the 
existing regulatory framework to determine current assignment of 
authority and responsibility, and then to determine if there are any 
regulatory gaps for UGD that need to be closed. In some cases, a 
history of development of another mineral resource within a given 
jurisdiction may aid the governing body in the development of 
governing mechanisms for UGD. 
Regulatory traditions tend to reflect the values that are important 
to people in a particular region. Jurisdictions may place priority on 
certain elements within their regulatory system based on factors 
like population density, distinct aesthetic or community character, 
proximity to rivers and lakes, and other special environmental 
resources. On the other hand, some essential resources, such 
as drinking water and air quality, will always give rise to public 
concerns if it becomes apparent that UGD is a threat to those 
resources.
In countries with multiple levels of government, regulatory 
systems could have national authorities provide minimum levels 
of regulatory protection (“floors”) but allow states/provinces and 
localities to go beyond the floors if they wish. Alternatively, national 
regulatory systems can pre-empt state and local regulatory 
actions, and state/provincial authorities can serve as the primary 
regulators (instead of the national government) and permit or 
prohibit additional regulation by local governments (so called 
“primacy” arrangements). 
The case for national regulation is stronger when there are large 
interjurisdictional externalities (i.e. one state/province is polluting 
the air or water of other states) and/or when there is evidence that 
competition for industry could lead to a race-to-the-bottom in 
the amount of regulatory oversight provided by states/provinces. 
Opinions vary as to whether these conditions are applicable to 
UGD. 
Real-world oil/gas regulatory systems differ in how much 
authority is allocated to national, state/provincial and regional/
local regulatory bodies. Insofar as the objective is competent 
and trustworthy regulation, it is important that the authority be 
assigned to a governmental unit with the resources and expertise 
for effective regulation, and the credibility to meet the public’s 
and industry’s expectations for competence. The location of such 
governmental units may vary from country to country.
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Should there  be a consistent national regulatory program or is it 
preferable to have  a state  or provincial approach that  is tailored 
to a region’s geology, community values,  and industrial capacities? 
States (“states” in the US or “provinces” in Canada and other 
nations) and industry are often  proponents of state-level controls, 
citing  the greater  resources, expertise and information in the 
states,  more responsiveness to public and industry concerns, and 
compatibility with historical land use. Alternatively, environmental 
entities often argue that a uniform national (“at country level,” 
i.e. federal in the US or nations in Europe) regulatory system can 
better ensure implementation of the technical standards that are 
required to protect public health, safety and the environment. In 
other words, a uniform national system of UGD regulation may 
better  ensure minimum safeguards for public health, safety and the 
environment than a system that relies entirely  on state/provincial 
regulation.
Industry will tend to favor regulation when the regulators 
are responsive to industrial interests, but industry views are 
not monolithic. Firms that are leaders in health, safety and 
environmental protection may prefer strict safety standards 
applicable to all firms, in part to increase the production costs 
of rivals but also to avoid accidents by unscrupulous firms that 
could damage public support for all firms in the industry. Small 
firms are often quite innovative and they have been crucial to the 
development of the UG industry but those same small firms may 
lack the staffing and infrastructure to deal with complex regulatory 
systems at multiple levels of government. Larger, more established 
companies – which sometimes purchase the smaller yet innovative 
firms – are generally in favor of regulation if it is based on science 
and industry best practices. Additionally, industry is often in favor of 
“regulatory certainty”. When companies are considering where to 
do business, those jurisdictions that demonstrate well-functioning 
regulatory systems are preferred, even if the system may appear 
stringent or burdensome as its predictability and credibility are 
highly valued by developers. 
For many, if not most jurisdictions, the assignment of general 
governance authority and responsibility is already established. In 
North America, where states or provinces are the primary regulatory 
authorities, UGD is exempt from several national environmental 
statutes. Sometimes state or provincial regulation fills gaps in 
national authority. In general, when states or provinces operate 
under national regulatory regimes, they may be afforded some 
flexibility to tailor the associated rules and regulations to their 
state’s needs and preferences. 
Similar arguments are often cited in the policy debate about 
the extent of state versus local governance authority. Local 
governments often argue that their traditional land use authority 
and their high responsiveness to local concerns should outweigh 
increasing state control over UGD. A counter argument is that 
local control creates a patchwork quilt of regulations that increase 
compliance costs for industry and may create a disparate impact 
on disadvantaged communities, especially where local government 
is dysfunctional or lacks technical expertise in UGD. As a result, 
the different levels of government may compete for regulatory 
power over UGD, with the location of power shifting over time in 
various jurisdictions. 
Because oil and gas development practices are location specific, 
regulatory systems tend to be oriented to the issues that arise with 
a particular subsurface geology and the related surface conditions 
and activities (Koppelman & Woods, 2012). The approximate depth 
of the Eagle Ford Shale formation in South Texas ranges from 4,000 
to 12,000 feet, with the shale located predominantly in rural areas 
of low-population density. The Barnett Shale is located between 
6,500 and 8,500 feet below the surface and underlies suburban 
Fort Worth, Texas, where the population is almost 750,000 citizens. 
In contrast, both the Antrim Shale in Michigan and Illinois’s New 
Albany Shale have depths ranging from only a few hundred feet 
to 2,000 feet below ground. Different regulations and safeguards 
are required in different geological and geographic settings. In 
Texas, for example, the Railroad Commission has created some 
rules that are unique to specific gas-producing fields or regions, 
and municipalities in Texas have authority to establish setback 
requirements and well distances from commercial buildings, public 
parks and residential homes. 
Differences between regulatory systems are influenced not only 
by geological factors, but also by variability in the overall value of 
oil and gas reservoirs and the distribution of ownership of those 
resources. Moreover, regulatory systems may reflect the extent 
of a pro-safety culture among developers who have operated in 
an area, with a history of “bad actors” generally causing more 
stringency in the design of the regulatory system.
The relationship between developers and nearby communities 
will also vary enormously and is influenced to some degree by the 
design of the regulatory system. What is expected of a developer, 
in terms of community engagement, may vary depending on:
• Population density of nearby communities; 
• Sophistication of the community governance systems;
• Maturity of the development; 
• Community norms related to extractive industries; and
• Ownership of the mineral rights or impacted natural resources 
like water, and other factors. 
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Even if a regulatory system does not compel specific forms of 
community engagement, the informal regulatory system will look 
for evidence of community engagement.
Therefore, it should be expected that regulatory systems for 
UGD will vary. Any new or modernized regulatory system will not 
necessarily be a carbon copy of another jurisdiction’s system.
Box 6: Pennsylvania “scrambles” to address wastewater disposal issues
The State of Pennsylvania developed its own UGD environmental regulations because the oil and gas industry is exempted from several federal 
environmental laws. This has resulted in a pattern of state regulators reacting to crises rather than anticipating and preventing them. The disposal of 
contaminated wastewater from UGD is a case in point.
UGD often generates a significant amount of wastewater, particularly when high-volume hydraulic fracturing operations are used, or if UG operations 
intersect brine-producing formations. The wastewater, along with the gas from wells, may contain some of the chemicals found in the fracturing fluid, 
as well as metals from the formation and high concentrations of total dissolved solids (TDS), mainly salts and minerals. In Pennsylvania, questions 
about the industry’s management of wastewater grew with the rapid pace of drilling in the region. 
The industry had experience elsewhere injecting the wastes into deep wells or evaporating them, but neither is feasible in Pennsylvania because 
of its geology and climate. To determine how to properly manage and safely dispose of the generated waste, mistakes were made that harmed the 
environment, allowed for unsafe water to be delivered to homes, damaged the credibility of the regulatory system and contributed to a poor perception 
of the industry.
The flowback and produced water from shale gas production in the Marcellus Shale has dissolved solids concentrations many times greater than the 
ocean, and thousands of cubic meters of wastewater may be generated from each well. Publicly owned treatment facilities were the first to accept 
the wastewater from the industry, and they did so for a nominal fee. Dilution of the pollution was the remedy, and this practice, a permit violation in 
some cases, did not draw the scrutiny of Pennsylvania’s regulators for four years (Sapien, 2009). 
In late 2008, regulators and the public began to pay attention after elevated concentrations of total dissolved solids were measured on the Monongahela 
River, a major tributary of the Ohio River (Hopey, 2008d). Industrial water users were the first to report high TDS concentrations in the river because of 
the corrosive effects on machinery. Citizens quickly followed as the drinking water supply for more than 350,000 people exceeded the US Environmental 
Protection Agency’s drinking water standard for taste (Hopey, 2008c). It was debated how much of the fall 2008 spike could be attributed to the 
UG operations (Hopey, 2008b; Tetra Tech, 2009), but ultimately regulators decided to place voluntary limits on the brine disposal at these treatment 
facilities. These limits had immediate effects on UG operations and the economics of wastewater disposal for the industry (Hopey, 2008a; Sapien, 
2009). TDS issues re-emerged in the Monongahela region the following summer (August 2009), and again there was wide disagreement about the 
origins of the pollution. Environmental groups mobilized following the water quality issues in 2008 (Hopey, 2008a), and plans were set in motion to 
effectively ban high TDS discharges to surface waters.
In September 2009, there was a major fish kill on Dunkard Creek, which lies on the border between Pennsylvania and West Virginia. More than 20 
miles of stream were impacted by salt-loving golden algae toxic to aquatic species (Hopey, 2009b). Environmental groups labeled the fish kill a “crime 
scene,” and there was again disagreement about the role of nearby UG operations in the fish kill. There is a long history of coal mining in the region, 
and mining was a known source of elevated TDS concentrations in the creek. The TDS spike that occurred prior to the fish kill and the source of the 
toxic green algae were investigated by the US Environmental Protection Agency and regulatory officials from both Pennsylvania and West Virginia 
(Hopey, 2009a). The natural gas industry denied any role, but in the spring of 2010 a widespread program of illegal wastewater dumping by a service 
company to the industry was uncovered, and the Dunkard Creek watershed was one of the disposal sites (Hopey, 2011). The illicit dumping revealed 
regular non-compliance with existing waste manifest systems that made it impossible for regulators to know if waste was being properly handled and 
disposed. Further, there continues to be speculation about the role of the shale gas industry in the fish kill (Soraghan, 2011). 
As TDS issues emerged in 2008, so did concerns about the levels of bromide in surface waters (Handke, 2008). As water is disinfected, the bromide 
forms a disinfection by-product that is known to be carcinogenic. In summer 2010, water suppliers in the region began to measure disinfection by-
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products in their water supplies at concentrations above US EPA limits. Many potential sources were investigated, but by 2011 there was conclusive 
evidence that bromide concentrations increased downstream of wastewater treatment facilities that were receiving wastewater from Marcellus Shale 
operations (States et al., 2011; Johnson, 2013b). 
Faced with this evidence, state officials decided to request that Marcellus Shale operators voluntarily stop disposing of their waste at these facilities. 
An advocacy group for the industry backed the voluntary request and stated its members would comply (Gilliland, 2011), but there are questions 
about whether self-regulation is working, as the levels of bromide in the source water for Pittsburgh and nearby communities remain high (States et 
al., 2011; Ferrar et al., 2013). If bromide loading in the basin does not stop, costly changes in water treatment processes will be necessary to avoid 
violating the US EPA’s limits.
The lesson from Pennsylvania is that although the amount of waste, its constituents, and suitability of disposal options will vary, regulatory and political 
systems must support proactive efforts to understand the potential environmental and human health risks, as well as the concerns of the community. 
Commercial UGD should not be pursued without a plan for the safe handling and disposal of its wastes, and plans that are enacted must be enforced 
vigorously. Though Pennsylvania’s brief history of disposal of shale gas wastewater has been tumultuous, notable progress has been made with water 
reuse, drastically reducing the disposal requirements and making the industry much more sustainable, financially and environmentally. When drilling 
began in 2004, Pennsylvania’s regulatory system was ill-prepared for UGD; the growth was overwhelming and numerous regulatory procedures for 
tracking and enforcing the safe disposal of waste were inadequate. 
Pennsylvania is now confronting the issues of handling contaminated solid waste generated from drilling, wastewater treatment and other UGD 
activities. Proper management of solid wastes requires specialized expertise and an effective regulatory system. A similar pattern of reaction, rather 
than anticipation, is unfolding.
Distinctive aspects of UGD and its 
regulation
Production of oil and gas is not new, and many governing bodies 
already have regulatory systems in place that govern conventional 
or unconventional oil and gas development. In Texas, for example, 
UGD is not treated differently from conventional gas development 
in terms of basic regulatory process. Pennsylvania, however, has 
recently adopted special regulatory provisions for UGD.
Several factors are unique to the development of unconventional 
gas resources and require special attention by regulators. The 
practice of directional drilling (horizontal boreholes) adds additional 
complexity to designing a permit for a drilling or production unit. 
Geographic areas allowing access to development activities – 
typically defined by easements and setbacks – must apply to the 
surface location, but the subsurface geometry of the producing 
borehole must also be integrated into the assignment of geographic 
drilling units. Appropriate information to make these assessments 
must be required from the operators and reviewed by regulators.
When hydraulic fracturing of a reservoir is employed to stimulate the 
production of gas, a new level of technical complexity is added that 
requires specialized regulatory expertise. Because regulators and 
developers cannot directly observe events occurring thousands 
of meters below the surface, there is inherent uncertainty about 
what happens downhole. Although such uncertainty is also present 
with conventional development, the uncertainty is magnified with 
UGD due to the complexities of horizontal drilling and the large 
volumes and chemical composition of materials used during 
hydraulic fracturing operations. Therefore, the modern process 
of hydraulic fracturing requires specialized expertise and refined 
regulatory systems. 
An issue of growing concern with respect to all gas development 
and use, especially UGD, is the potential for loss to the atmosphere 
of produced natural gas – so-called “fugitive” methane emissions. 
As explained in Section 2, the climate-control benefits of UGD may 
not be realized if methane emissions are not controlled. In a recent 
report, the US EPA found that methane leaks during natural gas 
production are significant, but lower in magnitude than previously 
thought (Taylor et al., 2012). 
It may be fortunate that shale gas development is proceeding much 
more slowly in jurisdictions without a strong history of oil and gas 
development (e.g. North Carolina and Quebec) than in jurisdictions 
with a strong history (e.g. Alberta, Pennsylvania and Texas). But 
even in areas with a history of oil and gas production, the rapid rise 
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in UGD is increasing the concentration of operations, and thereby 
substantially increasing the potential impacts and visibility of UGD. 
Consequently, rapid growth in UGD is putting strains on the ability 
of regulatory bodies to effectively regulate development because 
of capacity limitations in the public sector, including possible gaps 
and deficiencies in the design of the regulatory system but also 
a simple shortage of qualified personnel in the public sector who 
understand UGD. We therefore turn to the essential ingredients 
of a regulatory system.
Key components of a regulatory 
system
This section focuses on components of a regulatory system 
that are applicable across different systems of property rights, 
alternative political systems, and different designs of governing 
bodies. A “comprehensive” regulatory system of UGD is one that 
addresses each of the key components. In a theoretical sense, 
the aim of the comprehensive system is to efficiently maximize 
the overall welfare of society, accounting for both the risks and 
benefits of UGD (Taylor et al., 2012). Translating the theory into 
practice, however, is challenging. 
Comprehensive systems address five fundamental issues: 
1) measurement and documentation of baseline conditions; 
2) establishment of technical standards based on best industry 
practices; 3) implementation mechanisms; 4) oversight of industry 
compliance through inspections and enforcement; and 5) financial 
viability of both the regulatory entity and the industry, including 
adequate mechanisms of financial assurance. At the same time, 
a comprehensive system should also have the ability to adapt, 
based on new technical and economic data, and changing public 
preferences. 
Some of the desirable features of regulatory systems seem to be 
at odds with each other. For example, there is tension between the 
need for stability and predictability in the conditions that govern a 
site-specific operating permit (regulatory certainty) and the need 
for flexibility and adaptability in response to new evidence and 
unexpected developments. Regulatory systems differ in how much 
emphasis they give to stability/predictability versus flexibility/
adaptability.
Measurement and documentation of 
baseline conditions
Baseline conditions refer to measuring and documenting the 
physical and chemical condition of a development site prior 
to the initiation of development activities. Often these include 
characterizing the geology, soils, air quality, ecosystems and 
surface and groundwater systems. This can be accomplished 
by using existing information, which is often available from 
government, or by requiring new information to be acquired 
by developers via testing and analysis. To ensure an effective 
regulatory approach, baseline assessments should be based 
on an evaluation of potential pathways for adverse impacts to 
public health, safety and the environment. Developers should 
be required to share baseline information with the appropriate 
regulatory authority.
The baseline measurements required by a regulatory system should 
be designed based on an evaluation of the potential pathways for 
contaminants to impact human health, safety and the environment. 
If those pathways are properly identified, the potential adverse 
impacts from UGD can be anticipated and prevented or minimized. 
For example, if the productive reservoir is shallow and relatively 
close to groundwater supplies, then regulations should focus 
on mitigating any potential negative impacts to the groundwater 
system by implementing practices such as establishing minimum 
distances from wells to buildings and other susceptible areas 
and/or activities. If the groundwater source cannot be utilized 
for drinking water due to poor quality, deliverability concerns or 
prior contamination, regulatory oversight to protect it should be 
commensurately reduced since the potential public health impact 
is low. Identified pathways for public health or environmental 
impacts should be studied, and the baseline monitoring system 
should address each pathway. 
Since reservoirs vary geophysically and geochemically, the 
resulting plays vary in depth, thickness, composition, distance 
from groundwater and other subsurface mineral resources, amount 
and the composition of the formation water and associated 
hydrocarbons. Evaluating the specific characteristics of the 
resource will help guide the development of appropriate standards 
and highlight areas for regulatory priority. Some of the necessary 
information is available from government while some must be 
generated by industry. Thus, an effective regulatory system 
presumes a significant degree of partnership between government 
and the UGD industry. At the same time, the regulatory agency 
must have access to the data generated by developers in order to 
establish detailed regulations tailored to a specific region or area 
and that are well designed to anticipate and prevent or mitigate 
possible risks. 
For developers, the task of measuring and documenting baseline 
conditions may seem onerous, especially since the establishment 
of baseline measurements often requires a partnership (shared 
responsibility) between government and industry. Recently, one of 
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the major developers in the US (Chesapeake Energy) offered the 
EPA the opportunity to conduct before-and-after water sampling 
tests at one of its drilling sites. The EPA tests are part of a larger 
study that Congress requested on the environmental impacts of 
natural gas drilling in the United States. 
Adverse impacts to air and water resources can affect communities, 
economies and individuals. Water and air baseline assessment – 
including measurements and analyses conducted before shale 
gas development begins in a new area – provides a metric by 
which to compare the impact of shale gas development. (American 
Petroleum Institute guidance (API - HF1) recommends that a 
baseline assessment program, which includes the sampling of 
nearby water wells, be conducted prior to hydraulic fracturing 
operations.) Baseline assessments can include both ambient 
monitoring over a large area and site-by-site evaluations. Regular 
measurements for comparison to baseline data are then necessary 
to assess whether shale gas development has caused cumulative 
or site-specific adverse impacts. Baseline characterization 
has most often been used for groundwater and can include 
assessment of the groundwater quality and quantity, existing 
pollution levels and sources (urban, industrial or agriculture), and 
groundwater hydrology such as flow and contaminant transport 
and biogeochemical interactions and transformations to determine 
the vulnerability of groundwater to contamination from shale gas 
development activities. 
Baseline assessments may also be useful for spatial planning. Shale 
gas development is progressing rapidly due in part to the increased 
flexibility provided by directional drilling and a minimized surface 
footprint. Although shale gas development is limited to the location 
of the play, horizontal drilling can reduce some of the surface 
area impacts and provides increased flexibility to the industry to 
more fully consider competing land uses and community needs 
in well siting. Land use planning utilized in coordination with other 
implementation methods (discussed below) can help locate shale 
gas operations that enlarge resource extraction in a balance with 
respect for other community needs. Baseline assessments inform 
spatial planning efforts that balance the competing demands for 
natural resource protection and sufficient resources for a variety of 
industries, economic development efforts, and community needs.
Box 7: Types of monitoring
The following is a listing of the various types and the associated value of monitoring systems. The application of each should be enacted in proportion 
to the potential risk in a given circumstance. 
1. Seismic monitoring – helps detect locations where subsurface injection might provoke seismic activity.
2. Groundwater monitoring – allows for immediate detection of major leakage, but probably not minor leakage. The effectiveness of groundwater 
monitoring can be heightened by instaling measurement gauges around the well that are linked to a chemical and toxicological monitoring device. 
Moreover, monitoring measures need to be supported by an emergency plan so that the appropriate response can be initiated quickly.
3. Gas monitoring – allows for assessment of the greenhouse gas footprint based on methane emissions data.
4. Building status monitoring – allows for determination of whether any defects that appear predate a seismic event or were caused by induced 
seismicity.
5. Leakage monitoring at the well and in pipelines via pressure and other measurements.
Is monitoring meant to be an alarm system or an observation process?
The answer is both. Some processes move faster than others. For example, concerns that polluted deep groundwater has been flowing toward thermal 
baths for decades can only be validated through long-term monitoring. On the other hand, rapid action is needed for cases in which, for example, 
contaminants are percolating out of a well or a leaky pipeline. The exact procedures in such cases should be addressed through dialogue with the 
various concerned parties.
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Establishment of technical performance 
standards
Technical performance standards are drawn from fundamental 
scientific concepts, analogs and experiences and are grounded, 
whenever feasible, with baseline information. The standards 
must be as comprehensive as possible to address the range of 
potential events that could lead to adverse impacts. The actual 
standards should be based on baseline assessment, community 
needs identified in land use plans and on the latest industry best 
practices. The industry is changing rapidly, and some citizen 
concerns are being addressed by technological innovation. 
For example, companies are increasing the use of food-grade 
chemical additives to replace the BTEX chemicals and in response 
to restrictions on wastewater disposal, industry is increasingly 
re-using wastewater, at least in some areas of UGD. The areas 
where industry innovation and best practices are making the most 
contributions should be integrated into the assessment process. 
Rather than prescribe specific technical practices, some 
authorities argue that technical standards should be written with 
performance goals that developers must meet in their compliance 
plans. Developers should be free to select the most appropriate 
means of compliance with technical standards. The need for 
a performance orientation of technical standards was recently 
emphasized by the UK’s Royal Society and Royal Academy 
of Engineering (Koppelman & Woods, 2012). There are some 
international standards established through ISO processes as well 
as industry best practices defined in individual countries or regions 
(e.g. see the Australian best practice guidelines on development of 
unconventional gas from coal seams at: http://www.scer.gov.au/
workstreams/land-access/coal-seam-gas/). Best practices need 
to move the entire industry forward but must also be sensitive to 
cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness concerns.
If pre-drilling activities have appropriately sited well locations, then 
drilling and production activity regulation can focus on adherence 
to technical performance standards specific to the jurisdiction. A 
regulatory system may include technical standards that prescribe 
minimum well spacing, easements, road use restrictions and 
procedures for establishing pipeline right-of-ways.
During the production’s drilling and development phase, well 
construction and well integrity standards, water and waste 
management procedures, and notification/disclosure policies 
must all be based on technical standards. Standards should 
include casing and cementing; identification of pathways for 
fluid migration; management of wastewater; availability of water 
considering competing uses and environmental impact; and spill 
and accident response.
Activities that take place during the productive phase of the well’s 
lifetime must also be considered. These include normal operational 
functions, as well as refracturing and workover operations (major 
repairs or modifications to increase well production or fix a problem 
with the well) and need to be addressed with the same technical 
standards. 
Finally, plugging or well closure and site reclamation are critical 
steps to minimize the long-term impact of shale gas development. 
A robust regulatory system should have standards to ensure 
that proper closure (plugging and abandonment procedures) 
minimizes any risks to other subsurface resources and the surface 
environment, and that well sites are restored to a level consistent 
with the surrounding uses.
Since it is predictable that wells will be abandoned, developers 
should be required to design, construct and operate wells so that 
they can be suspended or abandoned in a safe manner. Regulators 
should be notified of abandonment, including periodic reports 
during the abandonment process. 
Technical standards must also address environmental and public 
health risks, as discussed in Section 2. These risks include:
• Cumulative impacts to essential resources like air and water; 
• Effects to landowners near the area of impact;
• Cumulative public health impacts;
• Transportation and infrastructure impacts;
• Impacts on light and noise; and
• Valued features of community character. 
Implementation mechanisms
Implementation mechanisms include direct regulation (i.e. 
prescriptive tools such as operating permits with specified 
conditions), incentive tools that include liability rules and taxes/
subsidies and voluntary practices. The mix of implementation 
mechanisms depends upon a wide range of technical, political 
and economic considerations. The goal of implementation is to 
design a site-specific system that considers and protects regional 
planning, safety, public health and the environment, corporate 
interests and landowner and community values. 
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• Regulatory systems can include a mixture of implementation 
tools, but most jurisdictions rely primarily on permits to meet 
specific technological standards or to meet environmental or 
public health goals through performance standards. Permits 
vary depending on the structure of the regulatory system. 
For example, if the existing governance framework includes 
multiple, separate regulatory agencies (one for groundwater, 
surface water, land use planning), then UGD may be regulated 
by a multi-permit system. Governing bodies may also choose 
to consolidate permitting authority into a single permit, thereby 
increasing regulatory efficiency. Regardless of the underlying 
regulatory structure, permitting – a multi-step process with 
potential cross-media impacts – is necessarily complicated 
and may not fully balance corporate interests, regional planning 
and community values. 
• Often complementary to permitting, land use planning and 
monitoring of environmental impact may also be important 
implementation mechanisms, particularly if strong baseline 
assessments are conducted. Environmental impact analysis 
may already be covered – at least implicitly – in the development 
of the permit, but in some cases a separate environmental 
impact process may be appropriate (e.g. at a site where a large 
number of wells may produce cumulative impacts). 
 Land use planning can help identify setbacks for well sites from 
valued natural or sacred areas, schools and other community 
features. This planning can also address subsequent property 
development, community growth, economic development 
for other industries and natural resource impacts like habitat 
fragmentation and destruction. 
 Land use plans are generally developed at the local level, while 
permit systems for UGD are typically issued by local offices 
of state or provincial agencies. Existing land use plans in a 
community may have been adopted without realization of the 
opportunity presented by gas development. Most state or 
provincial regulatory systems do not have a formal mechanism 
for incorporating local land use considerations into permitting 
and siting decisions. Since the precise location of the well pad 
and the orientation of the wellbore are critical to commercial 
success, existing land use plans may need to be modified 
to facilitate UGD. Where mineral rights are held by multiple 
parties, some procedures of unitization and pooling also may 
be important to facilitate UGD.
• A proper process of community participation in permitting and 
siting projects can facilitate adjustments to UGD that respect 
important values in existing land use plans. Setbacks for well 
sites can protect natural or sacred areas, schools and other 
community features, while accounting for subsequent property 
development, community growth and economic development 
of other industries. In some cases, a decision may be made to 
respect existing land use plans in order to avoid natural resource 
impacts, such as habitat fragmentation and destruction. When 
the size of the shale play is large enough to impact several local 
jurisdictions, community participation in a regional land use 
planning process may be necessary and appropriate.
• A regulatory system can incorporate additional implementation 
mechanisms, including industry best practices as performance 
standards and incentive-based liability practices. One of the 
most recent examples of incentive practices is Pennsylvania’s 
adoption of a “presumptive liability” test for groundwater 
contamination (similar to the EC Environmental Liability 
Directive, which is a strict application of the polluter-pay 
principle). If a drinking water well within 2,500 feet of any 
well is contaminated, the driller of the well is presumed to 
have caused the contamination and is liable unless he can 
show otherwise. This rule puts the onus on the industry and 
landowners to complete a baseline assessment before drilling 
starts. The rule balances landowner protection against false 
claims against the industry, and is not implemented primarily 
through a permitting mechanism. Insurance requirements may 
be another mechanism for balancing the industry’s needs. 
Pollution insurance policies, if targeted to the correct risks and 
to fill gaps in general liability coverage, may be another risk 
management strategy incorporated into a regulatory system. 
Financial assurance requirements, including bonds or trusts, 
are commonly used to cover activities in which the regulatory 
incentives are not effective. In most cases, incentive-based 
mechanisms are supplements rather than alternatives to direct 
regulation. 
Oversight of compliance
A robust system of inspections, enforcement and punishment is 
essential to an effective regulatory system. When done correctly 
and communicated appropriately, the enforcement process 
provides information to the industry and the public about the 
types and frequencies of violations that may have public health, 
safety and environmental impacts. Therefore, this process acts 
as a reassurance that the industry is collectively abiding by the 
protective technical standards. Since penalties are assigned to 
specific violators rather than the whole industry, non-offending 
developers do not necessarily suffer damage to their reputations 
from an enforcement action. Data on violations can also be 
analyzed for trends and clustering in specific regions. All of 
these virtues of a robust system make some key assumptions: 
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adequate resources, expertise and manpower are made available 
for inspections, enforcement and prosecution of violators; there 
is a political will to enforce the conditions of permits; and the 
process focuses on protecting human health, ensuring safety and 
minimizing environmental impact. 
Regarding the inspection process, the frequency and timing of 
inspections must be sufficient from a deterrence perspective to 
influence developer behavior in all phases of UGD over a sustained 
period of time. The Texas Railroad Commission, for example, 
sponsors about 120,000 inspections per year, but still relies in part 
on community complaints to identify problematic operations. There 
are high-priority areas for inspections (e.g. well casing operations), 
but others need to be determined as data are accumulated over 
time. Oversight during this time is critical to ensure the cementing 
of the well casing meets the technical standards. 
Penalties for violations must be set to serve as an effective 
deterrent, but they may also play a role in boosting public trust 
in the system and providing funding for the agencies to conduct 
essential investigative operations. 
Making enforcement information publicly available allows 
independent analysts to search for patterns in the data, identify 
possible cumulative impacts, and highlight areas in the process 
where innovative and more protective standards may be necessary. 
In cases where an enforcement system is not considered credible, 
it may be necessary to implement independent audits to ensure 
durability.
Financial viability 
A regulatory system must be financially sustainable, which includes 
consideration of financial burdens on the industry, the regulatory 
agency and the public at large. 
Regulatory agency funding must be sufficient to provide:
• Staff and technology for permit review; 
• Outreach and coordination with the public and industry; 
• Enforcement and inspections; 
• Staff training; and 
• Data collection and management. 
Funding should also be adequate to address impacts from all 
stages of shale development. Regulatory agencies can be funded 
through permit fees paid directly to the agency, severance taxes on 
produced gas, royalties on public lands, general funds or through 
direct appropriations. 
A regulatory system should also consider the life cycle of the 
specific development by the industry when creating financial 
mechanisms. Environmental issues requiring remediation may 
occur at any stage. To reduce the risk of unfunded environmental 
externalities, regulatory systems generally require financial 
assurance from the industry, often in the form of a surety or bond 
to the regulatory agency. Financial assurance requirements may 
only be effective if they are commensurate with the environmental 
costs to be internalized. For activities such as well plugging and 
abandonment, financial assurance requirements incentivize the 
operator to perform the reclamation. In general, failure to perform 
activities subject to financial assurance results in the bonded or 
otherwise held monies going to the regulatory agency to perform 
the work. Financial assurance requirements can be comprehensive 
– applying to proper well closure, restoring the surface to pre-
development conditions, and remediation of contamination caused 
by the drilling operation. Costs of reclamation projects can vary 
widely and a current challenge is providing sufficient incentive for 
operators to perform activities required by regulation. Financial 
assurance requirements may apply to single operators or wells 
and often allow for multiple wells of a single operator covered by 
a blanket bond (GAO, 2010). Some bonding requirements can 
be increased or decreased based on factors identified by the 
regulatory agency, such as well depth or number of wells on a 
well pad.
Other financial assurance mechanisms for addressing the clean-
up associated with these events include payment into trust funds 
managed by the state or federal government and insurance 
requirements. Experience with these mechanisms for other 
industrial sectors has not been wholly positive. The trust funds 
are often outpaced by the costs of the clean-up or the numbers 
of abandoned sites. Bonding and insurance may be insufficient 
for the level of environmental or public impact. Outreach and work 
with the industry, insurers and the public may lead to a financially 
viable approach.
Complications arise when the company responsible for production 
subcontracts with other companies to handle closure and post-
closure issues. Regulators may need to examine the subcontracts 
to ensure that proper expertise and economic resources are 
available to follow through on reclamation of a site and post-closure 
monitoring. Without clear financial arrangements, unexpected 
costs that arise in the post-closure setting may be a target of 
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avoidance by all firms associated with a particular play. Financial 
viability also includes the industry’s economic needs – a stringent 
regulatory system with large fees may fail to account for the financial 
viability of the industry and thus serve as a de facto prohibition 
on UGD. Most states assess a severance tax that is calculated 
based on the gross value of the shale gas. States vary, however, 
in calculating “value,” which may be reduced by production costs, 
ad valorem taxes or royalties paid to mineral rights owners. Fees 
and assessments may also affect the financial viability of shale 
gas development. Other related fees include corporate income 
taxes, real property taxes, personal property taxes, sales and use 
taxes, impact fees and permit fees (which are discussed above). 
A fee assessed to offset an identified community impact such as 
degrading transportation infrastructure or increased emergency 
responder costs is another option. 
When the overall costs of the regulatory system on industry are 
considered (e.g. the costs of obtaining permits, meeting technical 
standards, paying royalties and fees), a determination must be 
made that each cost is necessary, balanced by the fiscal incentives 
available, and that the overall burden is not excessive in the context 
of an evolving industry. A policy judgment is required to achieve 
the best balance of economic gains for industry, communities 
and consumers and risks to communities, public health and the 
environment. Such policy judgments can be expected to vary 
across political systems.
In US states, regulation covers or can cover the following elements:
Site development and preparation: 
• Pre-drilling water well testing
• Water withdrawals
• Setback restrictions from residential and other buildings
• Setback restrictions from municipal and other water sources
Well drilling and production:
• Cement type regulation
• Casing and cementing depth
• Surface casing cement circulation regulations
• Intermediate casing cement circulation regulations
• Production casing cement circulation regulations
• Venting regulation
• Flaring regulation
• Fracking fluid disclosure
Flowback/wastewater storage and disposal:
• Fluid storage options
• Freeboard requirements
• Pit liner requirements
• Flowback/wastewater transportation tracking 
• Underground injection wells for flowback/wastewater and produced water
Well plugging and abandonment:
• Well idle time
• Temporary abandonment
Well inspection and enforcement:
• Accident reporting requirements
• Number of wells per inspector 
• Number of regulating state agencies
Other:
• State and local bans and moratoria
• Severance tax calculation methods
• Severance tax rates
For more information and for updates: http://www.rff.org/centers/
energy_economics_and_policy/Pages/Shale_Maps.aspx
Box 8: Shale gas regulations in the US
The Center for Energy Economics and Policy at Resources for the Future is analyzing regulations in the 31 states in the continental United States 
that have significant shale gas reserves or where industry has shown interest in shale gas development. It publishes maps to show which important 
regulatory elements are included, and how, in each state. 
The purpose of these maps is to provide an overview of the regulatory patterns, similarities and differences among states – not to authoritatively 
compile any given state’s regulations or fully analyze any specific regulation. The maps show state-level regulation (local regulation is excluded) and 
states that regulate via the permitting process.
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Proper stakeholder engagement in the regulatory process builds 
trust between parties with diverse viewpoints, ensures all views 
are considered and balanced in the regulatory system, and creates 
a check on the integrity of the regulatory system. Stakeholders 
include the shale gas development industry, representatives of 
state and local governments, environmental advocacy interests, 
landowners and the public. In North America stakeholders may also 
include First Nations with inherent rights in a particular geographic 
area. Overly limited stakeholder coordination, education and 
participation can lead to dysfunctional controversy, thereby 
slowing the development of a particular site or region. 
Stakeholder concerns are not necessarily the top concerns 
of scientists and engineers. Whether the issue is excessive 
flaring, noise levels, traffic concerns or fears of excess water 
use, the regulatory system must be flexible enough to respond 
to stakeholder concerns. Where similar concerns have been 
raised by stakeholders at multiple sites, it is wise for industry 
and regulators to act proactively to address such concerns rather 
than be put on the defensive by reacting only after complaints are 
lodged. In British Columbia (Canada), for example, the Oil and Gas 
Commission has found it advisable to develop proactive policies 
on the specific subject of flaring. 
Stakeholder participation occurs at multiple levels. It should be 
incorporated into the process for determining the appropriate 
regulatory system and, after the regulatory system is established, 
in site-specific permit decisions. Stakeholders should have input 
into how a regulatory system is constructed, including specific 
regulations, technical standards, assigning governing authority, 
and the use of permits or other implementation mechanisms. A 
good illustration of stakeholder engagement in the design of a 
regulatory framework is the framework for coal seam gas led by 
the government of Australia (Australia, 2012). 
Full participation by any stakeholder is directly associated with 
the degree to which stakeholders have a common understanding 
and familiarity with UG exploration and production. As illustrated 
by the large public acceptance of UGD in Poland, understanding 
and familiarity can increase community acceptance, industry 
accountability and investment in the area, and contextualizes 
regulatory decisions. Poor understanding of the details involved 
in UGD presents a challenge for both the industry to operate and 
the development of an effective regulatory system. Such a lack 
of understanding often reduces tolerance of risks and accidents, 
leading to violations of the “social license to operate.” Increased 
education, interaction among stakeholders, and recognition and 
response to divergent values may create a regulatory system that 
more closely balances the development of shale resources with 
potentially competing uses and values.
Stakeholder coordination,  
education and participation  
in the regulatory system
Box 9: The trend toward public disclosure of hydraulic fracturing fluids
Stakeholder engagement exercises can lead to frustration and mistrust when participants have unequal access to technical information. Controversy 
about UGD has erupted in some jurisdictions because detailed information on the hydraulic fracturing fluids used by service companies is not typically 
made available to the public. The issue represents a tradeoff between the commercial interest in protecting confidential business information (trade 
secrets) and the public interest in access to information relevant to safety determinations. 
Fluids used for hydraulic fracturing, while predominantly comprised of water and sand, contain a wide variety of chemicals such as acids, biocides, 
corrosion inhibitors, friction reducers, gelling agents and oxygen scavengers. Each chemical is included in the fluid for a particular purpose, and 
companies compete with each other based on innovation in the mix of chemicals that are used. Not surprisingly, there is concern among communities 
and health professionals about the constituents and their potential health effects. Adequate toxicity data do not exist for some of the chemicals currently 
in use, and there is uncertainty about appropriate medical responses to human exposure when spills or leaks of hydraulic fracturing fluids occur.
The trend in North America is toward more public disclosure of information about hydraulic fracturing fluids, although claims of confidential business 
information have not been wholly ignored. A group of state regulators has formed a chemical disclosure registry called FracFocus (www.fracfocus.
org), in which 200 companies have registered information about the chemicals used at more than 15,000 sites in the United States. Several states 
have gone further, compelling energy companies to disclose more information than is currently available on FracFocus.
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In conclusion, transparency of the entire regulatory system 
is generally critical to effective community participation and 
stakeholder engagement. Without transparency, a regulatory 
In February 2012 the Texas Railroad Commission implemented the “Hydraulic Fracturing Disclosure Rule,” one of the most comprehensive rules 
for public disclosure of chemical ingredients used in hydraulic fracturing fluids. The rule compels developers to disclose the type and amount of 
chemicals used (including water volumes) on the FracFocus website. The rule was partly a response to public concern that chemicals in hydraulic 
fracturing fluid were highly toxic and potentially detrimental to human health and safety. 
For Europe, the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) launched in 2013 a platform for voluntary disclosure of chemical additives 
on a well-by-well basis in the European Economic Area (EEA) at: http://www.ngsfacts.org/ 
system will become vulnerable to various forms of corruption, 
incompetence and disregard for community norms.
Box 10: Recognizing and complying with existing EU environmental law will be crucial for UCD in Europe 
As of this report’s writing, the European Commission is considering whether or not it needs to regulate the exploration and exploitation of unconventional 
oil and gas. The effort is led by the Directorate General for the Environment, with participation from DG Climate and Energy. As indicated in Section 
3, DG Environment is preparing a risk management framework to deal with technical issues, which is expected to be released at the end of 2013. A 
recent workshop held in March, 2013 explored these issues (Eriksson et al., 2013).
According to the consultation mentioned in Section 3 a majority of the EC population believes that the EC should clarify the existing EU legislation 
through guidelines, and an even larger majority believes that it should develop a comprehensive and specific EU piece of legislation for unconventional 
fossil fuels. A minority believes that adapting individual pieces of existing EU legislation would be enough. Such a regulation or any other ways to 
ensure safe, secure and sustainable operations is expected to focus in particular on the need to acquire, collect and share information for:
• Transparency of operations (operators, their licenses and permits for planned developments); 
• Collection of baseline  data prior to commencement of operations (e.g. on volumes or water used and chemical additives);
• Information on potential risks related to exploration and production; 
• Information on potential benefits; and 
• Information on incidents.
EU environmental regulation, particularly for the protection of water quality, is very comprehensive. According to some, existing regulations in Europe 
are sufficient to prevent UGD risks (primarily exploitation and production) from causing harm to people’s health and the environment, both in the 
short term and in the long term. According to others, there are gaps which need to be filled, lack of consistency, and need for a specific regulation.
Existing regulations include:
The Water Framework Directive (WFD – 2000/60/EC) requires all EU waters, including groundwater, to achieve “good status” by 2015, which 
includes both ecological and chemical status, and more specifically “the least possible changes to good groundwater status, given impacts that 
could not reasonably have been avoided due to the nature of the human activity or pollution.” 
The Groundwater Directive (2006/118/EC) aims to prevent or limit pollutants to groundwater. Hydraulic fracturing with concrete casings can be 
carried out without damaging groundwater supplies, but the industry will have to meet mandatory environmental tests. 
The Drinking Water Directive (98/83/EC) includes strict, wide-ranging parameters for levels of chemicals in drinking water. 
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The Priority Substances Directive (2008/105/EC) focuses extra controls on some 33 initial priority hazardous substances in an attempt to ensure 
these do not enter EU-controlled water supplies. 
The REACH Chemicals Regulation (1907/2006) controls most chemical substances placed in the EU market and applies particularly strict controls 
to Substances of Very High Concern – notably: carcinogens, mutagens, reprotoxins, persistent bioaccumulative and toxic substances; very persistent 
and very bioaccumulative substances; and substances of equivalent concern such as endocrine disrupters. This legislation will have important indirect 
effects on chemical usage in fracturing fluids used for unconventional gas production. Full disclosure of chemicals used will be required under this 
full directive.
The Waste Framework Directive (2006/12/EC) applies to the disposal of large volumes of flowback water if it is “contaminated” by chemical substances.
The Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (2011/92/EU) makes baseline assessment compulsory above a certain threshold. Some argue that 
Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEAs) should be made compulsory in all UG projects. One positive effect might be to reassure the population 
that long-term negative impacts would be avoided or minimized.
The Environmental Liability Directive (2004/35/EC) will require operators to clean up and restore the environment following exploration and production 
operations, over and above any national programs relevant to land contaminated by unconventional gas activities. This directive applies above a 
certain threshold determined by the size of the project.
The Seveso III Directive (2012/18/EU) prevents industrial accidents.
As indicated in Section 3, DG Environment is preparing a risk management framework to deal with technical issues, which is expected to be released 
at the end of 2013. According to the European Commission website7, the initiative consists of an “‘Environmental, Climate and Energy Assessment 
Framework to Enable Safe and Secure Unconventional Hydrocarbon Extraction’ … (subject to an Impact Assessment). This initiative will aim at delivering 
a framework to manage risks, address regulatory shortcomings, and provide maximum legal clarity and predictability to both market operators and 
citizens across the EU. An Impact Assessment will look at options to prevent, reduce and manage surface and subsurface risks, to adapt monitoring, 
reporting and transparency requirements, and to clarify the EU regulatory framework with regard to both exploration and extraction activities.”
A related question that the EC will have to address is the level of governance: should technical and administrative matters and measures be dealt 
with at the European, national or regional level? 
Another area of debate in Europe is whether voluntary measures (yet to be developed, mainly by the industry) would be sufficient, including for providing 
public confidence, or whether binding/mandatory measures are needed. European citizens may expect strict regulation. The European oil and gas 
industry is heavily regulated and might prefer to develop its own voluntary standards.
7 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/energy/unconventional_en.htm
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Recommendations
1. Understand and evaluate the general regulatory environment 
to ensure that shale development regulation is consistent 
with existing regulatory systems. If it diverges, provide an 
explanation to support the difference.
a. Review the existing regulatory system, identify the current 
role of public and private entities. Understand the geology 
and shale gas resource and identify other jurisdictions 
with similar geology as a source of analogous technical 
standards. Identify regulatory gaps.
b. Assign regulatory authority: assess current division of 
authority; share responsibility for managing risks between 
government and industry; create mechanisms that 
improve coordination of governmental divisions, industry 
and stakeholders; since public expectations and trust 
in government and industry varies, assign authority and 
responsibility consistent with public expectations.
2. Regulatory systems have five key components: baseline 
assessments; technical standards; implementation mecha-
nisms; enforcement and oversight; and financial viability.
a. Conduct a baseline assessment of the source rock, impact 
pathways for water or air contamination, community 
values or expectations (rural versus urban environment) 
and conduct land use planning as appropriate for the 
jurisdiction.
b. Technical standards must address all steps in the process: 
exploration through plugging and abandonment; cover all 
environmental and public health risks; and be tailored to 
the source rock and community values.
c. Implementation mechanisms should include prescriptive 
permitting, incentives and voluntary practices as appropriate 
for the jurisdiction.
d. Enforcement and oversight should have provisions 
for adequate level and frequency of inspections, data 
management and analysis, and sufficient fines and 
penalties.
e. Financial viability entails making sure that the regulatory 
entity is properly funded, that the technical standards 
are affordable for industry, and that financial assurance 
mechanisms are available to address spills, accidents and 
abandoned sites.
3. Stakeholder engagement, education and participation are the 
bedrock for a legitimate regulatory system, and transparency of 
the regulatory system is a prerequisite to effective stakeholder 
engagement.
a. Stakeholders should be involved in establishing the 
regulatory system and the regulatory system should 
include provisions for involving affected communities and 
other stakeholders. Education for all stakeholders builds 
relationships, fosters understanding for diverse viewpoints, 
and may result in innovative solutions.
b. Stakeholder and community trust in UGD operations would 
be enhanced if energy companies were required to disclose 
publicly more information about the chemicals that are used 
as drilling fluids, though some degree of non-disclosure may 
be necessary to protect confidential business information.
Risk Governance Guidelines for Unconventional Gas Development international risk governance council
P 59
Section 5:
Roundtable on responsible UGD
Based on the findings of this evaluation, there is an urgent need 
for the establishment of a “roundtable” where technical, economic, 
regulatory and political developments related to unconventional 
gas development can be discussed among stakeholders from 
different regions of the globe on a regular basis. The rationale 
for such a forum has been echoed in conversations with dozens 
of practitioners in public and private organizations in both the 
developing and developed world. 
As there is significant variability in UGD projects around the 
world, much can be learned as practitioners share site-specific 
experiences with others in the field. The same concerns about 
UGD are being raised repeatedly at different locations, and lessons 
about how these concerns are addressed should be shared as 
widely as possible. More broadly, political jurisdictions vary in 
how energy policies are modified to promote or accommodate 
UGD, and how pursuit of UGD is being coordinated with policies 
to slow the pace of global climate change. It is very likely that the 
roundtable could also facilitate learning on these broader issues. 
Given how rapidly the unconventional gas industry is growing 
and how many new projects are likely to be launched in the next 
decade or two, now is the critical time for stakeholders to form a 
global roundtable that would facilitate shared learning. Moreover, 
the roundtable would serve as a venue where various stakeholders 
can discuss the evolution of technical and regulatory systems, 
how well the systems are working, and how further modernization 
of technical and regulatory systems could serve the interests of 
diverse stakeholders and the public. Currently, formal technical 
expertise and informal knowledge about the UGD industry 
are concentrated among professionals in a limited number of 
companies, making it difficult for regulators, investors, academics, 
NGOs and other stakeholders to access reliable information and 
engage directly with corporate experts on open and equal grounds. 
To some extent, the needs for information sharing are met by 
a variety of bilateral communications (e.g. the exchanges of 
information about UGD between the US and China and between 
Canada and India). Although bilateral dialogue is encouraged, 
it does not bring other governments to the table, and it is not 
always accessible to stakeholders in nations outside of these 
arrangements. There have been proposals to create some 
roundtables or platforms on a regional basis. For example, a 
workshop organized in March 2013 by the European Commission’s 
Joint Research Centre Institute for Energy and Transport led to the 
conclusion that creating a European platform on UGD would be 
beneficial in Europe. The IRGC supports such regional platforms, 
but believes they cannot accomplish the same objectives as a 
global roundtable.
The development of the unconventional gas industry has global 
ramifications. Many professionals we interviewed believe that 
UGD is already altering the balance of power among nations and 
regions of the globe, restructuring global energy markets, tapping 
scarce water resources, changing national energy policies and 
influencing strategies to address global climate change. Given 
that unconventional gas resources are distributed throughout the 
globe and that resource development has global ramifications, 
a global roundtable organized around a few key functions can 
make a constructive contribution that bilateral or regional exercises 
cannot fulfill.
Useful reports on UGD have been produced by a variety of 
consulting firms, think tanks, universities and international 
organizations. While these reports (which are listed and annotated 
in the Appendix) have produced significant insights, none of the 
sponsoring organizations for the reports have stepped forward 
and proposed to sponsor the kind of regular global roundtable 
that we believe would be of significant value. The complexities of 
a global forum are admittedly daunting, especially since financial 
support must be secured from multiple sources (e.g. governments, 
international agencies, corporations and foundations) and a 
governing structure and philosophy for the roundtable would need 
to be established.
In light of the complexities, the IRGC has taken the additional 
steps of suggesting what a global roundtable on UGD could look 
like, what its mission could be, how it could be organized, and 
proposed funding models. We conclude this report by proposing 
specific functions for the roundtable to give the concept some 
practical clarity. 
Organization
A private, non-profit independent body, or consortium, of 
concerned stakeholders should be formed to establish a forum 
for regular dialogue about unconventional gas development issues. 
It could be an entirely new organization, or it could be housed 
within an existing organization. Stakeholders with a wide range of 
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views about UGD would be invited to participate with the request 
to provide evidence-based knowledge for improving practices, 
policies and understanding of UGD, and sharing that knowledge 
gained in one part of the world with others.
A multi-stakeholder membership 
organization
To represent the various facets of development and their 
stakeholders, the roundtable should be comprised of 
representatives from at least six stakeholder groups: 
• Business and industry: oil and gas exploration and production 
companies, service providers and suppliers, investment firms 
and insurers;
• National and regional scientific organizations: geological 
and engineering trade associations, risk analysts and 
communicators; 
• Policymakers and analysts: international organizations, elected 
officials and their staff, energy and environmental ministries, 
and advisors/consultants in science and technology; 
• Regulators: federal, national, state/provincial and local/
municipal regulators;
• Civic society: local community leaders, environmental and 
consumer NGOs, public health groups; and
• Colleges and universities: faculty and students with research 
and educational activities related to UGD.
Depending on how the roundtable evolves, it may be useful to 
establish chapters where stakeholders in a particular group meet 
separately (perhaps via webcast) to generate priority issues for 
discussion and propose participants to represent the chapter in the 
regular global forum. In this way, the agenda and participants for 
the global roundtable would be generated in a grassroots manner 
rather than defined only by a small group of conference organizers. 
Recommended primary roles of each chapter: 
• Industry: to explore the safety culture in the industry, thereby 
paving the way for sustainable unconventional gas development 
and the benefits it provides in affordability, reliability and 
environmental protection;
• Science: to provide and help others interpret data and 
information and identify research needs and priorities;
• Policymakers: to access trusted information and share views 
about policy goals and legislative issues;
• Regulators: to discuss the development and improvement of 
regulatory frameworks consistent with political decisions about 
health, safety and environmental protection; affordable energy; 
energy security; and overall economic, environmental and social 
sustainability;
• Civic society (local communities, consumer groups, and 
environmental NGOs): to primarily enhance dialogue for better 
decision-making and
• Colleges and universities: to discuss educational priorities 
related to UGD as well as scientific collaboration.
International scope
As Canada and the United States have accumulated most of 
the experience with UGD to date, North American participation 
is crucial. Europe is currently divided on the future of UGD but 
significant interest is apparent in the United Kingdom, Poland 
and some other EU member states. The European Commission 
is also devoting more priority attention to this issue. In China 
and India, UGD is already viewed as a crucial energy issue and 
many countries in the developing world are beginning to establish 
policies and regulatory systems for UGD. Even countries lacking 
unconventional gas reserves (or that have no commercial interest in 
UGD) may have interests in learning about the future of UGD, since 
it may affect their energy systems or offer insights into whether they 
can rely on UGD for importation of natural gas. To ensure efficient 
use of resources, the global roundtable must complement other 
initiatives while avoiding unproductive overlap. 
Venue
The roundtable should have an independent host that is globally 
accessible. Meetings and venues should be chosen to further the 
mission of the roundtable, and should continue at regular intervals 
as the exploration of UGD and the technology continues to evolve. 
The platform should also have a distributed and comprehensive 
digital component. Networking capacities should be maximized 
to create continuous engagement in the primary functions of 
the roundtable, whether hosting panel discussions, sponsoring 
webinars, or offering continuing education classes. 
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Box 11: Examples of constructive roundtable discussions 
• In 2012, the International Energy Agency announced the formation of a platform described as follows: “At their recent Camp David summit, G8 
leaders welcomed and agreed to review this IEA work on potential best practices for natural gas development. ‘To build on the Golden Rules, 
we are establishing a high-level platform so that governments can share insights on the policy and regulatory action that can accompany an 
expansion in unconventional gas production, shale gas in particular,’ said Maria van der Hoeven. ‘This platform will be open to IEA members and 
non-members alike.’”
 http://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2012/may/name,27266,en.html
• The Center for Sustainable Shale Development (CSSD), a collaboration built on engagement among environmental organizations, philanthropic 
foundations and several energy companies from across the Appalachian Basin, aims to develop rigorous performance standards for sustainable 
shale development and commit to continuous improvement to ensure safe and environmentally responsible development of the resources. CSSD 
strives to offer an independent, third-party evaluation process to certify companies that achieve and maintain these standards. 
 http://www.sustainableshale.org/
• The Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB) is an international multi-stakeholder initiative that brings together farmers, companies, NGOs, 
experts, governments and inter-governmental agencies concerned with ensuring the sustainability of biofuels production and processing. 
Participation in the RSB is open to any organization working in a field relevant to biofuels sustainability. This platform was launched in 2007 by 
three core funders: EPFL (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Switzerland), Shell and the National Wildlife Federation. 
 http://rsb.org/
Objective
The primary mission of the roundtable should be information 
sharing on technical, economic, regulatory and political issues 
related to UGD. Through information sharing, the roundtable could 
contribute to the wise implementation of appropriate restrictions 
on development as well as practices that assure the safe, efficient, 
sustainable and responsible development of unconventional gas 
resources. Once the roundtable is firmly established, it may 
expand its mission to include consensus building with regard to 
best practices in UGD – whether those practices are technical in 
nature or relate to how community participation in UGD should be 
organized. Since many organizations already exist to advocate for 
and against UGD, the case for transforming the roundtable into 
an advocacy organization is not strong. 
Functions 
The roundtable may consider the following areas where information 
sharing among stakeholders would be beneficial to develop 
unconventional gas in a safe, sustainable and responsible manner.
Dissemination of reliable information and 
promotion of knowledge transfer
The technologies and processes involved in UGD continue to 
change at a rapid pace. Information on these technologies and 
processes and the risks associated with their use can be difficult 
to access and understand. Creating a publicly accessible system 
for organizing data collection and experience sharing, and for 
submission and publication of reliable information in multiple 
languages, is a desirable function of the roundtable. If the 
roundtable accepts the role of global clearinghouse for information 
related to UGD, it must be impartial and accepting of alternative 
views, but should not host widely discredited information. 
Beyond passive sharing of information, the IRGC believes 
an important function of the roundtable could be to promote 
knowledge transfer. This may involve sharing of experiences 
but may also include formal certification or education programs. 
Mechanisms for transferring knowledge are well established in 
the oil and gas industry; it occurs when companies are hired and 
acquired, and it is also supported by existing industry organizations. 
The roundtable can fill a critical void by also being a forum for 
regulators, researchers, citizens and other stakeholders to share 
their tacit and explicit knowledge and engage with interested 
parties across the globe.
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Box 12: Industry associations involved in data and experience collection and sharing
Technical guidelines and recommendations of best practice are also produced by these associations:
• The Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) has designed with its members a set of Guiding Principles and Operating Practices for 
Hydraulic Fracturing.
 http://www.capp.ca/canadaIndustry/naturalGas/ShaleGas/Pages/default.aspx#operating
• The Canadian Society for Unconventional Resources is a not-for-profit society active in promoting responsible development of unconventional 
hydrocarbon resources in Canada. 
 http://www.csur.com/ 
• The American Petroleum Industry (APPI) is working with its members to develop guidelines for safe and efficient shale gas operations.
• The International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) is collecting sets of best practices, notably to demonstrate the importance of pilot 
and demonstration projects with involvement of independent research institutions. 
 http://www.ogp.org.uk/global-insight/gas-from-shale/ 
• The German Industrial Association for Mineral Oil and Natural Gas Extraction (WEG) is developing standards and guidelines for natural gas 
development. 
 http://www.erdoel-erdgas.de/Themen/Technik-Standards
Box 13: Knowledge transfer on technical, regulatory and policy issues between nations
As per the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) principles for technical and financial assistance (OECD, 2003), technical 
cooperation between nations can increase the institutional capability of organizations to fulfill their roles and responsibilities with respect to the safety 
of hazardous installations. Such technical cooperation and experience sharing can address, for example, assistance related to implementation of risk 
assessment and risk management programs, including accident prevention, emergency planning and accident response.
Programs for capacity building and experience sharing need to:
•  Be responsive to specific, well-defined needs (i.e. be “demand driven”) and be results oriented;
•  Utilize local experts and local languages;
•  Take into account a long-term perspective; and
• Include active participation of all relevant stakeholders (e.g. public authorities, industry, including labor, and community organizations).
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Capacity building for community  
and stakeholder participation
Political and societal legitimacy involves earning the trust of local 
communities, elected officials and other stakeholders. To the 
industry, political and social legitimacy is its license to operate. 
UG operations may be obstructed by the public or be subject to 
undue regulatory/political interference when the level of trust is low. 
Many promising technologies, from nuclear energy to genetic 
engineering, have been hampered in their commercialization 
because the concerns of stakeholders and the public are not 
addressed effectively. When innovators are not aware of the need 
to involve the stakeholders, or are not trained or experienced in 
stakeholder engagement, they may not accomplish an appropriate 
type or degree of community participation. Even when industrial 
companies make responsible, science-based efforts at stakeholder 
engagement (see Box 4: Dialogue process on UGD in Germany), 
it does not guarantee that communities will accept – promptly 
or eventually – a new technology that creates potential risks for 
human health, safety and/or the environment. 
The concerns about UGD that motivate academics and national 
environmental leaders are not necessarily the same concerns that 
activate grassroots community residents who live near UG wells. 
Journalists find that community residents are most vocal about 
annoyances such as noise, smell, traffic congestion and potential 
adverse impact on resale values of properties. One of the most 
frequent complaints is about truck traffic. Drilling and fracking a 
single well can require 1,000 or more truck trips, as the vehicles 
haul equipment, workers, sand, drilling fluids and wastewater (Gold 
& McGinty, 2013). Addressing the concerns of community residents 
may be different than addressing the concerns of scientists and 
professional environmentalists.
Nor should it be assumed that community acceptance challenges 
will be confined to towns near wellheads. A vibrant UG industry 
must have infrastructure to support the drilling activity. The growth 
of production of sand used as a proppant in hydraulic fracturing, a 
crucial component of the UG industry in the US, is located in states 
(e.g. Wisconsin and Minnesota) that do not have gas production 
(Marley & Bergquist, 2013). Yet sand mining, if not managed 
properly, raises community concerns. The air emissions from gas-
processing facilities have triggered community concerns. Pipelines 
are increasingly needed to bring gas to markets and freshwater 
from rivers to drilling sites but some communities are objecting to 
the large withdrawals from rivers or to the construction of pipelines 
(Gold, 2013b). And the sites for disposal of wastewater may be 
located in different towns (or even different states/provinces) to 
the drilling sites. Some town officials in the State of Ohio are 
objecting to the disposal of drilling wastes that are transported 
from wells in Pennsylvania (Downing, 2013; Bell, 2013b). Thus, 
there is a pressing need for international and regional sharing of 
information on how to address community concerns about the 
entire life cyle of UGD. 
Political and social systems vary, but the roundtable can help 
government, industry and other stakeholders share community 
engagement experiences as they unfold around the world. With a 
forum for exchanging information about these experiences, IRGC 
expects that community engagement activities will continue to 
evolve and improve. 
Strengthening safety cultures 
Complex industrial procedures require sophisticated processes 
to enhance the safety of industrial operations and individual 
behaviors. These procedures benefit from being developed with 
others. Improvements in safety management practices have 
resulted in highly developed “cultures of safety” that address 
the specific concerns of individual companies and promote the 
integration of companies into the social fabric of the communities 
in which they operate (OECD, 2003). The main characteristic of a 
“culture of safety” (KAS, 2008; Baker et al., 2007) is viewed in the 
way managers and staff focus their attention on accomplishing 
safety through close mutual cooperation. 
For example, operational safety can be organized proactively by 
the following measures (and others): 
• Establishment and integration of a safety management system 
into company operations; 
• Providing employees with safety training; 
• Ensuring that external company personnel apply equally 
exacting safety standards;
• Setting aside sufficient time and financial resources for safety;
• Defining safety performance indicators (API, 2010; CCPS, 2011; 
CEFIC, 2011);
• Learning lessons from operational experience and accidents;
• Achieving preparedness if accidents and emergencies occur; 
• Conducting regular audits and management reviews of 
installation safety and performance.
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Although work is required to tailor these general measures to the 
specific case of UGD, a key function of the roundtable would be to 
foster a culture of safety around UGD that is ultimately reflected in 
the day-to-day practices of industry, regulators and other decision-
makers. 
Clarifying how UGD can serve as a bridge 
to a low-carbon, sustainable energy future 
One of the promises of UGD is to facilitate the transition of 
economies to a lower-carbon future that is environmentally 
sustainable, socially acceptable and economically viable.
Natural gas is the cleanest burning fossil fuel, but emissions 
associated with UGD and delivery of natural gas to consumers 
may offset some of the gains. Mitigating and, where possible, 
avoiding the impacts of climate change is a global imperative and 
an important part of the context in which the unconventional gas 
industry operates. Proponents of UGD tout the potential for natural 
gas to serve as a transition or “bridge” fuel to a lower-carbon 
future. For this to become reality, technology lock-ins that would 
block the transition to more sustainable energy sources must be 
avoided. The unconventional gas industry, its regulators, the public 
and other stakeholders must play an active role in overseeing this 
transition. The roundtable should provide a forum for stakeholders 
to address failings, promote achievements and to debate critical 
climate-related issues such as recoverable resources and methane 
emissions. The roundtable may also promote more efficient uses 
and ways to conserve natural gas, and advocate for policy changes 
that can achieve these objectives.
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Conclusions
At the IRGC November 2012 workshop and in ensuing conversations, the IRGC has learned of several promising organizations 
and partnerships supporting responsible UGD, as well as positive impacts from grassroots efforts and corporate outreach. 
The IRGC is also familiar with the environmental and human health risks of UGD, and has witnessed strong opposition 
to UGD from some governments, citizens and other stakeholders. UGD’s global potential is undermined if risks to land, 
water and air are not properly understood, managed and communicated when UGD is undertaken. On a global scale, the 
IRGC believes there is an urgent need to share information and transfer knowledge, build capacities for community and 
stakeholder engagement, address climate change issues and strengthen safety cultures. A global roundtable with a cross 
section of relevant stakeholders should be organized to advance these objectives.
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Section summaries
The reference guide is split into six sections containing various 
technical reports, papers and summaries on enhanced natural 
gas production. A common thread is that they examine the 
consequences of increased shale gas production through hydraulic 
fracturing techniques on areas pertaining to the economics of 
natural gas, public perceptions of natural gas and a host of 
infrastructure related subtopics. The first category of reports 
explores the impact of enhanced natural gas production on 
greenhouse gas emissions; this is then followed by a section 
comprised of articles that address the potential air, water and land 
impacts associated with the increased production of natural gas 
and, particularly, shale gas. The third group of references examines 
the impacts of enhanced natural gas liquefaction and its potential 
effects on maritime trade. The subsequent section documents 
technical papers that delve into the role that enhanced natural gas 
production will have on the electric generation and transportation 
sectors. Section five contains reports that investigate potential 
distribution restrictions associated with accessing this increased 
supply of natural gas, which has primarily been bolstered through 
various shale discoveries across the United States. Examples of 
distribution restrictions include, but are not limited to: access 
to pipeline infrastructure, the viability of access to processing 
facilities and the ability to access storage systems (depleted oil 
or gas wells, underground aquifers or salt caverns). The final 
section of resources deals with studies that examine stakeholder 
engagement in the natural gas industry, public perceptions of 
enhanced production and the current system of regulatory 
oversight that governs resource extraction. 
Greenhouse gas emissions
Lev-On, M. & Shires, T., 2012, Characterizing Pivotal Sources 
of Methane Emissions from Natural Gas Production, American 
Petroleum Institute and America’s Natural Gas Alliance. 
Available at: http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/News/2012/12-
October/API-ANGA-Survey-Report.pdf 
Overview
This study presents the updated results from a collaborative effort 
among members of the American Petroleum Institute (API) and 
Appendix:
Tabulation of enhanced natural gas production resources
America’s Natural Gas Alliance (ANGA) to gather data on key 
natural gas production activities and equipment emission sources 
that are essential to developing estimates of methane emissions 
from upstream natural gas production. In an attempt to provide 
additional data and identify uncertainty in existing datasets, the 
API and ANGA conducted this joint study on methane (CH4) 
emissions from natural gas production operations starting in July 
2011. API/ANGA collected data on 91,000 wells distributed over 
a broad geographic area and operated by over 20 companies; this 
represents nearly one fifth of the estimated number of total wells 
used in EPA’s 2010 emissions inventory. Ultimately, this project was 
directed toward gathering more robust information on workovers, 
completions, liquids unloading, centrifugal compressors and 
pneumatic controllers with the intent of supporting revisions to 
the activity factors used in EPA’s national inventory.
Fulton, M., Mellquist, N., Kitasei, S. & Bluestein, J., 2011, 
Comparing Life-Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
Natural Gas and Coal, Worldwatch Institute. Available at: 
http://www.worldwatch.org/system/files/pdf/Natural_Gas_
LCA_Update_082511.pdf
Overview
Natural gas has been widely discussed as a less carbon-intensive 
alternative to coal as a power sector fuel. In April 2011, the US EPA 
released revised methodologies for estimating fugitive methane 
emissions from natural gas systems. These revisions mostly 
affected the production component of the natural gas value chain, 
causing a very substantial increase in the methane emissions 
estimate from US natural gas systems. This large increase in 
the upstream component of the natural gas value chain caused 
some to question the GHG advantage of gas versus coal over 
the entire life cycle from source to use. However, the results of 
the life cycle analysis conducted in this report indicate that the 
EPA’s upstream estimates of methane emissions from natural gas 
systems do not undercut the GHG advantage of natural gas over 
coal. Nevertheless, given the EPA’s proposed new air quality rules 
that were released in July 2011, it is possible that the natural gas 
industry might need to mitigate many of the methane emissions 
associated with natural gas development in the near future and, 
specifically, with emissions related to the enhanced production 
of shale gas.
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Beusse, R., Dunlap, C., Good, K., Hauck, E., McGhee-Lenart, 
R. & Narimatsu, J., 2013, EPA Needs to Improve Air Emissions 
Data for the Oil and Natural Gas Production Sector, US 
Environmental Protection Agency Report 13-P-0161, Office 
of the Inspector General. Available at: http://www.epa.gov/
oig/reports/2013/20130220-13-P-0161.pdf
Overview
High levels of growth in the oil and natural gas (gas) production 
sector, coupled with harmful pollutants emitted, have underscored 
the need for EPA to gain a better understanding of emissions and 
potential risks from the production of oil and gas. However, EPA 
has limited directly measured air emissions data for air toxics and 
criteria pollutants for several important oil and gas production 
processes and sources, including well completions and evaporative 
ponds. Also, EPA does not have a comprehensive strategy for 
improving air emissions data for the oil and gas production sector; 
the agency did not anticipate the tremendous growth of the sector, 
and previously only allocated limited resources to the issue. EPA 
uses its National Emissions Inventory (NEI) to assess risks, track 
trends and analyze envisioned regulatory controls. However, oil 
and gas production emissions data in the 2008 NEI are incomplete 
for a number of key air pollutants. This hampers EPA’s ability to 
accurately assess risks and air quality impacts from oil and gas 
production activities. 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2013, Greenhouse Gas 
Reporting Program: Petroleum and Natural Gas Systems 2011 
Data Summary, Office of Atmospheric Programs, Climate 
Change Division. 
Overview
In February 2013, EPA released greenhouse gas data for petroleum 
and natural gas systems collected under the Greenhouse Gas 
Reporting Program (GHGRP) from the 2011 reporting year. These 
data represent a significant step forward with respect to better 
understanding greenhouse gas emissions from petroleum and 
natural gas systems. EPA is working to improve the quality of data 
from this sector and expects that the GHGRP will be an important 
tool for the agency and the public to analyze emissions, identify 
opportunities for improving the data and understand emissions 
trends. This presentation attempts to provide a summary of the 
reported data. 
Howarth, R., Santoro, R. & Ingraffea, A., 2011, “Methane 
and the greenhouse-gas footprint of natural gas from shale 
formations,” Climatic Change, letter, doi10.1007/s10584-011-
0061-5. 
Overview
This reports evaluates the greenhouse gas footprint of natural gas 
obtained by high-volume hydraulic fracturing from shale formations, 
focusing on methane emissions. Natural gas is composed largely 
of methane, and 3.6% to 7.9% of the methane from shale-gas 
production escapes into the atmosphere in venting and leaks over 
the lifetime of a well. These methane emissions are at least 30% 
more than and perhaps more than twice as great as those from 
conventional gas. The higher emissions from shale gas occur at 
the time wells are hydraulically fractured – as methane escapes 
from flowback return fluids – and during drill out following the 
fracturing. Methane is a powerful greenhouse gas, with a global 
warming potential that is far greater than that of carbon dioxide, 
particularly over the time horizon of the first few decades following 
emission. Methane contributes substantially to the greenhouse gas 
footprint of shale gas on shorter time scales, dominating it on a 
20-year time horizon. The footprint for shale gas is greater than that 
for conventional gas or oil when viewed on any time horizon, but 
particularly so over 20 years. Compared with coal, the footprint of 
shale gas is at least 20% greater and perhaps more than twice as 
great on the 20-year horizon and is comparable when compared 
over 100 years.
Bylin, C., 2013, Methane and Black Carbon Emissions from 
the Global Oil and Gas Industry, US Environmental Protection 
Agency and the Global Methane Initiative. 
Overview
This presentation seeks to demonstrate that significant potential 
exists to reduce methane and black carbon emissions from the 
oil and gas sector. Existing synergistic programs leverage country 
and company participation to reduce emissions by focusing on 
three particular areas/ideas: voluntary partnerships, project-level 
management and creating commitments or reduction targets 
pertaining to methane emissions. Building on existing synergies 
and expanding the current work being done in the area of GHG 
control, specifically with methane release, is crucial for the natural 
gas industry moving forward. 
Global Methane Initiative, 2013, Global Methane Emissions and 
Mitigation Opportunities, prepared for the US Environmental 
Protection Agency. 
Overview
Methane (CH4) is a hydrocarbon and the primary component of 
natural gas. Methane is also a potent and abundant greenhouse 
gas, which makes it a significant contributor to climate change, 
especially in the near term (i.e. 10–15 years). Methane is emitted 
during the production and transport of coal, natural gas and oil. 
Understanding the emissions statistics associated with methane 
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release into the atmosphere is crucial for the ever-expanding US 
natural gas industry, especially with the advent of new horizontal 
drilling techniques that unlock gas from shale-rice geologic 
formations in various areas around the country.
Ritter, K., Emmert, A., Lev-On, M. & Shires, T., 2012, 
Understanding Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
Unconventional Natural Gas Production, The American 
Petroleum Institute. Available at: http://www.epa.gov/ttnchie1/
conference/ei20/session3/kritter.pdf 
Overview
Natural gas comprises almost one fourth of all energy used in 
the United States. New technologies, sometimes referred to as 
“unconventional,” have enabled the production of more natural 
gas and have expanded domestic energy reserves. Natural gas 
is generally recognized as a clean-burning fuel source, producing 
fewer greenhouse gas emissions per quantity of energy consumed 
than either coal or oil. However, a number of recent studies are 
raising questions as to the impact of these new production 
techniques – especially hydraulic fracturing – on the carbon 
footprint of natural gas. Current published assessments rely 
mostly on highly uncertain information provided in EPA’s November 
2010 technical support document for mandatory GHG reporting 
from petroleum and natural gas systems, and from information 
associated with EPA’s Inventory of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
and Sinks: 1990–2009. It is becoming increasingly important to 
document the GHG emissions associated with the different stages 
of natural gas production in order to demonstrate the continued 
environmental benefits of natural gas. Therefore, technically sound 
quantification and assessment of GHG emissions from its life cycle 
– from production to delivery to end users – is essential. This 
paper summarizes results from a technical review of the emissions 
data used to develop EPA’s 2009 national inventory and the 2010 
inventory updates. 
Brown, S.P.A., Krupnick, A.J. & Walls, M.A., 2009, Natural Gas: 
A Bridge to a Low-Carbon Future? Resources for the Future 
and the National Energy Policy Institute, Issue Brief 09-11. 
Available at: http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-IB-09-11.
pdf 
Overview
Over the next 20 years, the United States and other countries seem 
likely to take steps toward a low‐carbon future. Looking beyond 
this timeframe, many analysts expect nuclear power and emergent 
energy technologies – such as carbon capture and sequestration, 
renewable power generation and electric and plug‐in hybrid 
vehicles – to hold the keys to achieving a sustainable reduction 
in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. In the meantime, however, 
many are discussing greater use of natural gas to reduce CO2 
emissions. Recent assessments suggest that the United States 
has considerably more recoverable natural gas in shale formations 
than was previously thought, given new drilling technologies that 
dramatically lower recovery cost. Because natural gas use yields 
CO2 emissions that are about 45 percent lower per British thermal 
unit (Btu) than coal and 30 percent lower than oil, its apparent 
abundance raises the possibility that natural gas could serve as 
a bridge fuel to a future with reduced CO2 emissions. Such a 
transition would seem particularly attractive in the electric power 
sector if natural gas were to displace coal.
IPIECA, 2013, The expanding role of natural gas. Comparing 
life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions. Available at: http://
www.ipieca.org/publication/expanding-role-natural-gas-
comparing-life-cycle-greenhouse-gas-emissions 
Overview
Natural gas is enjoying a period of strong growth. Significantly 
increased resource estimates, and improvements in production 
and transport technologies allow it to fill an expanding role 
in energy supply, and in important demand sectors such as 
electricity generation. Almost all mitigation scenarios established 
by international or national research organizations, such as 
the International Energy Agency, the US Energy Information 
Administration and national laboratories, agree that the role 
of natural gas is expanding significantly, thanks to improved 
technologies employed in its extraction and supply. In the USA, a 
rapid increase in production from “unconventional” sources (e.g. 
shale) has resulted in an abundance of low-priced natural gas, 
encouraging a shift from coal to gas in power generation. Since 
natural gas is a fuel with inherently lower carbon content than coal, 
that shift has contributed to a significant decline in greenhouse 
gas emissions. 
Hughes, D., 2011, Life-Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
Shale Gas Compared to Coal: An Analysis of Two Conflicting 
Studies, Post Carbon Institute. Available at: http://www.
postcarbon.org/report/390308-report-life-cycle-greenhouse-
gas-emissions 
Overview
Two studies with conflicting conclusions have recently been 
produced on full-cycle greenhouse gas emissions from shale gas 
production, one from scientists at Cornell University and another 
from a scientist at the National Energy Technology Laboratory 
(NETL). The Cornell study, published in a peer-reviewed journal, 
suggests that lifecycle GHG emissions from shale gas are 20–
100% higher than coal on a 20-year timeframe basis, especially 
considering that 70% of natural gas consumption is not used 
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for electricity generation. The NETL study, presented in a talk at 
Cornell University and later posted on the NETL website, suggests, 
on an electricity-generation comparison basis, that natural gas 
base load has 48% lower GHG emissions than coal on a 20-year 
timeframe basis. The NETL comparison, however, does not single 
out shale gas, which is projected by the US Energy Information 
Administration to be the major source of natural gas supply 
growth going forward, nor does it consider the overall emissions 
from natural gas-fired electricity generation, focusing instead on 
the more efficient base load combined cycle component. When 
the assumptions of the NETL study are examined in detail and 
compared with the US EPA 2009 emissions inventory for natural 
gas, as well as to the likely ultimate production from shale gas 
wells, the resulting conclusions are not significantly different 
from the Cornell study. Shale gas full-cycle GHG emissions are 
higher than those of coal when comparing both the existing 
electricity generating fleets and best-in-class electricity generation 
technologies for both fuels over a 20-year timeframe basis, but 
are lower than those of coal on a 100-year timeframe basis. This 
has significant policy implications for utilizing natural gas as a 
“transition” fuel to a low carbon future in mitigating near-term 
GHG emissions.
Air/water/land impacts
Grubert, E. & Kitasei, S., 2010, How Energy Choices Affect 
Fresh Water Supplies: A Comparison of U.S. Coal and Natural 
Gas, Worldwatch Institute, Natural Gas and Sustainable Energy 
Initiative. Available at: http://www.worldwatch.org/system/
files/BP2.pdf 
Overview
Declining water availability is already limiting energy choices. 
Over the past decade, concerns about water availability have 
halted power plant construction or operation in the states of 
Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Massachusetts, Missouri, 
New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas and Washington. As state and local 
governments around the country plan their electricity generation 
mix for the coming years, they will need to consider the water 
dimension of their decisions. A shift from reliance on coal-fired 
steam-turbine generators to combined-cycle plants fueled by 
natural gas could have a profound effect on the power sector’s 
water demands. NGCC plants consume one tenth to one half as 
much freshwater as conventional coal plants do to generate each 
unit of electricity, which provides a critical advantage in regions 
where water shortages present as urgent a concern as air pollution 
and climate change.
Adams, M.B, Ford, W.M., Schuler, T.M. & Thomas-Van Gundy, 
M., 2011, Effects of Natural Gas Development on Forest 
Ecosystems, Proceedings of the 17th Central Hardwood Forest 
Conference, Lexington, KY, (April 5–7, 2010), Newtown Square, 
PA, US Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Northern 
Research Station, 219–226. Available at: http://www.nrs.fs.fed.
us/pubs/gtr/gtr-p-78papers/23adamsp78.pdf 
Overview
In 2004, an energy company leased the privately owned minerals 
that underlie the Fernow Experimental Forest in West Virginia. The 
Fernow, established in 1934, is dedicated to long-term research 
and in 2008, a natural gas well was drilled on the Fernow and 
a pipeline and supporting infrastructure were constructed. This 
study describes the impacts of natural gas development on the 
natural resources of the Fernow, and develops recommendations 
for landowners and land managers based on these experiences. 
Some of the effects (forest clearing, erosion, road damage) were 
expected and predictable, and some were unexpected (vegetation 
death from land application of fluids, an apparent increase in white-
tailed deer presence). Although this is a case study, and therefore 
the results and conclusions are not applicable to all hardwood 
forests, information about gas development impacts is sufficiently 
rare that forest managers, research scientists and the concerned 
public can learn from the study.
STAC Workshop Report, 2013, Exploring the Environmental 
Effects of Shale Gas Development in the Chesapeake 
Bay Watershed, Pennsylvania State University, Scientific 
and Technical Advisory Committee, STAC Publication 
13-01. Available at: http://www.chesapeake.org/pubs/297_
Gottschalk2013.pdf
Overview
The purpose of this workshop was to engage scientists from across 
the nation in a review of the state of-the-science regarding shale 
gas development effects on the Chesapeake Bay. To date, many 
researchers have completed studies of various environmental 
effects, but a collective state-of-the science review of these 
studies has not been conducted. Without fully understanding the 
breadth of available scientific knowledge, the scientific community 
cannot adequately identify and prioritize future research needs. 
This workshop represents the first effort within the Chesapeake Bay 
Watershed to: 1) synthesize the collective research results available 
regarding shale gas development; and 2) identify the potential 
effects associated with shale gas development (e.g. water quality 
and quantity, land cover change) may pose to the Chesapeake 
Bay Watershed. 
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Pless, J., 2012, Natural Gas Development and Hydraulic 
Fracturing: A Policymaker’s Guide, National Conference 
of State Legislatures. Available at: http://www.ncsl.org/
documents/energy/frackingguide_060512.pdf
Overview
In recent years, technological advances in hydraulic fracturing 
and horizontal drilling have led to dramatic growth in natural gas 
development, with tremendous economic potential for state and 
local economies. Development currently is occurring in 32 states. 
Although hydraulic fracturing has been employed for decades, 
its use has rapidly increased in the past few years, and some 
states are taking steps to ensure that water and air quality are 
adequately protected during surface and subsurface natural gas 
development activities. This report provides an introduction to the 
domestic natural gas picture, explores the motivation behind state 
legislative involvement in natural gas regulation, and summarizes 
state legislation that is being developed to ensure safe, responsible 
development of this resource.
Murphy, S. & Ramudo, A., 2010, Hydraulic Fracturing – Effects 
on Water Quality, Cornell University, City and Regional 
Planning, CRP 5072. Available at: http://www.cce.cornell.edu/
EnergyClimateChange/NaturalGasDev/Documents/City%20
and%20Regional%20Planning%20Student%20Papers/
CRP5072_Water%20Quality%20Final%20Report.pdf 
Overview
Hydraulic fracturing development has the potential to impact the 
quality and quantity of water supply through land disturbance, 
toxic chemical usage near ground water supplies, disruption 
of groundwater flow pathways, increased water consumption, 
waste generation, release of methane pockets and other possible 
negative risks. The overall goal of this project is to identify the 
potential threats to the groundwater and surface water supplies in 
the New York State area. This report analyzes the costs associated 
with this process in order to determine what the future has in store 
for the feasibility of producing this natural gas. Finally, suggestions 
are offered regarding regulation for New York, implementations 
that should be set in place, possible ways to avoid certain risks 
and overall conclusions on the process of high-volume slick water 
horizontal hydraulic fracturing in the State of New York.
Rahm, B.G., Riha, S.J., Yoxtheimer, D., Boyer, E., Davis, 
K. & Belmecheri, S., 2012, Environmental Water and Air 
Quality Issues Associated with Shale Gas Development in 
the Northeast. Available at: http://www.marcellus.psu.edu/
research/pdf/ChangingEnvironment.pdf 
Overview
Development of Marcellus Shale for natural gas resources involves a 
variety of activities that can potentially impact environmental water 
and air quality. Some of these impacts are straightforward, while 
others involve more complicated relationships and/or could result 
from cumulative effects of multiple development activities over 
time and space. Through a review of research and experience in 
the Marcellus Shale region and elsewhere, the environmental water 
and air quality working group has identified potential environmental 
impacts and relates them to natural gas development activity. 
This study attempts to illustrate the state of scientific knowledge 
of these impacts, their causes and strategies for preventing and 
mitigating negative environmental consequences by providing a 
sample of annotated references and scientific literature. This report 
also identifies broad areas of particular research need, including 
interdisciplinary research (e.g. economics, sociology, governance) 
that could help stakeholders better understand environmental risk 
and define effective management strategies. 
Gregory, K.B., Vidic, R.D. & Dzombak, D.A., 2011, “Water 
Management Challenges Associated with the Production 
of Shale Gas by Hydraulic Fracturing,” Elements Journal, 
7, 181–186. Available at: http://wp.cedha.net/wp-content/
uploads/2012/11/Water-Management-Challenges-Associated-
with-the-Production-of-Shale-Gas-by-Hydraulic-Fracturing.
pdf
Overview
Development of unconventional, onshore natural gas resources 
in deep shale formations are rapidly expanding to meet global 
energy needs. Water management has emerged as a critical issue 
in the development of these inland gas reservoirs, where hydraulic 
fracturing is used to liberate the gas. Following hydraulic fracturing, 
large volumes of water containing very high concentrations of total 
dissolved solids (TDS) return to the surface. The TDS concentration 
in this wastewater, also known as “flowback,” can reach five times 
that of seawater. Wastewaters that contain high TDS levels are 
challenging and costly to treat. Economical production of shale 
gas resources will require creative management of flowback to 
ensure protection of groundwater and surface water resources. 
Currently, deep-well injection is the primary means of management. 
However, in many areas where shale gas production will be 
abundant, deep-well injection sites are not available. With global 
concerns over the quality and quantity of freshwater, novel water 
management strategies and treatment technologies that will enable 
environmentally sustainable and economically feasible natural 
gas extraction will be critical for the development of this vast 
energy source.
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Glassman, D., Wucker, M, Isaacman, T. & Champilou, C., 
2011, The Water-Energy Nexus: Adding Water to the Energy 
Agenda, World Policy Institute Paper. Available at: http://www.
worldpolicy.org/sites/default/files/policy_papers/THE%20
WATER-ENERGY%20NEXUS_0.pdf
Overview
The competition between water and energy needs represents 
a critical business, security and environmental issue, but has 
not yet received the attention that it merits. Energy production 
consumes significant amounts of water; providing water, in turn, 
consumes energy. In a world where water scarcity is a major 
and growing challenge, meeting future energy needs depends 
on water availability and meeting water needs depends on wise 
energy policy decisions. As it pertains to natural gas, hydraulic 
fracturing has proven to be a game changer that could alter the 
entire energy mix of transportation fuels and electricity generation. 
The main water issue here involves pollution; however, additional 
research is needed on consumption, particularly in order to reflect 
substantial changes in the technology and its application to oil. 
Current data indicates that natural gas produced by hydraulic 
fracturing consumes seven times more water than conventional gas 
extraction but roughly the same amount of water as conventional 
oil drilling.
Natural gas liquefaction and maritime 
trade
Goncalves, C., 2013, North American LNG Exports: How 
Disruptive For How Long? 17th International Conference 
and Exhibition on Liquefied Natural Gas, Houston, Texas, 
April 1, 2013. Available at: http://www.gastechnology.org/
Training/Documents/LNG17-proceedings/06_07-Christopher-
Goncalves-Presentation.pdf
Overview
North American natural gas fundamentals and LNG exports 
confront the LNG industry with disruptive changes that create 
considerable uncertainties, risks and opportunities for LNG 
buyers, sellers, traders, investors and lenders. This study 
analyzes the impact and implications of North American natural 
gas fundamentals on North American LNG exports and global 
LNG markets and transactions. Such an analysis is conducted in 
order to provide conclusions regarding the implications for LNG 
investments, contracts, flexibility and trading. 
Ditzel, K., Plewes, J. & Broxson, B., 2013, US Manufacturing 
and LNG Exports: Economic Contributions to the US Economy 
and Impacts on US Natural Gas Prices, prepared for the 
Dow Chemical Company. Available at: http://www.crai.com/
uploadedFiles/Publications/CRA_LNG_Study_Feb2013.pdf 
Overview
A manufacturing renaissance is under way in the United States, 
and it is being driven by a favorable natural gas price environ-
ment not seen for over a decade. Since 2010, there have been 
announcements of more than 95 major capital investments in the 
gas-intensive manufacturing sector representing more than US$90 
billion in new spending and hundreds of thousands of new jobs all 
related to US domestic natural gas price advantage. The low gas 
prices are also sparking interest in large-scale LNG exports to higher- 
priced markets, such as Europe and Asia. While high volumes of 
LNG exports would increase profits to some participants in the oil 
and gas sector, the resulting increase in domestic gas prices may 
disrupt the growth in domestic manufacturing, natural gas vehicles 
and electricity generators. Consequently, the United States is faced 
with a critical policy decision: how to balance demand for LNG 
exports versus realization of domestic value added opportunities. 
To better understand the impacts of LNG exports, it is necessary 
to examine the importance of natural gas-intensive manufacturing 
to the US economy and how LNG exports could impact growth of 
other major demand sectors. This is especially important in light of 
the recently released NERA Report that finds LNG exports to be 
favorable to the economy along with recent comments submitted 
to the Department of Energy supporting unconstrained exports of 
our domestic natural gas resource. This report examines the major 
premises supporting unconstrained exports of LNG and shows 
that many of them are built upon false assumptions. Furthermore, 
this study finds that the manufacturing sector contributes more 
to the economy and is sensitive to the natural gas prices that will 
rise in an unconstrained LNG export scenario due to high global 
LNG demand and a non-flat domestic natural gas supply curve.
Ernst & Young, 2013, Global LNG: Will new demand and 
new supply mean new pricing? Oil and Gas Division. 
Available at: http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/
Global_LNG_New_pricing_ahead/$FILE/Global_LNG_New_
pricing_ahead_DW0240.pdf 
Overview
A massive amount of new LNG capacity has been proposed – as 
much as 350 million (metric) tons per year – which, if all were 
built, would more than double current capacity by 2025. Even with 
reasonably strong demand growth, this implies growing supply-
side competition and upward pressures on development costs and 
downward pressures on natural gas prices. Nevertheless, the very 
positive longer term outlook for natural gas is driving investment 
decisions, both in terms of buyers’ willingness to sign long-term 
contracts and sellers’ willingness to commit capital to develop the 
international risk governance council Risk Governance Guidelines for Unconventional Gas Development
P 82
needed projects. LNG demand growth is front-loaded, but in the 
wake of a capacity surge over the last few years, capacity growth 
is now back-loaded. What is being realized is a post-Fukushima 
squeeze, as well as a slowdown in near-term capacity additions, 
pointing to relatively tight markets over the next few years. LNG 
development costs have been rising at a torrid pace, and with LNG 
demand shifting to new, more price-sensitive customers just as the 
supply side battles with rising costs and increasing competition, 
sellers must adapt. The supply/demand magnitudes and dynamics 
aside, the biggest potential impacts are on LNG pricing: namely, 
will oil-price linkages continue to dominate global LNG contract 
pricing, will there be room for spot gas price linkages, and will 
divergent regional gas prices show signs of convergence? Going 
forward over the medium to longer term, there will most likely be a 
gradual but partial migration away from oil-linked pricing to more 
spot or hub-based pricing. 
Sakmar, S., 2010, The Globalization and Environmental 
Sustainability of LNG: Is LNG a Fuel for the 21st Century? 
2010 World Energy Congress, Montréal, Canada, (Sept. 12–16, 
2010). Available at: http://www.worldenergy.org/documents/
congresspapers/120.pdf 
Overview
As the world enters the 21st century, policymakers around the 
world are grappling with issues related to energy security, energy 
poverty and an expected increase in future demand for all energy 
sources. At the same time, concerns about global climate change 
and reducing greenhouse gas emissions have also emerged as 
primary issues to be addressed as the world searches for a 
sustainable energy future. As a clean-burning fuel, many policy 
leaders have suggested that liquefied natural gas, LNG, can play 
an important role as the world struggles to meet growing energy 
demand using more environmentally sustainable fuels. Others 
claim that the safety and environmental impact, including life cycle 
emissions of LNG, may nullify any clean burning benefit LNG might 
otherwise provide. This paper analyzes whether LNG is a fuel for 
a sustainable energy future. 
ICF International, 2013, U.S. LNG Exports: Impacts on Energy 
Markets and the Economy, prepared for the American 
Petroleum Institute. Available at: http://www.api.org/~/media/
Files/Policy/LNG-Exports/API-LNG-Export-Report-by-ICF.pdf 
Overview
The main conclusion of this report is that LNG exports will have 
net gains to the economy, in terms of GDP and employment gains. 
LNG exports are expected to have net positive effects on US 
employment, with projected net job growth of between 73,100 
to 452,300 jobs on average between 2016 and 2035, including 
all economic multiplier effects. Manufacturing job gains average 
between 7,800 and 76,800 net jobs between 2016 and 2035, 
including 1,700–11,400 net job gains in the specific manufacturing 
sectors that include refining, petrochemicals and chemicals. In 
terms of per Bcfd in LNG exports, the study concludes that the 
net effect on US employment is expected to also be positive with 
net job growth of 25,000 to 54,000 average annual jobs per one 
Bcfd of LNG exports, including all economic multiplier effects. 
International Gas Union, 2011, World LNG Report 2011. 
Available at: http://www.igu.org/gas-knowhow/publications/
igu-publications/LNG%20Report%202011-web-7.pdf
Overview
LNG trade grew stronger than anticipated in 2011. Since 2006, five 
new countries started LNG exports and ten new markets began 
importing LNG. At the same time, the price differential between 
oil-linked, spot and Henry Hub prices for LNG has created new 
opportunities and challenges for the industry. Demand for LNG 
reached new heights in 2011, primarily due to sharp increase in 
demand from Japan in the wake of that country’s March 2011 
natural catastrophe and the ensuing nuclear disaster at the 
Fukushima nuclear power plant. Strong demand in the UK, China 
and India, augmented by increased volumes from emerging new 
markets, further tightened the world’s LNG market. Though the 
unconventional gas boom in the United States was thought to 
prove detrimental for an industry that had spent the previous 
decade building liquefaction capacity, growing demand elsewhere 
and high oil prices saw LNG prices reaching record highs.
Henderson, J., 2012, The Potential Impact of North American 
LNG Exports, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Available 
at: http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/
uploads/2012/10/NG-68.pdf
Overview
Expectations that the world’s three major regional gas markets 
would become ever more closely linked via flexible LNG supply 
were put “on hold” with the emergence of the US shale phenomenon 
from circa 2008 onwards as North America, requiring minimal 
LNG imports, effectively de-linked from the rest of the gas world. 
At present the divergence in price between the US Henry Hub, 
European hub or oil-indexed prices and Asian LNG JCC contract 
prices has never been so marked. However, just as “nature abhors 
a vacuum,” trade and arbitrage dynamics will inevitably seek to 
exploit such price differences and, in doing so, reduce them. 
Beyond 2015, new sources of LNG supply from Australia, North 
America and East Africa will accelerate such arbitrage activity, 
although the scale and timing of these new “waves” of LNG are 
subject to considerable uncertainty. 
Risk Governance Guidelines for Unconventional Gas Development international risk governance council
P 83
Electric generation and transportation
Aspen Environmental Group, 2010, Implications of Greater 
Reliance on Natural Gas for Electricity Generation, prepared 
for the American Public Power Association. Available at: 
http://www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/ImplicationsOfGreater 
RelianceOnNGforElectricityGeneration.pdf
Overview
This report examines the impacts on natural gas and deliveries 
to electric utilities should the rules limiting utility emissions of 
carbon or other pollutants result in a shift away from coal towards 
using more natural gas to generate electricity. The report begins 
with a review of the natural gas industry for those who are less 
familiar with it. It then covers demand, supply, transmission and 
storage infrastructure, and operational changes that will need to 
be made by units switching from coal to gas. It then examines 
the economics of switches from coal to gas. An understanding 
of these issues is needed if the electricity industry should need 
substantially more gas than several studies have suggested. If 
substantially more gas is needed, then a number of changes 
will need to be made by both the gas and electricity industries: 
changes such as massive infrastructure additions, changes to 
nominating and balancing services, changes to curtailment rules, 
and changes to subscription levels on interstate pipelines, for 
starters. The ultimate purpose of the study is to identify those 
implications so that policymakers can take them into account in 
deciding what regulations to adopt, and utilities can take them 
into account in making selections about what resources to use in 
providing electricity to their customers.
Knittel, C.R., 2012, Leveling the Playing Field for Natural Gas 
in Transportation, Brookings, The Hamilton Project. Available 
at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/06/13-
transportation-knittel
Overview
Technological advances in horizontal drilling deep underground 
have led to large-scale discoveries of natural gas reserves that are 
now economical to access. This, along with increases in oil prices, 
has fundamentally changed the relative price of oil and natural gas 
in the United States. As of December 2011, oil was trading at a 500 
percent premium over natural gas. This ratio has increased over the 
past few months. The discovery of large, economically accessible 
natural gas reserves has the potential to aid in a number of policy 
goals related to energy. Natural gas can replace oil in transportation 
through a number of channels. However, the field between natural 
gas as a transportation fuel and petroleum-based fuels is not level. 
Given this uneven playing field, left to its own devices, the market 
is unlikely to lead to an efficient mix of petroleum- and natural 
gas-based fuels. This paper presents a pair of policy proposals 
designed to increase the nation’s energy security, decrease the 
susceptibility of the US economy to recessions caused by oil-
price shocks, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions and other 
pollutants. First, this study proposes improving the natural gas 
fueling infrastructure in homes, at local distribution companies, and 
along long-haul trucking routes. Second, this study offers steps to 
promote the use of natural gas vehicles and fuels.
Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2012, Natural Gas 
Use in the Transportation Sector, University of Texas Energy 
Institute and the Energy Management and Innovation Center.
Overview
Natural gas is the most flexible of the three primary fossil fuels (coal, 
petroleum, natural gas) used in the United States and accounted 
for 25 percent of the total energy consumed nationwide in 2009. 
In spite of the major roles that natural gas plays in electricity 
generation as well as in the residential, commercial and industrial 
sectors, it is not commonly used for transportation. In total, the US 
transportation sector used 27.51 quadrillion Btus of energy in 2010, 
of which 25.65 quadrillion Btus came from petroleum and just 0.68 
quadrillion Btus came from natural gas (93 percent and 3 percent 
of the sector, respectively). Natural gas used in the transportation 
sector resulted in the emission of around 34.5 million metric tons 
of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) in 2009. A variety of vehicle 
technologies available today allows natural gas to be used in light-, 
medium-, and heavy-duty vehicles. Most commonly, natural gas 
is used in a highly pressurized form as compressed natural gas 
(CNG) or as liquefied natural gas (LNG). While CNG and LNG are 
ultimately combusted in the vehicle, it can also power vehicles in 
other ways. It can be converted into liquid fuel that can be used 
in conventional vehicles, power fuel cell vehicles or be used in the 
production of electricity for electric vehicles. Despite the existence 
of these technologies, only about 117,000 of the more than 250 
million vehicles on the road in 2010 (about .05%), were powered 
directly by natural gas (not including electric vehicles). Of these, 
the majority of natural gas vehicles are buses and trucks. The 
recent relative cost differential between natural gas and oil as a 
fuel source, however, has increased interest in expanding the use 
of natural gas beyond just buses and trucks thus representing a 
much broader market opportunity.
Kaplan, S.M., 2010, Displacing Coal with Generation from Existing 
Natural Gas-Fired Power Plants, Congressional Research 
Service. Available at: http://fairbankspipelinecompany.com/
pdf/Displacing_Coal_with_Gas.pdf 
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Overview
Reducing carbon dioxide emissions from coal plants is a focus 
of many proposals for cutting greenhouse gas emissions. One 
option is to replace some coal power with natural gas generation 
by increasing the power output from currently underutilized natural 
gas plants. This report provides an overview of the issues involved 
in displacing coal-fired generation with electricity from existing 
natural gas plants. This is a complex subject and the report does 
not seek to provide definitive answers. The report aims to highlight 
the key issues that Congress may want to consider in deciding 
whether to rely on, and encourage, displacement of coal-fired 
electricity with power from existing natural gas plants. The report 
finds that the potential for displacing coal by making greater use 
of existing gas-fired power plants depends on numerous factors. 
Certain factors include: 1) the amount of excess natural gas-fired 
generating capacity available; 2) the current operating patterns of 
coal and gas plants, and the amount of flexibility power system 
operators have for changing those patterns; 3) whether or not 
the transmission grid can deliver power from existing gas power 
plants to loads currently served by coal plants; and 4) whether 
there is sufficient natural gas supply, and pipeline and gas storage 
capacity, to deliver large amounts of additional fuel to gas-fired 
power plants. Finally, focusing on such factors also begs the 
question of the cost of a coal displacement by gas policy, and the 
impacts of such a policy on the economy, region and states that 
could change in the future as load grows. Therefore a full analysis 
of the potential for gas displacement of coal must take into account 
future conditions, not just a snapshot of the current situation.
Cowart, R., 2011, Interdependence of Electricity System 
Infrastructure and Natural Gas Infrastructure, memorandum 
from Electricity Advisory Committee to US Department of 
Energy. Available at: http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/
EAC%20-%20Interdependence%20of%20Electricity%20
System%20Infrastructure%20and%20Natural%20Gas%20
Infrastructure%20Oct%202011.pdf 
Overview
The US Energy Information Administration reported in its July 
5, 2011 publication, Today in Energy, that at the end of 2010, 
natural gas-fired generators constituted 39% of the nation’s total 
electric generation capacity. Almost 237 GW of natural gas-fired 
generation capacity came online between 2000 and 2010, equaling 
81% of the total amount of generation capacity added during that 
time period. Furthermore, according to EIA data, natural gas-fired 
generation’s share of US electricity generation during the past ten 
years has grown 44%. This study analyzes the necessary steps 
that must be taken in order to realize the Obama Administration’s 
energy goals and how best to catalyze the interdependence of 
the nation’s electric infrastructure and natural gas infrastructure 
in order to determine where greater reliability and efficiencies may 
be achieved. 
Shadhidehpour, J., Fu, Y. & Weidman, T., 2005, Impact of Natural 
Gas Infrastructure on Electric Power Systems, Proceedings 
of the IEEE 93(5), 1042–1056. 
Overview
The restructuring of electricity has introduced new risks associated 
with the security of natural gas infrastructure on a significantly large 
scale, which entails changes in physical capabilities of pipelines, 
operational procedures, sensors and communications, contracting 
(supply and transportation) and tariffs. This paper discusses 
the essence of the natural gas infrastructure for supplying the 
ever-increasing number of gas-powered units and uses security-
constrained unit commitment to analyze the short-time impact 
of natural gas prices on power generation scheduling. The paper 
analyzes the impact of natural gas infrastructure contingencies 
on the operation of electric power systems. Furthermore, the 
paper examines the impact of renewable sources of energy such 
as pumped-storage units and photovoltaic/battery systems on 
power system security by reducing the dependence of electricity 
infrastructure on the natural gas infrastructure. A modified IEEE 
118-bus with 12 combined-cycle units is presented for analyzing 
the gas/electric interdependency.
Logan, J., Heath, G., Macknick, J., Paranos, E., Boyd, W. & 
Carlson, K., 2012, Natural Gas and the Transformation of the 
U.S. Energy Sector: Electricity, Joint Institute for Strategic 
Energy Analysis, Technical Report NREL/TP-6A50-55538. 
Available at: http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/55538.pdf
Overview
Domestic natural gas production was largely stagnant from 
the mid-1970s until about 2005. Planning had been under way 
by the early 2000s to construct about 40 liquefied natural gas 
import terminals along the US coast to meet anticipated rising 
demand. However, beginning in the late 1990s, advances linking 
horizontal drilling techniques with hydraulic fracturing allowed 
drilling to proceed in shale and other formations at much lower 
cost. The result was a slow, steady increase in unconventional gas 
production. What remains unclear, however, is whether natural 
gas will continue to exert such a dramatic impact on the power 
sector and the overall US economy. If natural gas prices continue 
to stay at, or near, historically low levels, then a self-correction 
in the shale gas boom may occur. Due to price concerns, some 
companies have shifted away from drilling for dry gas and instead 
are focusing on plays that provide natural gas liquids. The ongoing 
debate is about what price is needed for unconventional natural 
gas production to be more sustainable over the medium term as 
it concerns electric power generation. 
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Marbek, 2010, Study of Opportunities for Natural Gas in 
the Transportation Sector, prepared for Natural Resources 
Canada. Available at: http://www.xebecinc.com/pdf/Marbek-
NGV-Final-Report-April-2010.pdf
Overview
This report provides an assessment of the potential use of 
natural gas as an alternative fuel across the transportation sector. 
This includes the on-road and off-road, marine, rail and indoor 
equipment sectors. The report has been prepared for the Fuels 
Policy and Programs (FPP) division of Natural Resources Canada 
(NRCan). The objectives of this study were: 1) to explore and 
analyze the potential for the use of natural gas in support of the 
Government of Canada’s policy objectives for the transportation 
sector; 2) to conduct a study that includes research and information 
gathering to inform the development of a Canadian strategy for the 
use of natural gas in the transportation sector; and 3) to identify 
and explore other potential future applications for natural gas in the 
Canadian context within the transportation sector. A preliminary 
assessment of previous, existing and future market and technology 
trends in North America and more specifically in Canada and 
consultation with natural gas vehicle (NGV) industry stakeholders 
showed that the more promising NGV market segments are likely to 
consist of the following: 1) heavy duty and medium duty, including 
line haul trucking (fleets); 2) return‐to‐base trucks; 3) transit buses; 
4) refuse trucks; and 5) light duty fleets. These segments were 
selected to be included in the study of financial, environmental 
and achievable potentials.
North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 2013, 2013 
Special Reliability Assessment: Accommodating an Increased 
Dependence on Natural Gas for Electric Power, Phase II: A 
Vulnerability and Scenario Assessment for the North American 
Bulk Power System. 
Overview
The combination of growth in natural gas demand within 
the electricity sector and its changing status among the gas 
consuming sectors continues to significantly increase the 
interdependencies between the gas and electricity industries. 
As a result, the interface between the two industries has become 
the focus of industry discussions and policy considerations. In its 
effort to maintain and improve the reliability of North America’s 
bulk power system (BPS), NERC examined this issue in detail 
and developed recommendations for the power industry. These 
recommendations will help improve existing coordination between 
the gas and electricity sectors and facilitate the reliable operation 
of the two industries. Addressing interdependence issues requires 
a coordinated approach for minimizing the risks and vulnerabilities 
on bulk power and gas systems. This report focuses on the electric 
industry’s dependence on natural gas and offers recommendations 
for reducing BPS exposure to increasing natural gas dependency 
risks. 
Gallagher, M., 2012, The Future of Natural Gas as a 
Transportation Fuel: Findings of the NPC Study, a presentation 
for the 2012 NGV conference, Schaumburg, IL, (Oct. 5, 2012). 
Available at: http://www.cleanvehicle.org/conference/2012/
NGVCS-Friday/GallagherNPCFutureTransportationFuelsStudy.
pdf
Overview
This study examines opportunities to accelerate future 
transportation fuels prospects for natural gas through 2050 for 
auto, truck, air, rail and waterborne transport. Addressing fuel 
demand, supply, infrastructure and technology includes analyzing 
certain factors related to energy efficiency, environmental issues 
such as carbon emissions, land impacts, and water impacts, as 
well as energy security concerns and efforts to improve economic 
competitiveness. 
Lee, A., Zinaman, O. & Logan, J., 2012, Opportunities for 
Synergy Between Natural Gas and Renewable Energy in 
the Electric Power and Transportation Sectors, National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory, Technical Report NREL/
TP-6A50-56324. Available at: http://www.nrel.gov/docs/
fy13osti/56324.pdf 
Overview
Use of both natural gas and renewable energy has grown 
significantly in recent years. Both forms of energy have been touted 
as key elements of a transition to a cleaner and more secure 
energy future, but much of the current discourse considers each in 
isolation or concentrates on the competitive impacts of one on the 
other. This paper attempts, instead, to explore potential synergies 
of natural gas and renewable energy in the US electric power 
and transportation sectors. The first section of this paper offers 
nine platforms for dialogue and partnership between the natural 
gas and renewable energy industries, including development of 
hybrid technologies, energy system-integration studies, analysis 
of future energy pathways and joint myth-busters initiatives. 
Section two provides a brief summary of recent developments in 
natural gas and renewable energy markets. It is intended mainly 
for non-experts in either energy category. Section three, on the 
electric power sector, discusses potential complementarities 
of natural gas and renewable energy from the perspective of 
electricity portfolio risk and also presents several current market 
design issues that could benefit from collaborative engagement. 
Finally, section four, on the transportation sector, highlights the 
technical and economic characteristics of an array of alternative 
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transportation technologies and fuels. Opportunities for natural gas 
and renewable energy transportation pathways are discussed, as 
are certain relevant transportation policies. 
Pipeline infrastructure, processing and 
storage
Yardley Associates, 2012, Gas Distribution Infrastructure: 
Pipeline Replacement and Upgrades, Cost Recovery Issues 
and Approaches, prepared for The American Gas Foundation. 
Available at: http://www.gasfoundation.org/ResearchStudies/
AGF-infrastructure-2012.htm
Overview
Natural gas local distribution companies (LDCs) and federal and 
state regulators are resolutely committed to the safe and reliable 
operation of natural gas transmission and distribution networks. 
This commitment is demonstrated by continuous improvements 
in critical LDC business processes including incident prevention, 
inspections and monitoring, and by replacement of network 
facilities subject to leaks or material failure. Facilities most likely to 
require replacement on a priority basis are pipe and other facilities 
constructed using unprotected steel and cast iron pipe, certain 
early vintage plastic pipe, pipe fittings and other infrastructure that 
is leak-prone. Approximately 9% of distribution mains services in 
the United States are constructed of materials that are considered 
leak-prone. At the current pace of replacement, it will take up 
to three decades or longer for many operators to replace this 
infrastructure. Investments in new technologies and advancements 
in system design, monitoring, control and maintenance methods 
provide additional opportunities to enhance the reliability and 
safety of gas distribution infrastructure.
Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2012, US Natural 
Gas Infrastructure, The University of Texas at Austin, Energy 
Management and Innovation Center.
Overview
The United States has the world’s most extensive infrastructure for 
transporting natural gas from production and importation sites to 
consumers all over the country. This transport infrastructure is made 
up of three main components: gathering pipelines, transmission 
pipelines and distribution pipelines. Though fundamentally similar 
in nature, each of these components is designed for a specific 
purpose, operating pressure and condition and length. This report 
examines the increasing demand for natural gas in the power, 
transportation and industrial sectors as well as in residential and 
commercial buildings and makes recommendations for methods 
to allow for significant system expansion to take advantage of 
potential greenhouse gas emission reductions, cost savings 
and energy security benefits, while at the same time minimizing 
methane leakage.
The INGAA Foundation, Inc., 2013, Building Interstate Natural 
Gas Transmission Pipelines: A Primer, INGAA Foundation 
Report 2013.01. Available at: http://www.ingaa.org/File.
aspx?id=19618
Overview
This primer was written to explain how interstate natural gas 
pipelines are constructed, from the planning stages to completion. 
It is designed to help the reader understand what is done during 
each step of construction, how it is done, the types of equipment 
used and the types of special practices employed in commonly 
found construction situations. It also describes practices and 
methods used to protect workers, ensure safe operation of 
equipment, respect landowner property, protect the environment 
and ensure safe installation of the pipeline and appurtenances. 
Interstate natural gas pipelines are the pipelines that transport 
natural gas across state lines. These pipelines typically carry 
significantly larger volumes than gathering lines (pipelines within 
a field that bring natural gas from production wells to a processing 
plant), intrastate pipelines (those that transport natural gas within 
a state) or distribution pipelines (those that provide gas to homes 
and businesses). Because this document focuses on interstate 
natural gas pipelines, the regulatory environment discussed largely 
is federal because federal agencies, including the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), among others, are the 
primary regulators of these pipelines. 
Peters, G., 2012, Gas and Electric Infrastructure 
Interdependency Analysis, prepared for the Midwest 
Independent Transmission System Operator. 
Overview
The Midwest and the Midcontinent Independent System Operator 
(MISO) region have become a crossroads in the North American 
natural gas market. There is an extensive network of over 25 
pipelines that transport natural gas from nearly all major supply 
basins in North America to and around the MISO region. However, 
natural gas flows in the MISO region have seen significant changes 
lately. Combined with shale gas developments nationwide, pipeline 
infrastructure projects have created a major paradigm shift and 
domino effect of altering traditional North American natural 
gas market flow patterns. For example, the traditional south to 
north pipeline capacity (Gulf and southwest gas) and north to 
south pipeline follows (Canadian gas) have been altered by the 
Rockies Express Pipeline (“REX”) and shale gas developments. 
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New pipeline infrastructure projects are concentrated in the 
expanding shale-rich oil, natural gas liquids (NGLs) and natural 
gas production areas throughout the United States and Canada. 
This layer of infrastructure is primarily providing access to local 
markets and interconnections through the interstate natural gas 
pipeline network. This trend will continue as new production 
opportunities develop in areas that have been overlooked for re-
work, undiscovered or become economical. In many of the most 
popular shale basins, prices and production are being pressured 
by a lack of pipeline capacity. “Take-away” capacity from the 
Permian basin shale region in west Texas is constrained as is the 
Eagle Ford shale region in south central Texas. The Marcellus 
shale region in the Northeast is highly constrained when it comes 
to moving natural gas liquids to market. The clear majority of all 
new gas pipeline projects are being driven by shale gas projects, 
as producers tap into oil and NGL-rich shale and work to remain 
financially viable in light of lower natural gas prices. 
Ware, T., 2010, Accurate Semi-Lagrangian Time Stepping For 
Gas Storage Problems, presentation at Fields Institute, Toronto, 
(Nov. 4, 2010). Available at: http://www.utstat.utoronto.ca/
sjaimung/Fields-MITACS-ASMF/10-11/TonyWare.pdf
Overview
This report analyzes the storage of natural gas using a semi-
Lagrangian approach that is fundamentally an approach to time 
discretization. As such, it can be combined with any desired 
discretization in the other dimensions. Additionally, second order 
accuracy can be achieved for certain kinds of stochastic optimal 
control problems. Although seasonality is not discussed, this 
dimension of natural gas storage can be incorporated without 
altering the format of the chosen equations, although care should 
be taken to limit the amount of time spent determining certain 
mathematic storage functions. Multifactor models are essential 
for any realistic storage valuation: unless the market model is rich 
enough to capture the variability of different calendar spreads, 
much of the value will be lost. Other challenges involve addressing 
some of the considerations faced by actual storage managers: 
such as determining the optimal policy when the storage facility 
is used as a partial hedge for existing risks.
Thompson, M., Davison, M. & Rasmussen, H., 2009, “Natural Gas 
Storage Valuation and Optimization: A Real Options Application,” 
Naval Research Logistics 56(3), 226–238. 
Overview
This paper presents an algorithm for the valuation and optimal 
operation of natural gas storage facilities. Real options theory 
is used to derive nonlinear partial-integro-differential equations 
(PIDEs) for the valuation and optimal operating strategies. The 
equations are designed to incorporate a wide class of spot 
price models that can exhibit the same time-dependent, mean-
reverting dynamics and price spikes as those observed in most 
energy markets. Particular attention is paid to the operational 
characteristics of real storage units, these characteristics include: 
working gas capacities, variable deliverability and injection rates 
and cycling limitations. This paper tries to illustrate a model with 
a numerical example of a salt cavern storage facility that clearly 
shows how a gas storage facility is like a financial straddle with 
both put and call properties. 
Gas Infrastructure Subgroup of the Resource & Supply 
Task Group, 2011, Natural Gas Infrastructure, National 
Petroleum Council. Available at: http://www.npc.org/
Prudent_Development-Topic_Papers/1-9_Natural_Gas_
Infrastructure_Paper.pdf
Overview
The US natural gas infrastructure system is comprised of a network 
of buried transmission, gathering and local distribution pipelines, 
natural gas processing, liquefied natural gas and storage facilities. 
Natural gas gathering and processing facilities are necessarily 
located close to sources of production. They gather gas from 
producing wells and remove water, volatile components and 
contaminants before the gas is fed into transmission pipelines, 
which transport natural gas from producing regions to consuming 
regions. Storage facilities are located in both production areas and 
near market areas, subject to geological limitations and market 
forces. This report provides an extensive overview of the natural 
gas infrastructure in the United States. 
Platts, 2012, The North American Gas Value Chain: 
Developments and Opportunities, Platts Price Group, Power, 
Oil and Petrochemical Divisions, Special Report. Available 
at: http://www.platts.com/IM.Platts.Content/InsightAnalysis/
IndustrySolutionPapers/GasValueChain.pdf
Overview
The exploration and proliferation of shale gas deposits in North 
America have changed the face of regional natural gas and natural 
gas liquids industries. The groundswell in domestic onshore 
supplies has reversed typical supply flows in the US, with shale 
plays such as the Marcellus and potentially the Utica opening up 
the possibility the US Northeast could become a net exporter of 
gas in a few years. The current paradigm shift that has positioned 
the US now as a potential net exporter of natural gas represents a 
complete reversal from the concerns a decade ago that spurred the 
construction of new liquefied natural gas import terminals along 
US coastlines. Many of those same terminals are now re-exporting 
and/or seeking licenses to export gas. US natural gas producers 
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now have the ability to bring more gas to the domestic market 
than the market can absorb. The shifting ground has extended 
further down the supply chain as well. Natural gas liquids margins, 
not natural gas itself, are driving development in US shale plays, 
and with natural gas prices at the Henry Hub benchmark at close 
to historic lows just below the US$3/MMBtu mark, these wet, 
or high Btu, plays should continue to drive production growth. 
Furthermore, the proliferation in liquids promises to shift the 
US petrochemical industry into a new “golden age,” as supply 
growth throughout the gas value chain promises plentiful feedstock 
supply for the downstream industry. As the crude-to-gas ratio 
and the fractionation spread between ethane and natural gas, or 
“frac spread” rose to record highs in late 2011, expansions and 
new construction projects, for olefin-producing steam crackers, 
primarily ethane-fed and ethylene producing, have progressed 
in the US at a rate of growth not seen for nearly three decades. 
Stakeholder engagement, public 
perceptions and regulatory oversight
43 CFR Part 3160, 2012, Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on 
Federal and Indian Lands, Department of Interior, Bureau of 
Land Management. 
Overview
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) oversees approximately 
700 million subsurface acres of federal mineral estate and 56 million 
subsurface acres of Indian mineral estate across the United States. 
Thus, BLM is moving forward with a proposed rulemaking in order 
to modernize its management of hydraulic fracturing operations by 
ensuring that those conducted on the public mineral estate follow 
certain best practices. These best practices include: 1) public 
disclosure of chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing operations 
on federal and Indian lands; 2) confirmation that wells used in 
fracturing operations meet appropriate construction standards; 
and 3) a requirement that operators put in place appropriate plans 
for managing flowback waters from fracturing operations.
Clark, C., Burnham, A., Harto, C. & Homer, R., 2012, Hydraulic 
Fracturing and Shale Gas Production: Technology, Impacts, 
and Policy, Argonne National Laboratory, Environmental Sci-
ence Division, ANL/EVS/R-12-5. Available at: http://www.afdc.
energy.gov/uploads/publication/anl_hydraulic_fracturing.pdf
Overview
Hydraulic fracturing is a key technique that has enabled the 
economic production of natural gas from shale deposits, or 
plays. The development of large-scale shale gas production is 
changing the US energy market, generating expanded interest in 
the usage of natural gas in sectors such as electricity generation 
and transportation. At the same time, there is much uncertainty of 
the environmental implications of hydraulic fracturing and the rapid 
expansion of natural gas production from shale plays. The goal of 
this white paper is to explain the technologies involved in shale 
gas production, the potential impacts of shale gas production, 
and the practices and policies currently being developed and 
implemented to mitigate these impacts. In terms of regulations on 
natural gas, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, specifically section 322, 
limits EPA’s authority on hydraulic fracturing issues by excluding 
from its regulatory authority under the Safe Drinking Water Act 
the underground injection of any fluid, other than diesel fuels, 
pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations. Several congressional 
efforts have been made to end this exemption, including H.R. 
1084, Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act 
of 2011, and S. 587, which is similarly titled. Meanwhile, other 
regulatory efforts have been under way on the federal, state and 
local levels. This paper attempts to illuminate current regulatory 
efforts at these various levels of government. 
Deloitte, 2012, Deloitte Survey – Public Opinions on Shale 
Gas Development: Positive Perceptions Meet Understandable 
Wariness. Available at: http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Energy_us_er/
us_er_ShaleSurveypaper_0412.PDF
Overview
The sudden rise in shale gas production, often in areas where 
residents are unfamiliar with energy exploration and production 
activity, has brought new public attention to and concern about 
shale gas extraction methods, and their impact on the communities 
where production is taking place. To look beyond the heated 
rhetoric on natural gas extraction that often dominates media 
coverage, the Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions commissioned 
a survey, polling Americans about their attitudes toward shale gas 
development in the US. The survey included samples of adults 
living in regions long accustomed to oil and gas production activity 
as well as adults living in states where energy production is a 
relatively new phenomenon. 
Brady, W.J., 2012, Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation in the 
United States: The Laissez-Faire Approach of the Federal 
Government and Varying State Regulations, University of 
Denver, Sturm College of Law. Available at: http://www.
law.du.edu/documents/faculty-highlights/Intersol-2012-
HydroFracking.pdf 
Overview
The United States contains vast amounts of oil and natural gas 
in shale formations. For decades, the US oil and gas industry 
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has employed the process of hydraulic fracturing to exploit these 
natural resources. The process raises significant concerns about 
air and groundwater pollution, which has led to a polarizing, often 
heated public debate that continues to this day, and will likely 
continue for the foreseeable future. Current US federal regulation 
of hydraulic fracturing, and oil and gas industry extraction 
operations, largely consists of a string of ad hoc exemptions and 
little oversight. The bulk of the regulatory responsibility is given to 
the states, and these regulations vary widely in their complexity 
and level of protection of human health and the environment. 
New research findings, proposed regulations, and allegations 
of groundwater contamination are released on an almost daily 
basis. With newly proposed federal regulations, studies being 
conducted by the states, the federal government, public interest 
NGOs and mounting pressure from environmental groups, the 
state of hydraulic fracturing regulation in the US is, quite literally, 
up in the air. This paper seeks to tie together the current regulatory 
environment concerning natural gas development in the US and 
makes future projections about how that environment might evolve 
in the future. 
Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2012, 
Those Aware of Fracking Favor Its Use: As Gas Prices Pinch, 
Support for Oil and Gas Production Grows, (Mar. 19). Available 
at: http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/3-19-12%20
Energy%20release.pdf 
Overview
At a time of rising gas prices, the public’s energy priorities have 
changed. More Americans continue to view the development of 
alternative energy sources as a higher priority than the increased 
production of oil, coal and natural gas, but the gap has narrowed 
considerably over the past year. Moreover, support for allowing 
more offshore oil and gas drilling in US waters, which plummeted 
during the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill, has recovered to pre-spill 
levels. Nearly 65% favor allowing increased offshore drilling, up 
from 57% a year ago and 44% in June 2010, during the Gulf 
spill. The latest national survey by the Pew Research Center for 
the People and the Press, conducted March 7–11, 2012, among 
1,503 adults, finds that 52% say the more important priority for 
addressing the nation’s energy supply is to develop alternative 
sources, such as wind, solar and hydrogen technology. On the 
other hand, 39% see expanding the exploration and production 
of oil, coal and natural gas as the greater priority. 
Brown E., Hartman, K. Borick, C., Rabe, B.G. & Ivacko, T., 
2013, The National Surveys on Energy and Environment, 
Public Opinion on Fracking: Perspectives from Michigan 
and Pennsylvania, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, 
University of Michigan. Available at: http://issuu.com/closup/
docs/nsee-fracking-fall-2012/1?e=1661894/2440099
Overview
This report presents the views of Michigan and Pennsylvania 
citizens on issues related to the extraction of natural gas through 
hydraulic fracturing, which is more commonly known as “fracking.” 
Hydraulic fracturing and new horizontal drilling techniques are 
creating significant opportunities to expand natural gas production 
across the United States. The absence of comprehensive federal 
legislation regarding hydraulic fracturing has placed the regulation 
of unconventional gas drilling primarily within the purview of state 
and local governments. This report examines public opinion in 
Michigan and Pennsylvania on a series of issues concerning the 
impact of fracking on the economy, environmental protection 
and information disclosure. Pennsylvania and Michigan have 
been selected as the focus of this report because they represent 
states with varied levels of hydraulic fracturing within their borders. 
Pennsylvania has emerged as one of the nation’s leaders in terms 
of the number of hydraulic fracturing sites with extensive drilling 
occurring in the commonwealth, and also has high levels of public 
debate and policy development related to this issue. Conversely, 
fracking has just begun to develop on a large scale within Michigan 
with corresponding public engagement around the matter in its 
early stages. These differences present a valuable opportunity to 
examine where the publics in these two states stand on an array 
of issues related to fracking. 
Willits, F.K., Braiser, K., Filteau, M.R., McLaughlin, D.K., 
Ooms, T., Tracewski, S. & Stedman, R.C., 2011, Pennsylvania 
Residents’ Perceptions of Natural Gas Development in the 
Marcellus Shale, Penn State University, Cornell University, 
and the Institute for Public Policy and Economic Development, 
http://energy.wilkes.edu/PDFFiles/Public%20Opinion/
respondentcharacter2.pdf
Overview
The presence of vast natural gas reserves in the region known 
as the Marcellus Shale has been known for decades. However, 
recent emphasis on domestic energy production, coupled with 
technological advancements that make the recovery of these 
deep natural gas reserves cost effective, have led to increasing 
interest and activity in developing these resources. Most of the 
counties within the region are rural in nature, and the potential 
impact of widespread gas development is profound. Large-scale 
energy development can bring increasing economic investments, 
jobs and population growth. At the same time, there are both 
environmental and social risks. The hydro-fracturing process 
used to free the embedded gas uses large quantities of water 
and requires treatment/disposal of flowback water. The drilling 
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process requires clearing land, often in forests or on farms, altering 
ecosystems, wildlife habitats and landscape amenities. The influx 
of new workers and residents may stress community services 
and infrastructure, shift community power structures, and alter 
community interactions, norms and values. Given these potential 
changes how do people living in the region view the natural 
gas industry developing in their area? To address this question, 
a household survey of residents in the Marcellus Shale area in 
Pennsylvania was conducted in winter of 2009–2010 to assess 
residents’ knowledge and perceptions of the Marcellus natural gas 
industry during the early stages of its development.
US Department of Energy, 2009, Modern Shale Gas 
Development in the United States: A Primer, Office of Fossil 
Energy, National Energy Technology Laboratory. Available at: 
http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-gas/publications/
epreports/shale_gas_primer_2009.pdf
Overview
The development and production of oil and gas in the US, including 
shale gas, are regulated under a complex set of federal, state and 
local laws that address every aspect of exploration and operation. 
All of the laws, regulations and permits that apply to conventional 
oil and gas exploration and production activities also apply to 
shale gas development. The US Environmental Protection Agency 
administers most of the federal laws, although development on 
federally owned land is managed primarily by the Bureau of Land 
Management and the US Forest Service. In addition, each state in 
which oil and gas is produced has one or more regulatory agencies 
that permit wells, including their design, location, spacing, 
operation and abandonment, as well as environmental activities 
and discharges, including water management and disposal, waste 
management and disposal, air emissions, underground injection, 
wildlife impacts, surface disturbance and worker health and 
safety. Many of the federal laws are implemented by the states 
under agreements and plans approved by the appropriate federal 
agencies.
Groat, C.G. & Grimshaw, T.W., 2012, Fact-Based Regulation 
for Environmental Protection in Shale Gas Development, 
The University of Texas at Austin, Energy Institute. Available 
at: http://barnettprogress.com/media/ei_shale_gas_
regulation120215.pdf 
Overview
Natural gas resources, and shale gas specifically, are essential 
to the energy security of the US and the world. Realization of the 
full benefit of this tremendous energy asset can only come about 
through resolution of controversies through effective policies and 
regulations. Fact-based regulation and policies based on sound 
science are essential for achieving the twin objectives of shale 
gas resource availability and protection of human health and the 
environment. The most rational path forward is to develop fact-
based regulations of shale gas development based on what is 
currently known about the issues and, at the same time, continue 
research where needed for information to support controls in the 
future. Additional or improved controls must not only respond 
to the issues of controversy, but also address the full scope 
of shale gas development. Priorities must be set on the most 
important issues as well as on public perceptions. The path 
ahead must take advantage of the substantial body of policies 
and regulations already in place for conventional oil and gas 
operations. Enforcement of current and future regulations must 
also be ensured to meet the twin objectives of protection of the 
environment and other resources and gaining public acceptance 
and support.
Further information
Clarke, C., Boudet, H. & Bugden, D., 2012, “Fracking” in the 
American Mind: Americans’ Views on Natural Gas Drilling Using 
Hydraulic Fracturing, George Mason University Center for Climate 
Change Communication and Yale Project on Climate Change 
Communication. Available at: http://climatechangecommunication.
org/sites/default/files/reports/Fracking_In_the_American_
Mind_2012.pdf
Ground Water Protection Council, 2009, State Oil and Natural 
Gas Regulations Designed to Protect Water Resources, US 
Department of Energy, National Energy Technology Laboratory. 
Available at: http://www.gwpc.org/sites/default/files/state_oil_
and_gas_regulations_designed_to_protect_water_resources_0.pdf
Wang, Z. & Krupnick, A.J., 2013, A Retrospective Review of Shale 
Gas Development in the United States: What Led to the Boom? 
Resources for the Future, RFF Discussion Paper 13-12. Available 
at: http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-13-12.pdf 
Krupnick, A., Gordon, H. & Olmstead, S., 2013, Pathways to 
Dialogue: What the Experts Say about the Environmental Risks 
of Shale Gas Development, Resources for the Future, RFF 
Report. Available at: http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-Rpt-
PathwaystoDialogue_FullReport.pdf
Resources For the Future, 2013, A Review of Shale Gas Regulations 
by State, Center for Energy Economics and Policy. Available at: 
http://www.rff.org/centers/energy_economics_and_policy/Pages/
Shale_Maps.aspx
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